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Environmental Studies

Toxic Trains: An Analysis of Disclosure in the April 11,1996 Montana Rail Link
Derailment and Mixed Chemical Spill at Alberton, Montana and Recommendations
for Improving the Community Right-to-Know
Chairman: William Chaloupka

On April 11, 1996 a Montana Rail Link train derailed just west of Alberton, Montana
releasing 64.8 tons o f chlorine, 17,000 gallons o f potassium cresylate and 85 pounds o f
sodium chlorate. The largest mixed chemical spill in U.S. railroad history, the Alberton
derailment created a suite o f health problems and unanswered questions which continue
to plague victims. This paper will describe how victims of the Alberton spill were
impacted negatively by a pattern o f non-disclosure by Montana Rail Link and
government officials regarding chemical exposure and resulting health effects.
Recommendations for enhancing the community right-to-know in the realm o f hazardous
materials transportation to foster accident prevention using a combination of legal,
political and community organizing tools will be presented.
Chapter 1 analyzes the events o f the Alberton derailment and mixed chemical spill,
from the April 11 beginning to the April 28 officially sanctioned re-entry into the spill
zone, for timely and thorough disclosure o f information to spill victims. Attention is
focused on the identification o f chemicals spilled, reactions between chemicals spilled,
and resulting short and long-term health effects.
Chapter 2 discusses how a lack o f disclosure prevented adequate testing to determine
the chemical content o f the spill and human exposure. Chapter 3 addresses how
incomplete disclosure prevented spill victims from acquiring proper medical diagnosis
and treatment o f their illnesses. Chapter 4 examines the aftermath of the incident when
the lead agency, Montana Department o f Environmental Quality, confronted ongoing
health problems and questions stemming from incomplete disclosure.
Chapter 5 outlines hazardous materials transportation law and regulation, identifying
opportunities for accident prevention by states and localities. Chapter 6 describes the
concept o f community right-to-know, its history, and current legal applications,
particularly the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act and the Risk
Management Program (§112(r)) o f the 1990 Clean Air Amendments. Finally, a case
study o f the Missoula County Local Emergency Planning Committee is presented in
Chapter 7 to examine how localities can increase disclosure o f risk from hazardous
materials transporters and use that information to prevent accidents.
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PREFACE
April 23,1996
Excerpt o f Letter to Mark Simonich, Director o f Montana Department of Environmental
Quality. From Gary Shockey o f Spence, Moriarity and Schuster, Attorneys at Law,
Jackson, W Y.' Emphasis added.
I believe the situation near Alberton presents a unique opportunity to minimize
the harmful effects o f uncertainty on the population,..Pcs I speak to individuals, it is
evident to me that they are experiencing significant uncertainty about their exposures. It
seems the only thing made certain the them as o f April 20, 1996, is that they have been
exposed to chlorine. That morning, Saturday, they were informed through newspaper
accounts o f the general nature o f other chemical agents tat they were probably exposed
to. While I am aware o f the daily meetings that have been conducted, it does not appear
that adequate information has been provided, or if provided, not in a format clearly
understandable.
I am writing to request immediate release of, and immediate access to, all
pertinent testing, monitoring and other data that has been generated with respect to the
identity o f and amounts o f chemicals involved in this matter. The people are entitled, as
soon as possible, to the opportunity resolve questions like: What was I exposed to? How
much o f it was I exposed to? How long was I exposed? How much was at my house or
nearby and fo r how long? What are the likely effects from a health standpoint? These
and scores o f other questions cannot even begin to be resolved without fu ll and total
disclosure o f the data immediately. If indeed the railroad has represented that discussions
o f “ settling up” may occur shortly after people are allowed to return, this underscores the
need for immediate disclosure o f all information. Individuals and families cannot be
expected to make informed, reasonable decisions about “settling up” without full
disclosure o f all pertinent facts for them to analyze.

Ill

‘Gerry Spence is well known for representing Karen Silkwood and other citizens harmed
by corporate toxic disasters.
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Introduction
On April 11, 1996 a Montana Rail Link train derailed just west o f Alberton, MT
spilling chlorine, potassium cresylate, sodium chlorate and setting off a chain of events
which today continue to plague residents. In the fall o f 1997 a runaway Montana Rail
Link (MRL) train was intentionally derailed yards from the interstate in Clinton,
Montana, just east o f Missoula. Fortunately, the chlorine and other hazardous materials
tanker cars on that train remained intact. As a result o f these and other accidents,
emergency responders, affected residents, and the general public grew increasingly
alarmed by the dangers presented by rail transport o f hazardous material.

Rail transportation o f hazardous materials: Recipe fo r disaster
Throughout the U.S. and the world, rail transportation of hazardous materials
creates the risk o f large-scale disasters. * The volume and scope o f hazardous materials
transported by rail has been steadily increasing, and with it the likelihood for disaster.
Rail traffic in the United States increased 40% between 1990 and 1997, while the
infrastructure was neither expanded nor adequately repaired, and railroad employee
numbers were reduced by corporate downsizing. Over six hundred railroads operate in
the U.S., only four are major. The railroads combined operate 173,000 miles of track, 1.2
million freight cars and employ more than 180,000 workers. In 1997, these railroads

' Few organizations have dedicated themselves solely to transportation risks. The Texasbased organization Rail watch (http://www.railwatch.org) is “dedicated to educating the
public about railroad safety” . Other enviroiunental and public interest organizations
advocate for public right-to-know, reduction o f rail accidents, and reduction o f toxics
transported by rail and other means.
1
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generated $33.1 billion. The railroads use more than 19,000 locomotives to pull freight
trains averaging 67 car loads. Trains are exceedingly difficult to stop once in motion, and
the result is a high frequency o f railroad accidents in the U.S.-one almost every hourand-a-half.^ The agencies regulating the railroad industry-the Federal Railroad
Administration’s Safety Program (FRA) and the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB)-have a combined budget of less than $65 million and fewer than 2,500
employees.^ In the face o f the gargantuan railroad industry FRA and NTSB are tasked
with regulating, prevention o f rail accidents is an underdeveloped focus o f the agencies’
work.
The frequency o f rail accidents is compounded by the seriousness o f the
incidents. Rail accidents carry a high likelihood o f fires and explosions that can have
grave consequences on public health and safety . The transport o f dangerous chemicals
further raises the probability o f serious impact on human health and the environment.
Train accidents account for nearly 80% o f chemical transportation accidents.** A train
derailment resulting in a hazardous chemical release and evacuation occurs
approximately every two weeks. ^ Train derailments are the second most frequent cause
of evacuations. The largest chemical accident evacuation, o f 225,000 people in

^ Steven Moss et al. 1998. Why Is There A Train Accident Every Ninety M inutesl M
Cubed.
"Id.
**Susan L. Cutter and John Tiefenbacher. 1989. Plume and Doom. American
Demographics 11(11):44-47.
^ Steven Moss et al. 1998. Why Is There A Train Accident Every Ninety Minutes'} M
Cubed.
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Mississauga, Canada—was caused by a train derailment.^ Each year, more than 10,000
people are evacuated from their homes and exposed to hazardous chemicals as a result of
train incidents in the U.S.’
O f the myriad chemicals transported by rail, chlorine causes the highest
percentage o f injury incidents. Releases of chlorine and ammonia are more likely to
result in evacuations than accidents involving other substances. Releases o f more than
one chemical are twice as likely as single chemical incidents to result in evacuations.®
Both chlorine and ammonia are in the top ten hazardous materials most commonly
shipped by rail.® Train accidents involving hazardous materials present high levels of
risk to the public health and safety because trains carry large volumes of hazardous
substances and can derail in rural, unprepared areas lacking response expertise and
resources.

While these types o f accidents occur less frequently than other types of

industrial accidents, “their consequences are more severe, resulting in any given occasion
in far greater number o f deaths and injuries, property damage and destruction, and social

®Sorenson, John H. 1987. Evacuations due to off-site releases from chemical accidents:
experience from 1980 to 1984. Journal o f Hazardous Materials 14:247-257.
’ National Safety Transportation Board statistics. Presented on Runaway Trains on the
Discovery Channel, 1997.
* Hall, Irene H, Gilbert S. Haugh, Patricia Price-Green, V. Ramana Dhara and Wendy E.
Kaye. 1996. Risk factors for hazardous substance releases that result in injuries and
evacuations: data from 9 States. American Journal o f Public Health 86(6)855-857.
’ Association o f America Railroads. 1995-1998. Annual Reports o f Hazardous Materials
Shipped by Rail.
See Tickner, J. and H. Gray. 1994. Accidents Do Happen: Toxic Chemical Accident
Pattern in the United States. Boston: National Environmental Law Center.
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and ecological disruptions,” " '^
In urban areas, the risks are enormous. By the late 1990s, each day nearly one
million tons o f hazardous chemicals were transported by highway and rail through the
metropolitan Chicago area.'^ Montana, Wyoming and Idaho, however, have the residents
at greatest risk from rail spills, despite low population densities.

Rural areas are

extremely vulnerable to chemical derailments and less equipped to respond adequately.
This leads to delayed containment o f the chemical release, increased contamination and,
as a result, increased risk to human health and safety.

Emergency responders and

medical personnel in rural areas tend to be less experienced in handling chemical
accidents. In both urban and rural areas, risk is increased further by the lack of
information provided by rail companies about the type, amount and frequency of
hazardous shipments. The seriousness o f a chemical accident is determined by the
chemicals involved, accident location, proximity to populations, and time o f occurrence
(day, week and season). Thus, “ [k]nowing where chemical accidents are likely to occur is
vital to disaster preparedness” as well as knowledge of what a train is likely to be

" E.L. Quarantelli. 1991. Disaster Planning for transportation accidents involving
hazardous materials. Journal o f Hazardous Materials 27:49-60.
" The costs o f the Montana Rail Link toxic spill in Alberton, MT were reported to be
$10,564,935 for the year o f the derailment. U.S. Department o f Transportation
Hazardous Materials Safety, Hazardous Materials Information System Summary for
1996.
" Hillel Gray and Allison LaPlante. 1998. Too Close to Home: Chemical Accident Risks
in the United States. U.S. PIRG and National Environmental Law Center.
Susan Cutter and Ji Minhe. 1997. The Professional Geographer 49(3):318-32.
Frederick J. Cowie.1992. Beyond Rural: The Montana Frontier Thesis (Emergency
Management in Extremely Rural-Frontier Areas). Montana Disaster and Emergency
Services. Helena, MT.
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carrying.** In the aftermath o f the 1996 Alberton derailment, spill victims requested
access to information that would improve accident prevention. They found that Montana
Rail Link was not eager to share information regarding risks with the public.

Montana Rail Link: On the wrong track fo r safety
Events in western Montana form an unfortunate microcosm o f the risks and
realities o f hazardous materials transport, and the lack o f information surrounding it, on a
national scope. Montana Rail Link (MRL) is a young railroad, incorporated in 1987,
which repeatedly falls near the bottom o f safety rankings for railroads in its size class. In
1995 and 1996, Montana Rail Link averaged o f 5.3 accidents each month along its 654.5
miles o f track, the second highest accident record for Class C railroads. The Federal
Railroad Administration noted that o f the railroads with the highest accident rates,
Montana Rail Link’s was deteriorating, not improving.*’
MRL’s atrocious safety ready was all too apparent to Montana residents. On the
day o f the Alberton derailment and toxic spill, Montana Rail Link derailed a second train
carrying hazardous materials near Noxon, MT, north o f Alberton. Missoula residents
were reminded o f the dangers presented by railroads the next summer when four fuel
tankers jum ped the track in the company’s rail yard in north Missoula.** On June 16,
1997, eleven cars o f a 36-car train derailed at East Missoula, spilling malt barley but.

** Susan L. Cutter and John Tiefenbacher. 1989. Plume and Doom. American
Demographics. 1 l(ll):44-47.
'^Federal Railway Administration, August 1997. http://www.fra.dot.gov.
** Missoulian. Rail cars carrying fuel jum p track. July 24, 1997.
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fortunately, none o f the fuel, fertilizer or sulfur that comprised the loads o f the remaining
derailed cars.*^
Missoula suffered its closest call on the night o f November 17, 1997 when a 107car Montana Rail Link train raced backwards towards Missoula at 50 mph, with no
engineers on board. Forty-nine cars derailed when railroad employees “intentionally
derailed” the train in Clinton, MT to prevent it from entering Missoula city limits. The
train’s brakes apparently had not been set at a stop in Drummond.^® Emergency officials
did not have enough time to prepare Missoula for evacuation, nor did they know what
hazardous materials were on the train until well after the intentional derailment. The
newspaper reported that “ [t]o the great relief o f everyone associated with the on-purpose
pile up, the mangled beast is not bleeding poison.”^' The next day, a representative of
Missoula City-County Health Department stated that there were no apparent leaks and
that “[w]e are extremely lucky. Extremely.”^^ Luck was about all that the lack of toxic
release and injury at Clinton could be ascribed to. A meeting between Montana Rail
Link, emergency responders and local and state officials was called to fact find and
discuss why communications between the railroad company and officials regarding train
contents and risk was so poor.^^
Other Montana cities were no less immune to Montana Rail Link’s derailments.
On July 20, 1999, in Billings, “a potentially catastrophic derailment o f two railroad
Missoulian. MRL derailments near Missoula. November 18, 1997.
Missoulian. Runaway derailed. November 18, 1997.
Missoulian. No leaks. November 19, 1997.
22 Id.
2^ This will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
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tanker cars transporting liquid propane gas forced the evacuation of several downtown
b l o c k s . T h e cars “inexplicably rolled” through the rail yard at 2:00 in the morning.
Three tank cars derailed, two carrying 36,000 gallons each of liquid propane and the
other carrying residue o f toluene. As in the Clinton derailment, an officially “empty” rail
car could have caused significant damage to human health and safety. Rail cars can be
categorized as empty when carrying only residual amounts. However, these “empty” rail
cars can harbor hundreds of gallons of toxic chemicals.^®
In the 1990s, derailments accounted for the largest category o f Montana Rail Link
train a c c id e n ts.M a n y of these derailments, including the toxic spill at Alberton, were
attributed to worn rails. Federal railroad inspectors conducted a special investigation of
Montana Rail Link following the April 11, 1996 Alberton derailment, “prompted by
several track caused derailments attributed to failed rails.

Between January 1, 1991

and December 31, 1995 the Federal Railroad Administration reported 28 track caused
derailments on MRL’s line. From January through April 1996, 21 additional MRL
derailments occurred.^* Track wear was detected, but apparently went uncorrected to
prevent future accidents. “During 1995 a total o f 553 defective rails were detected by
Sperry Rail Service detector cars.”^^ Rail wear has been blamed for the Alberton

Billings Gazette. Downtown derailed. July 21, 1999.
Missoulian. No leaks. November 19, 1997.
See Bozeman Chronicle, April 21, 1996 and Federal Railroad Administration web site.
John Cartwright, Federal Railroad Administration track specialist. 1996. Letter re:
D raft Rail Assessment o f Montana Rail Link line.
2* Id.
Id.
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derailment and railroad employees reported instances of extreme wear because it
presented increased likelihood o f derailment.^® Unfortunately for the people injured,
evacuated and killed by the Alberton derailment, MRL did not put public welfare above
profits. Rail wear and other problems went uncorrected as increasing volumes of
hazardous materials rumbled through communities.
Montana Rail Link’s abysmal safety record does not surprise those who have
monitored the company since its inception. The Great Northern railroad was cut west
through Montana in the late 1880s. Burlington Northern (BN) took over from Great
Northern and ran the tracks in Montana where “[t]he Continental Divide and other
mountain ranges demand the use o f helpers [additional engines] to move heavy tonnage
and state-of-the-art intermodal freight over steep passes.

Montana has been said to

draw “railfans from coast to coast each year to witness contemporary Western railroading
at its finest.
On November 1, 1987 Montana Rail Link assumed control o f 931 miles o f
Burlington Northern track, 300 o f which are branch lines. Burlington Northern retains
track rights for through trains and leases the main line to MRL. Montana Rail Link owns
the branch lines outright.

The formation o f MRL and buyout o f Burlington Northern did

not come without controversy and dissent. Burlington Northern employees organized and
resisted the buyout by non-union Montana Rail Link. The employees were unsuccessful
^ See depositions of Montana Rail Link employees, e.g. William W. Schutter, train
engineer, 1/27/98.
Rail/an and Railroad. 1990. The Montana Rail Link Story, Part 1.
" 'I d .

Id.
8
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and MRL’s actions fulfilled their worst expectations. MRL reduced train crews to two,
eliminated the use o f cabooses, lost numerous experienced Burlington Northern
employees and brought in railworkers from outside of M o n ta n a .T h e s e actions, coupled
with an overall reduction o f costs and increase in traffic, “turned the eyebrows o f other
regional carriers
The results o f downsizing a workforce while increasing shipments have been
documented at other railroads, most notably Union Pacific. Union Pacific increased its
shipments by sixty-seven per cent between 1985 and 1995. During the same decade.
Union Pacific also downsized its workforce by 4,200. The ratio o f worker to rail car
shipment doubled from 85:1 in 1985 to 170 rail car shipments per worker in 1995. The
increase in shipments and reduced work force resulted in worker complaints regarding
longer hours worked, exhaustion and hindered ability to ensure safety.^^ The national
increase in hazardous loads points to the necessity o f hard look at the impacts of
downsizing actions taken by companies like Union Pacific and Montana Rail Link.
Montana Rail Link’s corporate philosophy to reduce costs and increase business
created problems from the beginning. On October 31, 1987, the first night o f operation,
three engines were released from their train at Livingston, MT and hurtled full throttle up
Bozeman Pass at speeds reaching 80 mph. Once over the pass, the engines “tore through

See deposition and supporting documents of Robert Raney, former Burlington
Northern employee and union representative. 2/9/98. Deposition in the matter o f Schliep
V. MRL.
Railfan and Railroad. 1990. The Montana Rail Link Story.
Sanford hew is.1997. Ha::ardous Materials on the Rails: A Case Study o f Union Pacific
Railroad, the Nation's Largest Chemical Hauler. The Good Neighbor Project.
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the middle o f West End siding and burrowed down a 30-foot embankment, thoroughly
demolishing themselves in the process.”^’ Montana Rail Link’s record failed to improve
from its inauspicious start, leaving a wake o f derailments, chemical spills, ruined lives
and angry communities.

Right-to-Know: The missing piece
Understanding and improving upon railroad safety in western Montana has
proven a difficult task because federal law and policy regarding hazardous materials
transport is complex, and states, localities, and Indian tribes have only limited abilities to
regulate such transport. The problem is made more difficult because transporters are
exempt from all right-to-know laws, thereby preventing local governments and citizens
from obtaining information on the risks presented by hazardous materials transportation.
Thus, a community wishing to encourage transporters to practice accident prevention and
respond to local concerns must create mechanisms using legal, political, and community
organizing tools. The case study o f Montana Rail Link's Alberton derailment illustrates
why accident prevention and increased right-to-know is needed in the arena of hazmat
transportation. This paper describes how communities can gain access to information,
expand their right-to-know, improve emergency response preparation and, ultimately,
prevent rail accidents involving hazardous materials.
The right-to-know is a relatively new concept in U.S. law and policy. It is

Pacific Rail News. 1991. Mountain Country Regional.
10
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consistently resisted by industry.^* The right-to-know (or RTK) is a powerful tool that
provides citizens access to chemical process information previously kept secret by
private industry/^ despite its capacity for devastating impact on public health and the
environment. The disaster at Bhopal, India'*® provided the impetus for the first
community right-to-know legislation in the U.S.: Title III o f the 1986 Superfund
Amendments, the Emergency Planning and Conununity Right-to-Know Act.'** More
recently,1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act'*^ included Section 112(r), which outlines
a Risk Management Program requiring industrial facilities to make public information
concerning potential impacts o f onsite accidents to the surrounding community.
Transporters, however, are exempt from the community-right-to-know portions o f each
o f these and other relevant laws.
Right-to-know creates a feedback mechanism that industry would prefer did not
exist; that is, an informed public raises challenges and sets benchmarks of acceptable
risk. These demands are then passed along to lawmakers who may support the public
right-to-know by pressuring industry to share previously secret information and change

" See the legislative history for the Superfund law reauthorization and amendments.
Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility, Compensation and Liability Act. 42
U.S.C.A.§§9601-9675 as amended by SARA. (October 17, 1986).
^’Proprietary information (known as trade secrets) is protected under law. Industry
attempts to broaden this protection to avoid chemical and process reporting. The Toxic
Release Inventory (required by SARA (1986)) has forced companies to share non
proprietary information.
^U nion Carbide Corporation, a U.S. firm, released methyl isocyanate over the sleeping
city o f Bhopal, India killing over one thousand people and injuring thousands more. This
incident and others will be discussed in more detail in Chapter
Emergency Plarming and Community Right-to-Know Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §§11001-11050.
« 4 2 u s e . §7401 et seq.
11
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corporate practices in the interest of public health and safety. The RTK simply provides
access to that information which creates the impetus for people to push for accident
prevention because they view the risks as too large to bear. Thus, accident prevention, an
excellent method to achieve toxics release reduction and create changes in corporate
conduct, is directly informed and empowered by RTK. The right-to-know is an elegant
example o f the power o f information.
To be fully effective and most protective o f human health and the environment,
the concept o f right-to-know is crucial at every level o f decision making; before, during
and after a disaster. Inclusion and acceptance o f the right-to-know by official decision
makers is necessary to enable them to do the best job communicating with the affected
populace during an emergency. Principles o f disclosure and openness key to right-toknow can prevent many problems and misunderstandings from arising during an
emergency event; these problems may be a bureaucratic headache for officials but are
potentially life-threatening for disaster victims. The lack o f this underlying community
right-to-know philosophy was apparent during the Alberton derailment and aftermath.
This omission adversely impacted evacuees by denying them access to critical
information needed to make decisions based on health and safety about re-entiy into the
spill site during and after evacuation.
Thus, an overall adoption and acceptance of right-to-know principles by decision
makers would improve protection o f human health and the environment during incidents
and reduce accidents via accident prevention.

12
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Alberton: The reason fo r reform
A large human price is paid to allow companies to transport highly dangerous
chemicals by rail. When a spill occurs, unlucky residents o f track-side towns may lose
their health, jobs, financial security, and sense o f safety and well-being in their
community and homes.
After the spill at Alberton the affected community was treated patemalistically by
government and company officials. Information was not immediately or completely
shared with evacuated citizens and neither scientific uncertainty nor precautionary
policies were discussed with the community. Community demands for further testing and
assurances o f safety were rebuffed and marginalized. Basic democratic principles were
ignored, including the community right-to-know and participation in decision making.
Officials seemed to place assuring evacuees that all was basically well and under control
above their responsibility to ensure public health and safety. The Incident Command
System put in place to handle emergency situations was designed to handle technical
decisions but a gap exists in the area o f handling public concern and satisfying the
community right-to-know.
Evacuatees who reentered the area and their homes have stated that if they'd
known what they know now, after subsequent research and questioning, they never would
have entered the evacuated zone for pet rescues nor moved home when officials declared
it safe to return. The exclusion o f the affected citizenry catalyzed the formation of a
community group, first named Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE), later becoming the
Alberton Community Coalition for Environmental Health (ACCEH). This organization
13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

investigated the details of the toxic spill, response and remediation and pushed for
answers on behalf o f sickened and frustrated residents. They discovered a pattern of
disturbing actions and decisions by government officials; decisions which directly
contradicted evidence and paid little consideration to the community's right-to-know, the
precautionary principle, human health and the environment, or public safety.

Seeking solutions: Working towards accident prevention and increased right-to-know
The dangers inherent in transporting hazardous material by truck and rail are
faced by communities throughout the country and transporters’ track record is not good
Federal oversight o f transporters is limited by the sheer size of the industry and interstate
commerce law further protects transporters’ interests and shields them from public
scrutiny. Communities have limited jurisdiction as transportation is exempt from
portions o f existing laws regulating control o f toxic materials and involvement o f the
affected community.
Congressional studies of the situation found: ". ..that approximately 4 billion tons
o f regulated hazardous materials are transported each year...; [and] that accidents
involving the release o f hazardous materials are a serious threat to health and safety.

A

newspaper article several days after the Alberton derailment quoted Bill Reed, Missoula
Rural Fire Department chief discussing the transport o f dangerous materials through
Missoula. He said "[t]his stuff travels through Missoula all the time. .. [E]very train has

w Congressional findings for 1990 Amendments o f Hazardous Material Transportation
Uniform Safety Act (HMTUSA). Pub. L. 101-615, Sec. 2, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244.
14
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hazardous material." John Fitzpatrick, spokesman for the Federal Railroad Agency, told
the newspaper that “the general public has no way o f knowing what hazardous materials
are moving across Montana. ‘The railroad, and the railroad only, would know,' he
said.".'*^ In the same article, the contents o f the derailed Montana Rail Link tanker cars
were reported erroneously.
The risk presented by hazardous materials transport by rail, including nuclear
waste, is not disputed, but rather is not fully known. However, what little is known
evidences significant threats to human health and the environment. The Alberton
derailment illustrates not only what happens when risk is not known prior to a disaster,
but also when threats and critical information are inadequately disclosed during and after
the incident. The derailment at Clinton, MT reinforced how unprepared local responders
are to deal with a major rail disaster and how uncooperative the company is at sharing
information necessary to protect public health and safety. The lessons learned from the
Alberton and Clinton incidents differ, but each supports the need to improve
communication between the company, responders and the public.
Fortunately, there is much that can be done to ameliorate the existing threats from
hazardous materials transport. Local government and bodies such as the Local
Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)"^ have the power to improve community rightto-know and facilitate accident prevention. Citizen groups such as the Alberton

**Missoulian. Hazards routinely ride rails. April 12, 1996.
4) LEPC s were formed under EPCRA to devise emergency plans, coordinate emergency
response and convey information to the public. Their role will be explored further in
Chapters 6 and 7.
15
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Community Coalition for Environmental Health (ACCEH) have been and will continue
to be effective in pushing for reform and improvement in the area of hazardous material
transportation safety. Other groups around the country also provide examples o f how
better to protect our communities from these dangers.

Statement o f Purpose
The first half o f this paper focuses on right-to-know as a pivotal concept and
illustrate the problems its omission caused for Alberton evacuees during the evacuation
and aftermath. The temporal gap between officially known data and public disclosure of
those facts between the spill and re-entry—April 11-28, 1996—will be highlighted by
comparing inconsistencies in the timing o f information availability to decision makers
and the public."*® The paper will focus on several contentious issues that were either
belatedly or never addressed. The majority o f these revolve around very basic and critical
issues o f identity o f spilled chemicals, spilled materials’ reactions, possible health
effects, and contamination routes and pathways in humans and the environment.
The second half of this paper examines the right-to-know policy framework for a
locality such a Missoula County, Montana and recommends actions to reform hazardous
materials transportation, community right-to-know and accident prevention. The ease
with which accident prevention could move forward if transporters were not exempt
from right-to-know and if it were accepted and practiced by organizations, such as the

The public record for the Alberton derailment is located at the Missoula County
Courthouse in the Clerk and Recorder’s Office, Missoula, MT.
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Local Emergency Planning Committee, which work in this area is discussed as a matter
o f policy and specific recommendations. The resulting suite o f solutions and
recommendations provides Missoula, and other communities, with the information
needed to fully assess risk and identify tools to reduce risk. The ultimate goal is to
prevent accidents based on information obtained from increased right-to-know. Some
accidents, however, will occur, thus the corollary goal o f this paper is to show that
community right-to-know and full disclosure to victims must be an integral part of toxic
incident mitigation.

Disclosure Analysis and Methods
Information disclosure was analyzed using the public record for all information
which was available to decision makers and the public at the time o f the incident. Daily
minutes recorded from meetings o f the Health and Safety Technical Team, Incident
Command, and Evacuee Meetings were used to determine who knew what and when.
Media accounts, primarily the Missoulian newspaper, were also a major source of
information for evacuees and the public at large and thus were examined for content.
Officials failed in their duties and public protection by not disclosing information
to the public. These failures continued to plague victims and decision makers long after
the incident was declared over on April 28, 1996. For this analysis, the areas of non
disclosure are:
1) Lack o f timely public notification concerning the exact contents o f the spill
(particularly potassium cresylate) and initial toxic cloud, the potential for chemical
17
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reactions among spill components, the results o f such reactions and possible human
health effects.
2) The decision to allow evacuees to re-enter the affected area for “pet rescues” without
releasing information and data concerning potential risks and before disclosing the mixed
chemical nature o f the spill. Thus, the officials’ lack o f information translated into faulty
decisions which placed evacuees in danger without their informed consent based on
disclosure o f risk.
3) The decision to allow evacuees to permanently re-enter the affected area without full
disclosure o f possible risks, community input, or adequate data upon which to base such
a decision. Officials have since contradicted their assertions o f safety at the time of re
entry and acknowledged that additional risks may have been present.'^’In assembling this
chapter, the public record for the incident duration (April 11- April 28, 1996) were
consulted. The excerpts, presented as Appendix A, are a fraction o f the available
material. Excerpts were selected to highlight the following areas o f concern regarding
lack o f disclosure by government agencies and Montana Rail Link to the evacuated
residents: chemical composition o f spill, associated potential health effects, re-entry
decision making process and data, and discrepancies in information received and shared
by various stakeholders. The chronology o f events in Appendix A quotes (directly or via
media accounts or official meeting notes) evacuees and those who played pivotal roles in
the Alberton incident: government officials, company representatives and contractors,
For example, in an interview with documentary filmmaker Lisa Mosca, Tom Ellerhoff
o f Montana Department o f Environmental Quality acknowledged that evacuees could
have been exposed to chemicals other than chlorine in the initial toxic cloud.
18
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emergency responders and medical personnel.
A thorough review o f the record evidences many things done correctly and great
efforts taken to respond to the spill These efforts include, but are not limited to, the
technical expertise required to successfully unload chlorine tanker #3, countless hours
put in by members o f the Incident Command, responders, Montana Rail Link, and
volunteers who selflessly put themselves at risk for the public good; the chaotic and
terrifying nature o f such a disaster which places extreme pressure on decision makers to
normalize the situation; the enormity o f such a response effort for a semi-rural area
unpracticed in the management o f large scale incidents. However, these components,
while important, do not excuse or minimize critical mistakes or the resultant injuries.
Rather, scrutinizing the mistakes promotes learning from the mistakes to better
respond and serve public interests in similar situations. Unfortunately, there are other
toxic spills like that at Alberton and other flawed responses. Fortunately, there is a body
o f literature examining such incidents demonstrating commonly repeated mistakes, and
suggesting solutions and methods to prevent future mistakes. The reasons to avoid these
common mistakes in hazardous materials incidents are compelling: the injury wrought on
victims is incalculable; the costs increase as repetitive corrective actions are necessary to
remedy inappropriate responses; and the ill will and loss o f credibility government
agencies. Most important perhaps is the fact that most mistakes are discovered at great
cost and anguish to victims and great expense to all.

19
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Thus, the mistakes are emphasized and traced throughout this analysis o f incident
voices and information. Appendix A creates a narrative from which the reader can
understand what happened and what went wrong.

Sources Consulted
Evacuee Meeting Notes
Informational meetings for evacuees were held daily from April 12-27, 1996 in
various motel meeting rooms. These meetings were hosted by MRL. Incident Command
members presented the latest news, took questions, and occasionally had other experts on
hand to address the evacuees. Local interested citizens attended and asked questions as
well. Eventually, the question and answer period was eliminated or considerably
shortened at meetings and a facilitator brought in, due to the volume and content of
questions from evacuees and concerned citizens alike. The shutdown of the question and
answer period was attributed by Incident Command to local environmentalists’ questions
regarding chemical reactions and health effects caused by the spill. At one such meeting,
an evacuee publicly thanked a local environmental activist for providing information
which officials had not. This information was the foundation for increasing evacuee
demands for the full story and complete disclosure. Two sets o f meeting notes were
transcribed for the public record. All available notes were reviewed for this paper.
Technical Group Meeting Notes
The technical group was formed by MRL to address the offloading of chlorine
from the ruptured tanker and other chemicals, and any other technical questions return
20
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the site to 'normal'. It consisted o f representatives from MRL, Hulcher, American
Association o f Railroads, EmTech, Envirocon, Oxychem, and Georgia Pacific. The
Technical Group met on site at the forward command post, often several times per day
during the incident.
Incident Command Notes
The Incident Commander, Frenchtown Fire Chief Scott Waldron, and other
members o f Incident Command met daily to debrief and provide updates concerning each
area o f the IC's concerns, including health, safety, evacuation, communication with the
company and public. Members o f the Incident Command debriefed evacuees at the daily
meetings.
Media Accounts
The media was relied upon heavily during this incident as a means o f
disseminating information to the public. In particular, the local daily newspaper, the
Missoulian, was seen as a primary source o f information regarding the progression o f the
spill, information from incident command and the company, and status o f victims. The
newspaper was not immune to small town politics or pressures, however, and missed
numerous opportunities to investigate and report in the public interest. Still, media
accounts represent well the information that was available to the public at that time and
provide an excellent means for following the changing tides o f public sentiment and
tracing incident evolution.
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Chapter 1. Montana Rail Link^s Alberton Derailment and Mixed Chemical Spill:
April 11-April 28, 1996
The sound o f metal screeching went on and on...the impact made the house shake.
There was no air, and I realized I was in trouble and started backing up to the
main road, but I couldn't see through the fog, or breathe, and my eyes were
burning.'*^
At approximately 4:00 am on April 11, 1996, a 4,319 foot long, 5,551 ton, 71-car
Montana Rail Link train derailed two miles west o f Alberton, Montana immediately
south o f the Clark Fork R iv e r.E ig h te e n rail cars came o ff the tracks; six o f those cars
contained hazardous materials and three o f those released hazardous materials into the
environment.^ According to Montana Rail Link representatives, an estimated 64.8 tons
o f chlorine were released between April 11 and April 28, 1996. A 24-inch hole in the
side o f chlorine Tank Car #3 (ACFX 85824) resulted in the immediate release o f the
majority o f its load that morning, with smaller volumes escaping intermittently
throughout the next two weeks. Company representatives reported approximately 85
pounds o f dry sodium chlorate prills (pellets) were released from the railcar UNPX
120603, and tank car GATX 16194 released 17,000 gallons o f liquid potassium cresylate
on April 11, 1996, making the Alberton spill the largest mixed chemical rail accident in
U.S. history and the second largest chlorine release.^*
ACCEH, 1997. Account o f Sylvia Bookout, Alberton resident, o f the early morning
hours o f April 11, 1996
“^NTSB Preliminary Report, 1996
“ Olympus, 1996. Results of Environmental Monitoring Related to Train Derailment,
Alberton, Montana. 2 Volumes. Olympus Environmental, Inc. Report submitted to
Montana Rail Link, December 31, 1996.
URS, 1996. Sampling Activities/Trip Report, Revision 1, Alberton Train Derailment,
Alberton, Montana, TDD No.9604-0008. URS Operating Services, Inc. Consultants
report submitted to the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund
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The derailment occurred at mile post 154.60, approximately two miles west of the
town o f Alberton, in Mineral County, Montana (Section 33 o f T15N, R23W). The site is
located about 500 feet south o f interstate 90, roughly 200 feet south o f the Clark Fork
River and approximately 500 feet north o f Plateau Road.^^
The train engineers notified Montana Rail Link which in turn notified 911, setting
the response and evacuation into action. The local fire department, Frenchtown Rural
Fire Department, was first on the scene. Since the disaster was within its jurisdiction,
Frenchtown Fire Chief Scott Waldron was named Incident Commander. The local
Alberton Volunteer Department performed the initial evacuation of the town, despite a
dearth o f respirators and other protective equipment. Evacuees were directed to
Frenchtown High School where a temporary evacuation center was established for the
day.
Alberton, with a reported population o f 354” and average annual income of
$11,000, and the surrounding areas were evacuated firom approximately a four-mile
radius exclusion zone around the derailment. The evacuations were in effect from April
11, 1996 through April 28, 1996. An estimated 500 people were evacuated from the
exclusion zone. This zone included Interstate 90 and local roads, the Clark Fork River,
homes and the air space above the site.^

Technical Assessment and Response Team, Region Yin. July 18, 1996.
” Olympus, 1996a
” U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1990.
URS, 1996.
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Due to the size o f the chemical release, the largest mixed chemical release and
second largest chlorine release in U.S. rail history, the National Response Center (NRC)
was notified. By 8:00 am that morning, the NRC had in turn notified the National
Transportation Safety Board, Federal Railroad Agency, Environmental Protection
Agency, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and Federal Emergency
Management Agency. ”
Later that morning, the Department o f Military Affairs Disaster and Emergency
Services sent a memo to Montana hospital emergency departments "re: Chlorine Spill
emergency...Low level chlorine exposures produce headaches, nausea, vomiting,
coughing chest pain and breathing difficulties. " The memo provided numbers for clinical
toxicological assistance such as poison control centers.
Montana Governor Marc Racicot issued a state o f emergency declaration for
Mineral and Missoula Counties on April 11 in which chlorine is the only chemical
mentioned. However, a memorandum o f understanding between Missoula and Mineral
Counties dated April 12, 1996 begins by stating that "the derailment has resulted in the
release o f chlorine gas and other hazardous materials."^*

Routes o f Exposure and the Toxic Plume

National Response Center Incident Report, 4/11/96.
^ The Poison Center memo, state of emergency declaration and Memorandum of
Understanding between Missoula and Mineral Counties can be found in the
Administrative Record stored in the Clerk and Recorder’s Office at the Missoula County
Courthouse.
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Responders from a myriad o f agencies were misled about the actual content and
effect o f the spilled chemicals by Montana Rail Link for the first four days o f the
incident. During this time spill victims were not properly decontaminated or informed
about the potential components or levels o f their exposure. Some victims were allowed
reentry into the evacuated zone. Still other victims were never evacuated from
contaminated areas or not evacuated until days after the initial chemical release.
It may never be known what people were initially exposed to during the first few
hours o f the derailment because the correct testing was not done during that time to
determine the concentrations and kinds o f chemicals in the plume. However, some
fundamental facts are known from personal accounts o f evacuees.

The plume traveled

faster than the evacuation itself, and people were exposed as they woke up and tried to
get out o f town. Some people reported that when they opened their doors they could
smell something strange, while others said that when they opened their doors, they could
see a green cloud and couldn't breathe. Everyone complained o f immediate burning skin,
eyes, lungs, and throat when trying to evacuate. Some people complained o f burning
skin, especially around the ankles as they walked through the grass to get pets or go to
neighbors' houses. Many people were delayed in getting out while trying to contact 911
or other emergency services, which prolonged their exposure time. Some people were
told not to evacuate even though they were smelling the chemicals. Others had no choice

Compiled into a report by ACCEH and Linda King, Environmental Health Network
1997.
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but to drive through the toxic plume, while others had a hard time starting their cars due
to a lack o f oxygen.
No decontamination facilities or information were ever provided to the evacuees.
At the evacuation center at Frenchtown High School people were not told to remove
clothes, many were not given oxygen, and many were not told to wash their eyes or skin.
Even at the hospital, many people were not given oxygen or told to wash their eyes or
skin. In the hours after the evacuation, some people reported that their clothes were
sticking to their bodies and burning their skin.

Some exposure damage could have

been prevented if people had received even the minimal care prescribed by the Material
Safety Data Sheet for chlorine gas exposure. The trauma that victims of the chemical
spill underwent that first morning was soon complicated by unanswered questions
regarding the chemicals spilled, chemical reactions and resulting health effects. These
three areas o f incomplete disclosure to spill victims are the focus of the remainder of this
chapter.

Chemicals spilled: An Incomplete Story
Three chemical products were released during Montana Rail Link’s derailment,
and additional chlorine leaked sporadically throughout the evacuation period April 11April 28, 1996. As in any toxic event, information about the chemicals spilled forms the
foundation o f all decisions concerning victims’ health and safety, worker safety, scope
and duration o f evacuation, re-entry and clean-up. Due to the incompleteness of
« ACCEH and King, 1997.
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information available at Alberton, however, poor decisions were made that put public
health and safety at risk.. The following section presents the information that was
available regarding the health risks, decontamination and handling guidelines for the
three chemical products released. As carrier o f these hazardous chemicals, Montana Rail
Link had the responsibility to inform emergency responders, government officials and
spill victims o f the risks, impacts and safety procedures o f these chemicals.
Chlorine gas, heavier than air, billowed from the ripped tanker cars. Sodium
chlorate, in solid form, and potassium cresylate, a liquid, spilled on the ground adjacent
to the chlorine tankers. The potassium cresylate solution was emitted directly next to
chlorine tanker #3 which eventually emptied almost completely, and the potassium
cresylate pooled in a ditch alongside the tracks.
O f the three chemical products spilled, chlorine was the most familiar to victims,
officials, responders and medical personnel. The chlorine gas formed a low-hanging
cloud which presented the most immediate risk to health and safety. The continued focus
on chlorine and its initial effects, however, came at considerable cost to spill victims.
Long-term neurological and immunological effects o f chlorine exposure went
undisclosed. Information regarding the other chemicals and by-products of reactions with
chlorine and potential health effects was never disclosed, despite repeated requests and
evidence o f illness.
Information concerning the two non-chlorine chemical products was scarce for
victims and government officials during the period o f evacuation. The first Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) provided to evacuees for the potassium cresylate car was an
27
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MSDS for Sodium Hydroxide which is just one component of the potassium cresylate
mixture, a waste product o f petroleum processing. Additional information, however, was
in fact available and known to Montana Rail Link and their contractors (Envirocon and
Olympus) the day o f the derailment and soon after. Montana Rail Link's contractor
Olympus Environmental, Inc. included this detailed description o f the three chemical
products in their report released in June o f 1996:
Rail car ACFX 85824 released approximately 130,000 lbs. o f gaseous
chlorine which formed a cloud which migrated upriver from the site.
Rail Car GATX 1619 released approximately 17,000 gallons o f a
potassium cresylate solution on the derailment site within the MRL right
o f way. The potassium cresylate was a spent caustic cleaning solution
composed o f water (70-80%), potassium hydroxide (10-20%), potassium
cresylate (5-15%), ethyl mercaptan (0.1-0.5%), methyl mercaptan (0.10.5%), and butyl mercaptan (0.1-0.5%). Potassium cresylate is composed
o f a variety o f phenolic materials that generally boil above cresol range.
Rail Car UNPX 120603 released approximately 85 gallons o f sodium
chlorate in a solid, granular state. The spilled sodium chlorate formed a
small mound immediately adjacent to the rail car and was contained in an
area o f approximately 50 square feet, (emphasis added)

Chlorine: Immediate Threat with Long-Term Risks
Chlorine was first isolated in 1774 by Karl William Scheele o f Sweden. In the
early 1800s, Sir Humphrey Davy coined the name “chlorine” from the Greek 'chloros',
meaning greenish yellow. By 1825, the harmful health implications o f chlorine had been
recognized and information was published about an antidote for inhalations o f chlorine.
A series o f laboratory and field observations followed. Chlorine was used first by the
Germans on April 17, 1915 as a poison gas against enemy troops.

” T.E. Samda. 1922. The later effects o f gas poisoning. The Lancet: 857-859.
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Health Effects
A wide variety o f effects have been reported to be associated with acute and
chronic exposure to chlorine gas including; cough; conjunctivitis; fever; headache;
anorexia; nausea; vomiting; befuddled sensorium; pulmonary edema; anxiety and other
neuroses; anosmia; tuberculosis; nephritis; bronchitis; asthma; pneumonia; pleurisy;
meningitis; chronic tachycardia; neurocirculatory asthenia; chronic laryngitis; valvular
heart disease; keratitis; acne; dental caries; and pulmonary fibrosis.
Chlorine gas is an irritating toxic compound that can cause effects on the eyes,
upper respiratory system, lung, kidneys, liver, and the nervous system at high exposure
levels (greater than l.Oppm) and may be fatal at very high concentrations (greater than
60ppm)^‘.
Chlorine inhalation o f 4 hours or longer at concentrations as low as
0.5ppm does cause short-term (less than one day) changes in lung function
in humans. Longer-term effects are seen with higher concentrations and/or
longer exposure periods. The severity o f health effects increases as the
exposure concentration and exposure time increases. Other effects have
been noted in cases o f accidental exposures: anxiety, confusion, giddiness,
headache, and changes in blood enzyme levels and white blood cell count.
Effects on the liver and kidneys have also been noted following inhalation
exposure to chlorine gas.“
Symptoms and their correlated exposure levels include; itchy nose
(0.2ppm);dry throat, cough and difficulty breathing (l.Oppm); shortness of
breath, headache (above 1.3 ppm); intense choking, chest pain and
vomiting (above 30ppm).High gas concentrations cause burning, blisters.

“ National Academy o f Science. 1976.Chlorine and hydrogen chloride; Medical and
biologic effects of environmental pollutants, Washington, DC .Chapter 5; Ejfects o f
Chlorine and Hydrogen Chloride on Man and Animals.
Chlorine Institute, 1990.
Chlorine Institute,1990.
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reddening to the skin. Long term exposure effects include respiratory
effects and corrosion o f tooth enamel.
This description o f potential health effects from chlorine exposure is far more
detailed and thorough than any provided to Montana Rail Link spill victims. Long-term
effects o f chlorine were not fully disclosed, despite increasing evidence such effects were
occurring in spill victims. Victims were informed o f respiratory, dermal and ocular
impacts from chlorine exposure. Long-term and other system effects were not disclosed.
This lack o f information was compounded by the absence o f mapping to show levels of
exposure. Although chlorine plume modeling was provided to the EPA on the day of the
spill, victims were told that no plume modeling had been done. As a result, victims did
not know what chemicals they had been exposed to or at what levels. This prevented spill
victims and their medical providers from making informed diagnoses and treatment.^
Decontamination and First Aid
Proper decontamination procedures were not followed. The spill occurred in the
early morning hours o f April 11, 1996. Evacuees left homes enshrouded in the chemical
cloud; those who walked through grass reported burning skin on contact. Many victims
not already in the midst o f the cloud had to drive through it to reach safety. Evacuees
were told to assemble at Frenchtown High School where officials and emergency
volunteers met them. Upon arrival, evacuees were not told to remove their clothing or to
bathe. Many spill victims continued to wear the clothes they’d worn in the chemical
Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety. Information on Chlorine
Toxicity.
^ Implications o f improper and incomplete testing and non-disclosure o f results and the
impact on medical care will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.
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cloud. Chemical bums and rashes resulted and chemical odors emanated from victims at
the public meetings.
First aid for acute chlorine exposure is as follows:
Remove contaminated clothing; wash contaminated body parts with cool,
running water; call a physician as soon as possible; for those who may
have been 'exposed' but are not in immediate medical distress, obtain
pulmonary function test data and compare with baseline“
Avoid skin contact with victim. Flush affected area with lukewarm, gently
running water for at least 20 minutes. Under running water, remove
contaminated clothing.
Note: Obtain medical attention IMMEDIATELY for all serious
exposures.*^

Hazardous M aterial Handling Instructions: Information Existed, But Was Not Disclosed
Although chlorine is more familiar to responders and officials, information about
the other chemicals was carried on the train and held by Montana Rail Link for use in
preparation for such a chemical release. Hazardous Material Handling Instructions are
required to be on board any train carrying hazardous materials These instructions
provide guidelines for responding to any release o f the hazardous materials and tend to
be more specific than the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) which are obtained from
the chemical manufacturer. Information contained in the on board instructions should
have been made available to responders, the media and the public immediately following
the spill, as they provide specific information necessary for victims and responders to
comprehend the dangers o f exposure and appropriate treatment. Such detailed
Several days after the spill, Montana Rail Link provided money to evacuees to
purchase new clothes and supplies.
^ Chlorine Institute, 1993.
^7 Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety
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information was especially important in this situation for sodium chlorate and potassium
cresylate. These compounds were unfamiliar to responders, victims and the local medical
community charged with treating exposed patients.

Potassium Cresylate
According to the hazardous material handling instructions which should have
been carried on the derailed MRL train:
Potassium Cresylate (Cresylic sodium solutions containing sodium hydroxide)
Causes severe irritation and bums to skin and eyes. May cause blindness.
May be harmful or fatal if swallowed or inhaled. May be irritating to the
respiratory tract.
If ingested, potassium cresylate “may cause burning pain the mouth, throat
and abdomen along with coughing and constriction o f the throat, followed
by nausea, abdominal spasms, vomiting, hematemesis and diarrhea. May
also cause perforations o f the alimentary track, cardiovascular collapse,
coma and death. May cause harmful nervous system effects. May cause
liver and kidney damage.
Inhalation exposure “may cause symptoms similar to those listed under
ingestion.”^*
Potassium cresylate is a caustic, corrosive mixture derived from petroleum
refinery wastes and coal tar (cresol). It contains potassium or sodium hydroxide,
mercaptans (which contain sulfur), heavy metals, phenols, o, p, and m-cresols.
Potassium cresylate is used as a pesticide on the Western European market, while the
principal application in the United States and Japan is for resins. Cresylate can produce
heat if it comes in contact with water or air when moist. It can be carried in the air in
vapor form. It is considered an immediate hazard and a reactivity hazard which should be
Hazardous Material Handling Instructions for potassium cresylate.
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kept out o f low areas and human populations are advised to stay upwind.
Perhaps the most confounding thing about the potassium cresylate is that it is a
spent mixture. Since it is an oil refinery waste, no two batches are ever alike due to the
vagaries o f the industrial process. The mixture spilled in the Alberton derailment was
from the Tosco refinery in Washington state. Two Material Safety Data Sheets are on
record from Tosco. One lists the mixture as containing 20-40% potassium cresylate. The
other indicates that the mixture was 70-90% water, with only 5-15% potassium cresylate.
The result o f this confusion was that evacuees were informed that the mixture was
mostly water and, therefore, not harmful. On the contrary, the potassium cresylate
mixture contained a plethora o f extremely harmful substances, some o f which were not
disclosed until after evacuees had returned to homes likely exposed to potassium
cresylate vapors borne in the chemical cloud.^’
Health Effects
Health problems are severe in both acute and repeated exposure to potassium
cresylate. It is corrosive to the eyes, skin and mucous membranes on contact. Acute
exposure may cause damage to the liver, kidneys and central nervous system. It produces
burning in the mouth and throat, lesions in the mouth, esophagus and stomach,
abdominal pain, vomiting, bloody diarrhea, pallor, sweating, weakness, headaches,
dizziness, tinnitus, muscle weakness, dimness o f vision, ringing in the ears, mental

The chemical composition o f the cloud was either never tested beyond chlorine, or
those results have not been made public. It is extremely likely that potassium cresylate
and its reactants with the chlorine were airborne that morning and inhaled by victims.
This will be discussed further in proceeding sections.
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confusion, and mental disturbances. If cresol liquid or vapor contacts the eyes it may
cause extensive damage, blindness, and comeal or epithelial damage may be permanent.
If it contacts the skin, the skin becomes first red, then white with blister formation.
The MSDS section on health effects ends with this caveat: “Note: This material
has not been tested as a whole for all potential health effects. It may have other health
hazards related to its components.”’’ In addition to synergistic effects of the potassium
cresylate mixture itself, reactions between chlorine and potassium cresylate occurred at
Alberton creating another realm o f synergistic effects with undisclosed impacts on
human health.’^
Decontamination and First Aid
For skin contact: “Remove contaminated clothing immediately. Wash areas of
contact thoroughly with soap and water. Get immediate medical attention. Place
contaminated clothing in closed container for storage until discarded.”’^ If potassium
cresylate has made contact with eyes, eyes should be flushed “immediately with large
amounts o f water for at least 15 minutes. Eyelids should be held away from the eyeball to
ensure thorough rinsing. Get immediate medical attention.”’'*
Personnel working at the site of a spill should be directed to do the following:
“Caution should be exercised regarding personnel safety and exposure to the spilled
material. Do not touch or walk through spilled material...Prevent eye contact with this
’° Material Safety Data Sheet Number 2374. Tosco Refining Company.
” Material Safety Data Sheet Number 2374. Tosco Refining Company.
72 These reactions and effects will be discussed further in this chapter.
73 Material Safety Data Sheet Number 2374. Tosco Refining Company.
’Md.
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material. Wear chemical tight goggles and face shield. Provide an eyewash station
immediately accessible to the work area. Prevent skin contact. A safety deluge shower
should be located in the work area.”’*
Cresols: Another Dangerous Ingredient o f the Potassium Cresvlate Mixture
Cresols are the main component o f the potassium cresylate and are often used as
another name for it. Cresols occur in three forms: o-,m-, and p-cresol. According to the
ATSDR, urine samples can be tested for the presence o f cresols, although this test is not
routinely available in hospitals and clinics. The urine sample would have to be
taken within one day o f exposure to be valid. ATSDR notes that studies o f the
impacts o f inhaled cresols have not been “adequately detailed” but demonstrate
respiratory effects similar to chlorine;
When inhaled as a concentrated aerosol, o-cresol is a respiratory irritant in
humans.. .Following brief exposures to 6 mg/m*, 8 out o f 10 subjects
complained o f mucosal irritation symptoms including dryness, nasal
constriction, and throat irritation. . .An assortment o f respiratory effects,
including inflammation and irritation o f the upper respiratory tract,
pulmonary edema, and hemorrhage and perivascular sclerosis in the lungs
were seen in animals exposed to 9-50mg/m* of o-cresol 2-6 hours/day for
1 month or more.
Moreover, neurological and carcinogenic effects have been seen as a result of
cresol exposure, and ATSDR warns o f synergistic effects o f cresol with phenols, which
were also found at high levels at the derailment site:

’* Id. Workers were photographed on site with no protective gear. Protection seemed to
be based primarily on chlorine exposure risk. From the record, it appears that workers
were not directed to follow these precautions nor warned o f the health risks posed by
potassium cresylate.
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Neurological effects in animals acutely exposed to cresol aerosols have
been reported. The effects include mild nervous excitation, muscle
twitching accompanied by general fatigue, and clonic
convulsions...Corrosive damage to the skin has been reported in humans
dermally exposed to cresols. ..Results in a promotion study in mice
suggested that cresols can be cancer promoters. It is possible that they
would also promote the development o f tumors initiated by other
chemicals. Although no evidence is available, it is likely that cresols
would interact with phenols on the central nervous system to produce
convulsions and coma, and on the red blood cells to produce
methemoglobinemia.
None o f this information was made available to spill victims. Nor were
medical professionals informed o f spill victims’ exposure to the chemical
mixture, likely health effects, or potential for synergistic effects even
when symptoms similar to those described as due to potassium cresylate
appeared in spill victims.

Sodium Chlorate
Sodium chlorate is an odorless pale yellow to white crystalline solid used for making
herbicides, explosives, dyes, matches, inks, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, defoliants, paper
and leather. It is appreciably soluble in water and heavier, so may be expected to sink
and dissolve at a rapid rate. It is very flammable and combustible.’’
Sodium chlorate is the active ingredient in a variety of commercial herbicides and
is also used as a bleaching agent in pulp mills. Sodium chlorate comes in dust, spray and
granule form. There is a risk of fire and explosion in dry mixtures with other substances.
ATSDR. 1992.Toxicological Profile for Cresols: o-cresol, p-cresol, m-cresol; TP-91/11.
” Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
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especially organic material, including other herbicides, sulfur, powered metals, strong
acids, reducing agents and combustible materials.
Health Effects
Acute Sodium Chlorate exposure can cause abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting,
diarrhea and shortness o f breath. It can also affect the blood cells and cause kidney
damage.’*
Decontamination and First Aid
Appropriate chemical protective gloves, boots and goggles should be worn. Wash
away any material which may have contacted the body with copious amounts o f water or
soap and water. If contact occurs, move victim to fresh air, call emergency medical care.
Remove and isolate contaminated clothing and shoes at the site. In case o f contact with
material, immediately flush skin or eyes with running water for at least 15 minutes.’®

Agency response and company control
Due to the scale of the release, forty-three federal, state and local agencies
mobilized to the scene to assist in evacuation and assessment. In addition, Montana Rail
Link requested technical assistance from various industry groups and representatives,
particularly those with expertise in handling chlorine.
Federal agencies involved in the derailment response included the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), the National Forest Service, The USGS, and the EPA. Local
agencies included the Frenchtown Fire Department whose Chief served as
’* Id.
’®Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry.
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the incident commander (IC), state and county officials. The Missoula
Hazardous Materials Team (HAZMAT) provided emergency rescue and
medical support during the hazardous materials transfer and other
exclusion zone activities. Montana Rail Link assembled an on-site
technical team consisting of personnel from EmTech, Huelcher,
Envirocon, Dow, Georgia Pacific. Oxychem and the American Railroads
Association who met daily with the EPA CSC to develop and review
response procedures and progress.*”

Local, state and federal response to this largest mixed chemical spill in U.S.
railroad history was impressive. The agencies notified early that morning by the National
Response Center monitored the progress and most sent representatives immediately to
the scene. The EPA, NTSB, FRA, National Forest Service, U.S. Coast Guard had
personnel on scene during the incident. The EPA and ATSDR emerged as the de facto
lead federal agencies with the duty to protect health and human safety in the public’s
mind: EPA during the incident and ATSDR after April 28.

EPA: Missing in Action
The Environmental Protection Agency described its involvement this way:
On April 11, 1996, the Region VDI EPA was notified o f the derailment in
Alberton and mobilized two On Scene Coordinators (OSCs) to the site.
The EPA then mobilized URS Operating Services (UOS) Superfund
Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) personnel and the
U S Coast Guard (USCG) Pacific Strike Team. An EPA toxicologist and a
single OSC mobilized to the site on April 14, 1996, to replace the original
two OSCs...From April 11, 1996, until mid-moming April 14, 1996,
EPA's and START’s assistance was not requested by the state of Montana
and MRL within the wreckage area (hot zone), however EPA was allowed
access to the forward command post....Entry to the derailment area was
controlled by security personnel and records o f all entries and exits from
*” URS, 1996.
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the derailment site were recorded. On the afternoon o f April 14, 1996, an
EPA OSC, a START member and a Strike Team Member were allowed to
enter the hot zone. During this visit, the body o f Mr. John Elmer Smith, Jr.
(age 70) from Seattle, Washington, was discovered by them...Th&
Missoula County Coroner removed the body to St. Patrick’s Hospital for
definitive identification and autopsy. As mentioned, the cause o f death
was overexposure to chlorine gas/vapors (emphasis added).**
EPA states that their assistance was “not requested” in the hot zone by MRL. EPA
describes their eventual entry into the hot zone and presence at the forward command
post as “allowed” by MRL. Montana Rail Link displayed its attitude to the
Environmental Protection Agency during the Technical Group meetings from the second
day o f the incident on. On April 12, 1996 the Technical Group noted that “EPA
personnel have been at the Nine Mile Road Command Post asking questions.”*^ At the
same meeting, MRL and its technical advisors asserted that a “Pet Rescue/Feed may
being tomorrow. Another assessment will be done at daybreak. After that, the decision
will be made whether or not to begin the operation...”.*^ It is unclear who was in a
position to make the decision that citizens exposed on April 11 could safely re-enter the
chemical spill area.*^ EPA had not yet viewed the site nor conducted any tests to
determine chemical composition o f the initial chemical cloud or hazardous substances on
the ground and threats to human health and safety. While EPA officials were “asking
** URS, 1996. The discovery of a dead body by EPA immediately upon its first site visit
calls to question what else the agency would have been able to discover had it entered the
site on April 11, prior to manipulation o f the site by Montana Rail Link. MRL moved
soil, rail and did other site work prior to federal agency oversight.
“ Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/12/96 AM. Appendix A.
*Md.
The decision to allow “Pet Rescues” (before data on the chemicals spilled and
potential health effects were collected) proved to be a serious mistake. This will be
addressed in more detail later in this chapter.
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questions” at the roadblock, the technical group reported that MRL’s sister company,
Envirocon, was doing water and soil testing for pH levels only and reported that their
data indicated that the situation “is not serious.” But Envirocon insisted that “there was
no ground sampling done on the immediate site.”*^
The next morning’s newspaper quoted the Incident Commander as saying,
“W e’ve got all the best people in the country here doing all that they can do.” This
statement neglected to clarify that the “best” people on site were experts in technical off
loading o f chemicals from trains and chlorine producers skilled in handling the chemical.
Meanwhile, the government employees “best” skilled at identifying and mitigating risks
to human health and safety-the Environmental Protection Agency—failed to gain entry to
the disaster site.
The same day, April 13, MRL reported that “We have negotiated an entry plan for
the NTSB, the EPA and the Coast Guard.

By the afternoon meeting a permanent

decontamination station was added on site “at the request of the EPA.” At that meeting it
was also mentioned that EPA had requested to review the plan for off-loading the
remaining chlorine, and the Coast Guard had requested to be present throughout the
operation. The response from MRL was: “It was noted we need to limit the total number
of personnel on site. It was decided to allow the USCG and EPA 15 minutes on site to

Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/12/96 1800 hours. Appendix A.
^ The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was present to determine the causes
o f the derailment. The agency was kept off-site for three days while MRL moved and
removed the train cars and track. During these operations (which should have been a
focus o f EPA investigation), MRL also moved soil and began “clean-up” of the
contaminated site.
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view the operations. They may be allowed in more than once but only in 15 minute
windows.”®’
After one, or perhaps several, fifteen minute trips to the derailment site, Chris
Weis, EPA Region VIII toxicologist, somehow felt confident asserting to evacuees that
“It is very safe to re-enter the areas [for pet rescues and early return for residents farthest
from the derailment site] with respect to residual chemicals. We think your home is
safe.”*®Although EPA had only gained access to the site that day and then only for a
fifteen minute period, the agency personnel had found a dead body and requested
additional testing o f the chemicals spilled to ascertain health and safety risks. Despite the
stark contrast between EPA’s and MRL’s thoroughness and priorities on site, it is unclear
why EPA did not inform spill victims that key information was yet to be uncovered and
disclosed. Instead, EPA echoed MRL’s statements regarding the status of the site.
The next day, MRL stated that they “negotiated with EPA for entry and revision
o f site operations... The EPA will be included in the meeting from now on. He will not be
a speaking member, he’s just here to listening (sic).”®®In the intervening three days
before EPA’s entry damage had been done, some o f it permanently affecting victims
ability to gain information regarding their chemical exposure and likely health effects.
Even after EPA was “allowed” on site to listen in on meetings, damage to public health
and safety continued.

®’ Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/14/96 1800 hours. Appendix A.
®* Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/14/96. Appendix A.
*®Technical Group M eeting Notes. 4/15/96. 1300 and 1800 hours. Appendix A.
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The reasoning behind EPA's acceptance o f MRL's edict that no governmental
agencies be allowed on site until it allowed remains unclear. EPA had authority under
CERCLA (the Superfund law) to enter the private property site, as it was the source o f an
offsite risk to human health and safety. Why they stood aside and allowed the responsible
company full control over the site, testing, and information release for the critical first
four days o f the incident is a question that remains unanswered to this day. The
repercussions o f that decision, however, prejudiced the entire incident and adversely
affected victims o f the derailment. The prime example o f EPA’s failure to assert control
and resulting impact on human health and safety is found in the “pet rescues”.

Pet Rescues: Undisclosed Danger, Devastating Impacts
Montana Rail Link and government officials decided, based on incomplete
information, to allow residents back into the evacuated zone for the now infamous pet
rescues as early as April 13. “Alberton residents were allowed to temporarily re-enter
their homes to get personal belongs (sic) and to feed their animals ...Prior to these
temporary re-entries, chlorine concentrations were not detected by START in Alberton
above background concentrations.”^ The decision to allow already injured residents to
re-enter an area contaminated with still unknown chemicals which had only been tested
for chlorine residues, had lasting repercussions. The pet rescues provided the first source
*«URS, 1996.
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o f information about conditions in the impacted zone from people other than Montana
Rail Link and their employees. As a result, the pet rescues played a significant and
pivotal role in galvanizing government interest in the other chemical spilled on site.
The first pet rescue took place on April 13^', and approximately 50-60 people
participated. The second time people were allowed in was on April 15^, for a livestock
feeding. People were again allowed to feed their animals on April 17^ and livestock
feeding continued throughout the evacuation.
Despite the non-detection o f chlorine by the EPA at the time o f the pet rescues, a
number o f people not exposed to the initial cloud entered Alberton to feed animals and
became severely ill afterward. The pet rescuers reported “pesticide-like” odors and
developed symptoms similar to those which evacuees were suffering, all in the absence
o f exposure to chlorine. For example, one man who was not initially exposed by the
derailment went on the pet rescue to remove his father's livestock from the hot zone and
developed symptoms consistent with those o f evacuees.^' Some residents who had been
exposed to the initial cloud and evacuated, re-entered and were further exposed and
injured during the pet rescues.^^ The pet rescuers were allowed officially onto their
properties for only five minutes (for pet owners) or half an hour (for ranchers). In reality,
recent evacuees and previously non-exposed people were in the exclusion zone for many
hours on board a school bus as it stopped at each residence.^^
According to the personal accounts o f evacuees, the pet rescues did not proceed
Pers. Comm, ACCEH, 1998.
’^ACCEH and King, 1997
” Lisa Mosca, 1997. Interview with Paul Lodge, Alberton, MT.
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as the official record indicates. Many people refused to sign a release saying MRL was
not responsible if they got sick or died as a result o f going back to rescue their pets, while
some were not asked to sign a release at all.^ The vital importance o f the pet rescues
turned out to be the symptoms caused by re-entry to the contaminated zone at times when
chlorine levels were safe for human exposure provided the first evidence that chemicals
other than chlorine were present and at levels which made people ill. The dramatic
difference between MRL’s version o f conditions at the site, and the actual situation as
experienced by the pet rescuers set into motion a search for answers and accountability
that continues to this day.

Company Control and Effect on Information Disclosttre
Montana Rail Link was able to assert full control o f the incident and arrange the
information regarding chemicals and health threats in a disingenuously benign manner.
This initial tide of company public relations about chlorine and minimal health effects
was difficult to turn, even when clear evidence o f additional information and illness
became obvious to MRL and agency officials.
The gaps in the information made available to victims and the public at large can
be attributed to several areas o f non-disclosure. First, Montana Rail Link controlled the
scene exclusively from April 11-April 14, 1996. Two members o f the Missoula
Hazardous Materials Team were the first people on site following 911 notification. Soon
after their arrival, Montana Rail Link employees arrived and asked the HazMat Team
^ Pers. Comm. ACCEH, 1997.
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members to leave the site.’^ From that point on, the highly trained and experienced team
members would be asked only to man the evacuation roadblock entry points. The
HazMat team, USCG, EPA and others blocked from entering the site, would have, as a
matter o f process, immediately taken samples to identify the chemicals spilled in order to
protect their own health and safety as well as the public’s. On the site controlled by MRL
there were instances o f workers not wearing protective gear, presumably because they
were told that risk from the chlorine was minimal and that the other chemicals were of
little concern due to MRL’s ongoing position that no movement o f chemicals other than
chlorine had taken place. In fact, responders and workers were most at risk from the
potassium cresylate and its reactants with chlorine, but there is no evidence that MRL
informed its employees and contractors o f such dangers.
Even after Montana Rail Link allowed federal agencies on site in a limited
capacity, the company remained in control by virtue o f having “set the scene” in the first
four days and by exerting pressure on Incident Command, agencies and individuals. This
control was pervasive, but not always explicit. The agencies responsible for making
decisions regarding public health and safety were not provided with accurate and
complete information during the critical first four days o f the incident. During this time
plans were made and themes and atmospheres set. Once better information was
available, the agencies failed to assert their autonomy by questioning many o f the
assumptions established in the first four days. This failure allowed many o f MRL's
“omissions’*to carry the day. Coupled with the company’s tight control of the scene and
Pers. Comm. 9/99. LEPC/HazMat team meeting. Missoula Rural Fire District station.
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public relations, this prevented victims from knowing the full story and having the ability
to make informed decisions in their best interest. Moreover, evacuees were depending on
MRL for temporary housing, food and medicine, and responders, many Alberton
residents, were earning big money through the emergency. This all added to the feeling
MRL that was “taking care” o f everyone.
Both the company and the agencies are at fault in varying ways. A crucial
difference is that government agencies should not have expected a company to put
people above profits and provide information which could jeopardize them in the
inevitable onslaught o f lawsuits (for which they were already preparing, despite their
public relations plea for "neighborly resolution” o f the problem). But the spill victims did
expect the governmental agencies to defend the public interest and not surrender to
business interests.
The failure o f EPA to press Montana Rail Link for full disclosure became more
apparent as the health effects o f chemicals other than chlorine manifested themselves,
and as the facts of the incident grew beyond the fiction o f chlorine-only the agencies and
MRL stubbornly clung to. The symptoms experienced by the pet rescuers, and their
reports o f pesticide and chemical smells when no chlorine was detectable in the area,
forced the agencies to address the question o f “the other chemicals”.

“Alberton Syndrome '. MRL and Agencies Confronted by Symptoms not Attributable to
Chlorine
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Classic, acute chlorine symptoms can be categorized as respiratory, dermal and
ocular. These symptoms were acknowledged by the agencies, company and medical
professionals involved. Long-term symptoms of extensive exposure to chlorine include
neurological effects, corrosion o f tooth enamel and damage to other systems.^ None o f
the long-term health effects of chlorine were disclosed to victims, and no health effects,
short or long-term, resulting from exposure to the other chemicals and synergistic effects
were discussed. Spill victims became dubious when their own bodies told them
something different from the “experts” in charge.
The divergence between victims’ health and officially sanctioned symptoms
occurred early on, as did official denial of the problems. On April 14 at the second
meeting for evacuees with Incident Command, Ellen Leahy, Director o f the Missoula
City-County Health Department reassured victims: “We have been testing since the first
release. Everything is okay. If you find anything questionable, please call.” This
indication o f official confidence came after 50-60 people had entered the site for pet
rescues and as countless more were preparing. The confidence was misplaced, for at this
point neither MCCHD nor EPA had any test results on chemicals other than chlorine. At

^ Dr. Kaye Kilbum is one o f the few researchers who has investigated non-classic effects
o f chlorine exposure. He has followed workers and citizens exposed in industrial and
transportation accidents. His work indicates that neurological effects can occur, along
with a suite o f other health effects. These have yet to accepted by the mainstream
medical community, in large part because the responsible companies have no interest in
funding such studies and government agencies fail to follow through on their own. This
is exactly what happened in Alberton. Dr. Kilbum offered MRL and the agencies his
services to study the exposed victims o f the second largest chlorine release in U.S.
history. He was refused, and later did his research as an expert witness for a plaintiffs’
attorney.
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the meeting, an evacuee stated “My wife has been having reactions.” The answer came
that there was “[n]o evidence o f exposure that would lead to long term health problems.”
Dr. Walt Peschel, a local physician treating his first chlorine exposure victims, added that
“Chlorine is very toxic, can cause tissue damage. Long exposure might have long term
respiratory problems.
The next day the newspaper reported that residents o f outlying areas given
permission to return home weren’t going because “there are just too many unanswered
questions.”^® Resident Jamie Becker raised concerns about the potassium cresylate
(which had not yet been officially properly named or described to victims). The
Missoulian newspaper described her concerns;
“All o f the materials that were in that other car, that they don’t want to
talk about”, Becker said, referring to a tank o f material railroad officials
are calling a “caustic” substance. “We have no idea what’s in it, Becker
said. “I don’t want to be asking about one thing if the problem is
something else.” Becker ended by stating concern for the responders on
the scene, “I think they’re exposing themselves to things they don’t even
know about.
No answers were given, but officials asked evacuees who had entered for pet
rescues to contact them if they had any health problems as a result. Evacuees who had re
entered for pet rescues were now told that the officials—who had failed to supply them
necessary information regarding health risks prior to re-entry—were suddenly interested
Evacuee Meeting Notes, 4/14/96.
Missoulian. Evacuated families staying put. 4/15/96.
^M issoulian. Evacuated families staying put. 4/15/96. N ote: Jamie Becker died o f
cancer the summer o f 2001. Neighbors on her road who have also died since the spill
include: Forrest Tolker, Ron Stone and Naomi James. A cancer cluster is being
investigated by the Montana State Health Department after repeated requests by area
residents.
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in any health problems they may have had as a result. At the April 16 evacuee meeting
the questions increased. People from outside o f the evacuation zone reported health
problems and described symptoms o f house guests who had arrived after the initial
release. One evacuee requested a “notarized statement declaring the home free from any
chemicals in order to rent or sell the house in the future.” A request was made that
workers cleaning up the site not bring their work equipment and clothes back into their
hotels, the same ones where injured evacuees also were staying.
The main line o f questioning at the meeting challenged the officials’ assertion
that there were no chemicals on site and nothing to detect. This statement was based on
monitoring for chlorine released during the patching o f the leaking tank car and pH
testing o f soils and water for evidence o f chlorine-caused acidification. Yet chlorine
spikes were becoming less frequent and had not occurred while pet rescuers were in the
area. Nevertheless, people had smelled and reacted adversely to chemicals. One evacuee
said “You say there is nothing detectable- you need to adjust to people’s reaction”.
Another added “Who should we listen to, monitors or people? The nose is sensitive and
we smell gas.” Another evacuee said “ I live in the middle o f Alberton and go in for
livestock feeding...people are having reactions. Is there a buildup effect-should we go
back in?” ‘®'
The EPA toxicologist, Chris Weis, answered “You are more sensitive after
exposure, after a period o f time sensitivity does disappear.” He said it could take six to

Evacuee Meeting Notes, April 16, 1996. Appendix A.
Evacuee Meeting Notes, April 16, 1996. Appendix A.
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eight weeks for the sensitivity to subside. The injured evacuee, dissatisfied, pressed on.
“Should you go back in for livestock feeding if you have a reaction?” Finally, another
official on the panel answered “If you have a reaction, no.”
Another pet rescuer said that after he/she “returned to the area-[I] was forced to
return to the hospital-[this] does not match the monitor.” After that statement, another
evacuee observed “My nose is a better indicator than a monitor.” To this, Weis answered
that just because something is smelled does not mean that it is dangerous. On this day, a
full six days after the derailment, three days after the first evacuees were allowed to re
enter the contaminated area to feed pets and livestock, issues that EPA and other officials
should have pursued and addressed immediately were raised by victims: “Can other
chemicals be produced?”; “Were there any fires at the site?” “Can chlorine cause
permanent lung damage?” “What was in the box cars next to the tankers?” “What do skin
irritations look like? My animal did not want to brushed.”
The meeting ended with a pointed question that clearly demonstrated victims’
frustrations, fears and need for honest, timely information: “If you had a family, would
you move back into the [hot] zone after the incident is over?” The MRL official present
at the meeting quickly answered “Yes” .
The April 16 newspaper again featured EPA toxicologist Chris Weis‘°^
reassuring victims: “Once any chlorine clouds move out o f the area, there will be no
residual chemical left in your soil or your water that we are concerned about.” Again, this
Evacuee Meeting Notes, April 16, 1996. Appendix A.
Chris Weis was not part o f Incident Command. He addressed residents’ concerns from
the audience, not from the podium.
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statement was made in the absence of test results from soils at or around the derailment
site or any information regarding chemicals other than chlorine. On April 17, victims had
more questions. “What do we know about long term effects?” “Does chlorine exposure
knock you down, make you lose consciousness”. The answer; No. “I was knocked down
twice after exposure. This is not classic from chlorine exposure.” No response was given
and the meeting moved on to a discussion o f roadblocks and re-entry. Ellen Leahy,
Director o f the Health Department advised “If you are experiencing any problems or have
any concerns, we encourage you to consult your physician.” The last question: “The offgassing coming out o f the ground? Is that what the smell is? Should we be concerned?”'^
No answer was given and no information provided to evacuees that would assist the
physicians they would call upon to diagnose and treat their symptoms.

Finally, on April 19, eight days after the chemical spill. Health Department Ellen Leahy
told evacuees that the officials:
believe that you smell something. We don’t have answers yet, but we are
working on it. We have contacted Garon Smith [University o f Montana
Professor o f Chemistry]. We are attempting to find what the smell is. We
are in the assessment phase to determine the chemicals on site. We are
testing the soils, water and air. The DEQ, EPA and local health
department are working on it. The results will be public information.
A full week after the derailment, the local, state and federal agencies responsible
for protecting human health and the environment told the injured public that they finally
would do their job. This constituted a terrible irony for spill victims, whose bodies
Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/17/96. Appendix A.
Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/18/96. Appendix A.
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provided the evidence that forced these agencies into action; whose sickness and outrage
forced the agencies, for the first time, to question Montana Rail Link’s information. Later
the same day, victims were told for the first time exactly what three chemical products
had spilled. The next question was “What by-products can be produced? Are the
chemicals being analyzed. We need a chemist to explain ’’ Another evacuated resident
who had re-entered for pet rescues, reported that trees were browning on their road. EPA
noted that a plant specialist was being brought in, despite having earlier stated that there
was no damage to area vegetation.
Protecting Public Health: Conflicting Mandates. Mounting Pressures
The public officials found themselves in charge o f a situation spinning quickly
out o f control. Victims were experiencing unexpected health symptoms, which had
forced officials to admit publicly that they did not know the extent o f chemicals involved
and that no testing had been done to determine the most basic information regarding
chemical content and interaction. At the same time, Montana Rail Link continued to
focus only on chlorine and put pressure on everyone involved to get the clean-up job
done and people back into their homes. Not only was the incident a public relations
nightmare for MRL, but each day the tracks were closed was costing the company
considerable profit. In addition, traffic on Interstate 90 was detoured about 200 miles
onto a two-lane highway during the evacuation to prevent exposure to motorists. On
April 19, a Department o f Transportation official followed up on Ellen Leahy’s
An initial study o f damage to vegetation was conducted by Meikle and lanson for
Bitterroot Restoration, Inc. Additional research was done by University o f Montana PhD
student Marten Schroeder.
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presentation about the need to determine other chemical risks by stating; “We also need
the information on the threat o f the chemical [potassium cresylate/chlorine reactants].
We also have a life threatening potential with a detour o f 1-90. The threat o f both will
have to be weighed.” '®^
Spill victims were on the verge o f getting important questions answered, but the
odds were stacked against them. Public officials from EPA and the Missoula City-County
Health Department were attempting to find answers, but only after a week o f delay and
deference to Montana Rail Link. Full investigation and disclosure o f critical information
to the public would require the health agencies to stand up to MRL and its allies with the
clear statement: “Stop. We need to start over and do it right.”
Such a reversal proved impossible. EPA, MCCHD and DEQ had deferred to
MRL, and in doing, had lost valuable time, information, and, apparently, backbone. The
agencies had every right and responsibility to halt the re-entry indefinitely, continue the I90 detour, and assert control o f the site until they could ensure that citizens were
protected. Instead, the agencies ventured halfway down this path, found no easy answers,
and then succumbed to pressures and allowed the status quo to continue. The best time
for the agencies to have turned the course o f this incident was at this time: few data were
in, evacuees were clamoring for valid information, and the public would have supported
the agencies on the side o f precaution. The time was ripe for the agencies to conduct a
thorough, scientific and unbiased analysis o f what happened and what health impacts to
spill victims were likely.
Incident Command Notes. 4/19/96. Noon. Appendix A.
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Alberton was a scientific and medical mystery begging for a qualified sleuth to
solve it. It was a perfect time to undertake an unbiased, scientific analysis of what was
spilled, what could have reacted with what, what products could have been formed, what
could have been in the initial cloud, what was still present on site, what was causing
health symptoms and what long-term health effects were possible. A thorough analysis
o f the data collected and additional analyses would have allowed extrapolation to re
create the initial cloud the morning o f April 11 and the chemical reactions that occurred
then and afterwards. This type and specificity o f information was necessary to answer
questions regarding ongoing symptoms and long-term health effects. One can only
surmise that countless toxicologists and chemists would have welcomed the opportunity
to solve such a mystery and provide the affected populace with answers to questions
about what they were exposed to, at what levels, and what health effects could be
expected in the future. Unfortunately, no such expert investigators were given the
opportunity. The mystery was left unsolved.
Once EPA, MCCHD and DEQ chose to forgo the opportunity to do right by the
Alberton victims, their only choice was to revert back to the status quo as developed by
Montana Rail Link during that first week and defend it to the end. Any indication o f a
mistake or omission could be the fissure that would send the intricate wall of their
defense crumbling. The potential for fissures was great as the information regarding
potassium cresylate reactions with chlorine (upon which decisions for re-entry were
based) was shown to be incomplete and additional chemicals were shown to be risks to
human health.
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Non-Disclosed Chemicals: 2,4,5 & 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol, Benzene, Toluene and Xylene
On April 15 it was reported at the 1;00 PM Technical Group Meeting that two
boxcars were pulled out o f way near the leaking chlorine car. “A yellow substance was
observed on the end of the boxcars which looks like a reaction to the chlorine.” On April
18, the Technical Group reported that the soil around chlorine tanker #3 was yellow. This
substance was likely 2, 4, 6- Trichlorophenol, a chemical that appears as a yellow solid.
It has a strong, sweet smell with an odor threshold o f .0026 ppm in air and .30 ppm in
water. It is produced when chlorine is added to phenol in the presence o f aluminum
chloride catalyst. Production o f chlorophenols is known to produce highly toxic
polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDDs). The amount o f contaminants formed is
dependent upon the temperature and pressure o f the chlorination reaction, as well as
which solvents and catalysts were used. TCDDs (dioxins) also have been reported as
byproducts o f trichlorophenol p ro d u c tio n .P ro d u c tio n o f 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol was
discontinued in 1975 because o f the prohibitive costs o f removing its toxic dioxin
impurities.
Trichlorophenol is primarily present in the atmosphere as a gas and can be
significantly removed by dissolution in rain. It appears to bioaccumulate in fish and
Dioxins, by-products o f chlorine chemistry, are widely considered most toxic
chemical known. See Dying from Dioxin. Lois Gibbs et al for a full treatment of dioxin
health effects, chemistry, sources, and campaigns to eliminate them. See Our Stolen
Future by Theo Colburn et al. for a treatment o f organochlorines, dioxins and other
hormone mimicking chemicals.
The EPA reportable quantity regulations require that a spill o f 10 pounds or more of
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol be reported to the Federal Government National Response Center.
No estimates o f the total release was ever provided, despite the visual evidence o f a
yellow solid on the site.
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invertebrates. Although the compound is readily metabolized by fish and eliminated in
the feces and urine, it has been detected in the tissues o f fish-eating eagles and may have
some potential to accumulate in food chains.*'®
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol was detected April 20 in the potassium cresylate spilled at
levels o f 183 ppm*" 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol was not detected at the Alberton site in areas
o f air deposition by the cloud in tests conducted nine to fifteen days after the release.
These results are not surprising. Trichlorophenol can evaporate into the air. Sunlight
changes it into other chemicals within 1 day to 3 weeks. As a solid it breaks down
quickly-in one to nine days—with the help o f bacteria. **^
ATSDR reports that they:
do not know what happens to 2,4,6 in the body after you breathe this
chemical or get it directly on your skin....Cancer occurs in animals after
continued long-term oral exposure to 2,4,6. 2,4,6 has not been studied to
determine if it causes birth defects, but 2,4,6 has been shown in animals to
cause lowered body weight in newborns and a decrease in the number o f
offsprings. The health effects resulting from short and long-term exposure
o f humans to air containing specific levels o f 2,4,6 are not known. **^
Commonly, with diagnosing exposure to toxic chemicals early detection is the
key. Since disclosure o f its presence on the Alberton site came with the assurance that no
exposure had occurred, victims were not directed to take advantage o f an available test
that can measure the amount o f 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol in blood. ATSDR points out that
“Soon after exposure occurs, 2,4,6 enters the blood. Much o f the 2,4,6 can leave the

ATSDR. 1990.Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol. U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services Public Health Service, TP-90-28.
"* E n e rg y Labs. Semi-Volatile Organics Analysis Report. May 7, 1996. Billings, MT.
"Hd.
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blood and the body very quickly (within hours or days), so the test should be done as
soon as possible after exposure occurs.”

Trace amounts of 2,4,6 can be detected in

biological samples such as urine, semen, whole blood, serum and adipose tissue.
In epidemiological terms, the Alberton release was extremely rare. Particularly, if
trichlorophenol was inhaled because in the US only "about 5% o f known releases of
trichlorophenols were to the atmosphere.” ATSDR stated that "More information on
exposure levels for the general population, as well as populations living in the vicinity of
hazardous waste sites, would be useful.”

The opportunity to gain important, unusual

data from the exposed populace in Alberton was lost when health officials discounted
potential health impacts o f 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol and, instead, focused solely on
chlorine.
Benzene, toluene, xylene and other components o f the potassium cresylate
mixture o f oil refinery waste were also detected on and off site.

Exposure to these

compounds alone can lead to serious health effects; in conjunction with exposure to
chlorine and chlorinated phenols, the possibilities for negative impacts to health are
enormous.
Benzene...is a colorless liquid with a sweet odor. Benzene evaporates into
air very quickly, dissolves slightly in water, and is highly flammable. Most
people can begin to smell benzene in air at 1.5-4.7ppm. Brief exposure (510 minutes) to very high levels o f benzene in air (10,000-20,000ppm) can
result in death. Lower levels (700-3000ppm) can cause drowsiness.
ATSDR. 1990.Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol. U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services Public Health Service, TP-90-28.
"‘‘ATSDR. 1990.Toxicological Profile for 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol. U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services Public Health Service.
"*URS, 1996.
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dizziness, rapid heart rate, headaches, tremors, confusion and
unconsciousness. In most cases, people will stop feeling these effects
when they stop being exposed and begin to breathe fresh air.
Following acute inhalation o f benzene, humans exhibit symptoms
indicative o f central nervous system effects. These symptoms, reported to
occur at levels ranging form 300 to 3000 ppm included drowsiness,
dizziness, headache, vertigo, tremor, delirium, and loss o f consciousness.
These symptoms are similar to the consequences o f exposure to multiple
organic solvents (sic) are reversible when symptomatic workers are
transferred from the problem area.. .Chronic exposure to benzene has been
reported to produce neurological abnormalities in humans...[Those with]
chronic exposure to benzene and toluene....complained o f frequent
headaches, became tired easily, had difficulties sleeping, and complained
o f memory loss. Data on the reproductive effects o f occupation exposure
to benzene suggest that benzene may impair fertility in women.
Damage to both the humoral and cellular components o f the immune
system has been known to occur in humans following inhalation exposure.
This is manifested by decreased levels o f antibodies and decreased levels
o f leukocytes in workers. Many epidemiological and case studies correlate
benzene exposure with leukemia. These studies indicate that benzene is
carcinogenic."^
Thus, victims o f Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill were exposed to a panoply o f
toxic chemicals which went undisclosed and untested for, on the site and in victims’
bodies. In the meantime, Montana Rail Link and government officials continued to assert
that chlorine was the only danger to public health and safety.

Potassium Cresylate and The Myth o f “Chlorine Only”

Any release o f potassium cresylate over 1,000 pounds above this must by law, be
reported to the National Response C enter.'" 17,000 gallons, which is
equivalent to 255,000 pounds, o f the potassium cresylate spilled at
Alberton. It appears that Montana Rail Link did not comply with the
federal reporting law and report the potassium cresylate release to the
ATSDR. 1995.Toxicological Profile for Benzene (Draft for Public Comment).
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.
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National Response Center."*
From this inauspicious beginning, potassium cresylate presented a series of problems to
officials and victims, most o f which have yet to be resolved. First, government officials
knew little about potassium cresylate for the first seven days o f the incident calling it by
several different names with a variety of spellings ranging from “caustic solution”to
“cresylic sodium” to “potassium chiysilate”." ’ These discrepancies served only to
confuse spill victims and obfuscate the true nature and dangers o f potassium cresylate.
Montana Rail Link failed to educate agency officials, responders, and victims about the
nature o f their chemical cargo. The railroad company prevented disclosure concerning the
dangers o f potassium cresylate to victims by insuring that government officials knew
nothing about it.
The lack o f accurate disclosure on the part o f the company, and failure to question and
dig for answers on the part o f the officials and responders, placed already exposed spill victims
at further risk in two ways. First, basic information was not shared with spill victims, thereby
preventing them from knowing exactly what chemicals they had been exposed to at what levels
and the concomitant health risks. Second, the spilled potassium cresylate was injected with
chlorine gas the morning o f the derailment, leading to the formation o f additional toxic
compounds.

It is this chemical reaction and its toxic by-products which would ultimately

"* See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion o f the non-profit organization Cold
Mountain, Cold Rivers’ lawsuit alleging failure to report potassium cresylate and MRL’s
response.
See media accounts. Technical Committee Meeting Notes and Evacuee Meeting
Notes, 4/11/96-4/18/96. Appendix A.
This is apparent from the physical proximity of Tanker Car #3 and the potassium
cresylate car. Professor Garon Smith concurred with this in a video interview with Lisa
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overshadow the chlorine exposure and raise many questions which remain unanswered to this
day.
D espite the mixed chemical nature o f the spill, it was publicly portrayed as a “chlorine
only” event. The evacuation to protect hum an health and safety was initially ascribed only to
dangers from chlorine, and rem ained so even when impacts from the other chemicals became
evident. M ontana Rail Link's contractor, Olympus Environmental, Inc., described the officially
sanctioned health threats and protective measures taken in this way:
[P]otential health threats presented by the chlorine resulted in an evacuation order
from the Health D epartm ent on April 11, 1996 for the area located between
Interstate 90 mile m arker 70 (west) to mile m arker 82 (east). On April 14, 1996,
the H ealth D epartm ent reduced the evacuation area to Interstate 90 mile marker 70
(w est) to the Petty Creek Bridge (east). On April 24, 1996 the Health
D epartm ent reduced the evacuation zone to areas adjacent to the derailment site
along Plateau Road. By 9:00 am April 28, 1996 the Health Departm ent ended the
evacuation order entirely.
In reality, M ontana Rail Link knew that the potassium cresylate tank car had
dum ped nearly its entire load into the ditch along the tracks, and that almost a full tanker
load o f chlorine gas had been released directly onto the cresylate. MRL was also aware o f
the com ponents o f the cresylate, that it was a spent waste product containing phenols,
cresols, and possibly dioxins. M ontana Rail Link’s sister company and environmental
contractor, Envirocon, was on site April 12th, collecting samples o f the potassium
cresylate stained soil, w hich the company stated it tested only for elevated pH.

MRL

and Envirocon should have suspected that a chemical reaction with the chlorine had

Mosca..
Olympus Environmental Inc., 1996.
>22 Technical Team N otes, A!\2l9(i.Appendix A.
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created sem i-volatile by-product chemicals as early as the 12th o f April, but the company
inform ed no one o f this possibility and, in fact, allow ed residents to enter the hot zone the
very next day, April 13th, for a pet rescue.
On April 12th and 13th evacuees were told at the daily briefings that they were
only out o f their honies to protect them from an accidental chlorine release while the
technical team s transferred the chlorine product from the ruptured tanker cars offsite.
O therwise, it was declared safe inside the evacuation zone, and only very low levels o f
chlorine w ere being detected in residential areas. It seems likely that the emergency
responders were being told the same thing, after all, they were only equipped with
chlorine monitors.
The m yth o f “chlorine only” pervaded the entire incident and aftermath. Evacuees
were told that the only reason for the evacuation after the initial cloud dispersed was due
to a risk o f another release o f chlorine during the offloading and cleanup. Because o f this
explanation, residents clamored to be allow ed home, at least for long enough to attend to
pets and livestock. O fficials did not em phasize the enormity o f the health risk o f another
chlorine exposure to people recently exposed, nor did they disclose the potential dangers
presented by the two other chem icals and chemical by-products when they became aware
o f such dangers.

Spill Victims: Canaries in a Toxic Zone

123 Evacuee M eeting Notes, 4/12/96 and 4/13/96. Appendix A.
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The sequence o f cause and effect at A lberton was tragically inverted. Spill victims
w ere the canaries-they were sent back into the H ot Zone, exposed to unknown additional
chem icals and reactants, and developed symptoms. The existence and veracity o f these
new symptoms was ignored by the agencies and MRL, until ignorance becam e impossible.
Then, victim s’ symptoms were the reason for additional testing to determine the chemical
com position o f the spill, resulting reactions and assessing migration.
Evacuees trusted the inform ation provided until their bodies demonstrated the
falseness o f that information. Once victim s realized this, based on their suite o f symptoms
and the apparent causes and relief for them , they had to fight the agencies and MRL for
legitimacy. Spill victim s were at a serious disadvantage: their experiences and symptoms
did not fit into the official assessment o f the incident. Altering the official line on the
incident would require M RL to adm it culpability for more than chlorine impacts;
governm ent agencies to adm it to a lack o f oversight and engagement in determining what
chem icals w ere spilled and potential health effects and capitulation to responsible
com pany control over the incident. This is why nearly five years after the incident, victims
rem ain organized into a community group and press on to get the facts about what
happened to their health and their fam ilies’ health.

P otassium Cresylate Reactions with Chlorine: The Twisted R oad to (Partial) Disclosure
The chronology o f non-disclosure concerning potassium cresylate, its contents,
and the results o f its reactions with chlorine is astounding: officials charged with
protecting the public knew nothing o f this m ajor spill com ponent for the first four days o f
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the incident, and when they became aware o f the cresylate, they succumbed to pressures
to move the cleanup and re-entiy plans forward at any cost. The initial impression given
is that Garon Smith, Associate Professor o f Chemistry at the University o f Montana,
conducted the first analysis o f the potassium cresylate stained soil and then shared those
results with the public on April 19th. At that point it was disclosed that a reaction between
the contents o f the chlorine car and the potassium cresylate car had in fact occurred
creating chlorinated compounds.
Smith becam e involved in the analysis o f the spilled potassium cresylate through a
request from the M issoula County Health D epartm ent on April 16th, 1996, the sixth day
o f the incident. H e im m ediately verified that ’’potassium cresylate" is a non-systematic
name for potassium salt o f the aromatic alcohol, cresol. Smith indicated he could provide
analysis o f the potassium cresylate using gas chromatography and mass spectrometry
(GC/MS). Olympus Environm ental collected a soil sample from directly under the
cresylate car and delivered it to Smith's lab the evening o f April 17.
Dr. Sm ith's first GC/MS results, obtained on April 18, showed eight compounds
before the potent sample overwhelm ed the equipment, leading him to state that "[c]Iearly,
chlorinated phenolic cross products had been formed from a combination o f chlorine and
the arom atics in the cresylate tank car."‘^^ He im m ediately contacted the Incident
Com m and Post and alerted them to discoveiy. His recom mendation to Incident Command
and M ontana Rail Link was to cover the concentrated sludge with plastic to prevent

124

E v a c u e e M eeting.,4/19/96.Appendix A.

:25 Garon Smith, 1996. Chlorine spill, narrative o f sample analysis and rationale for re
entry criteria. M issoula, MT.
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infiltration o f rain from moving toxic compounds down into the soil toward ground water.
This recom m endation was not carried out; the company did not feel it was feasible to
cover the sludge because o f all the cleanup work in progress.
In a discussion with Olympus Environmental later in the day on 4/19/96, Smith
learned that the "soil sample" had been pure product sludge collected from beneath the
cresylate car. A fter cleaning out his laboratory equipment. Smith tested a less potent
sample o f potassium cresylate sludge and identified a total thirty-five compounds in it,
including an assortment o f toxic chlorophenols.*^*
That afternoon. Smith gave a presentation at the Evacuee meeting. He discussed
the behavior o f these com pounds in the environment and answered questions. He felt that
once the initial chlorine venting had ended, there was little reason to expect the
chlorinated phenols and cresols to m ove MRL makes no m ention o f his information in
their m eeting notes for that day.

Smith noted that a judgm ent could not be made if the

chlorinated phenols im pacted the residents’ health till further testing was completed. He
went on to state that "[tjhere is some possibility that the chemicals floated away from the
derailm ent on w ater particles —either particles created by the release o f chlorine or in the
light rain that was falling at the time."'^** When pressed, no public official ever disputed

Smith, 1996.
ACCEH, 1997. It is recom m ended in the Emergency Response Guidebook that
personnel should not walk on potassium cresylate contaminated material; if it is walked
on, the G uidebook directs that shoes m ust be removed and left at the site at the end o f
work.
‘2* Smith, 1996.
12» Technical Com m ittee M eeting Notes, 4/19/96. Appendix A.
1%M issoulian, 4/20/96, Appendix A.
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the possibility that the initial cloud, which they consistently referred to as a “chlorine
cloud”, m ight have been laden with myriad chlorinated phenols, cresols, benzene, toluene,
xylene and other com ponent o f potassium cresylate and by-products o f its reaction with
chlorine.
This assertion is impossible to prove based on the environmental monitoring; no
testing o f the initial plum e was ever done. All air m onitoring after that morning which has
been m ade available to the public was for chlorine only. The contents o f the cloud could
have been ascertained from hum an and animal tests such as fat bioassays, blood serum
testing, urine analyses and so on. N o such tests were performed, despite evacuees
dem ands that such inform ation be collected.'^' If such tests were performed on railroad
employees or others, the results have never been made public. The basic, critical questions
about w hich chem icals m igrated in the cloud that morning remain unanswered, ignored by
government officials, scientists, and industry.
N ot only did officials silence the issue o f what was in the original plume and never
disclose or discuss it with evacuees, they quickly moved to a group agreement that there
was no significant hazard from the products o f the potassium cresylate/chlorine reactions
despite incom plete test results, lingering questions and concerns. On the evening o f April
20, 1996, the Incident Com m and log states, "There will be a meeting with the doctors on

"I The com m unity group, Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE), demanded additional
testing. Individual evacuees also asked for the same information and attention during
several evacuee meetings. These demands were denied by MRL and the agencies. Spill
victim s then reached out to independent scientists and medical professionals outside o f
the M issoula-Alberton area to provide adequate testing and treatment. This issue will be
addressed further in C hapter 3.
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site, the toxicologists, chemists, the Health Departm ent, etc. It is the consensus that the
com pound is a heavy mass and did not migrate far from the site—Chlorinated organics
rem ain close to the site." This statement written by MRL makes it sound like the decision
has already been made that the chemical did not migrate from the site on the basis o f
consensus, rather than on the basis o f analysis, since m ost samples had not been analyzed
yet.
W hile consensual decisions were being made concerning evacuees' health and
w elfare, data were still coming in. According to EPA notes, Envirocon tested the contents
o f the potassium cresylate car on April 20, 1996. The sample was not analyzed by Energy
Labs until M ay 1st, 1996, three days after all evacuees were told it was safe to return
home. 2,4,6- Trichlorophenol was detected at 183 ppm. The sample also tested positively
for eight o f the thirty five compounds that Garon Smith had previously identified in the
cresylate sludge from under the tanker car.

Had Energy Labs tested for all thirty-five o f

the known com pounds previously identified in the potassium cresylate sludge by Smith’s
lab, and thereby com pared the contents o f the pure cresylate contained in the tanker with
the com position o f the cresylate sludge exposed to chlorine, answers about exactly what
was formed in the potassium cresylate/chlorine reaction would have been obtained.
U nfortunately, this w as not done and confusion lingered, as evidenced by Olympus
Environm ental’s description o f potassium cresylate and reaction products with chlorine in
their final report;

132 Energy Laboratories, Inc., 1996. EPA M ethod 8270: Semi-volatile organics analysis
report.
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The potassium cresylate solution is a caustic solution (potassium
hydroxide) containing a mix o f organic compounds, including various
phenols and mercaptans. Some o f these compounds can cause adverse
health effects above specific concentrations. In addition, analytical results
o f soil samples collected by Olympus at the spill site indicated that various
chlorophenols were present in impacted soils at the derailment site. The
chlorophenols m ay have originally been p resent in the potassium cresylate
solution or they m ay have fo rm ed when phenols fro m the spent caustic
potassium cresylate solution reacted with the released gaseous chlorine.
There were concerns with the potential distribution o f these chemicals
throughout the area, ‘^^(emphasis added)
The problem s created by the release o f the cresylate continued as residents who
had returned for pet rescues were reporting a pesticide smell in the evacuated area and
were experiencing symptoms not attributable to classic chlorine such as difficulty
thinking, severe headaches, mouth sores, and more. At a Sunday morning meeting on
April 21 including Chris Weis, EPA Region 8 toxicologist. Dr. Brown o f M issoula, Mike
Sehestedt o f the M issoula County Attorney's Office, and doctors from the Poison Control
Center discussed criteria for allowing reentry to the evacuated area. A participant stated
that "[t]he num erical values from the data would determ ine if it was safe for humans to
return to Alberton; or if unable to obtain num erical values, it would be by consensus o f
this group”. The m eeting notes included a list o f symptoms, including headache and
dizziness, reported by people re-entering the site. Ellen Leahy, Director o f the M issoula
City/County H ealth D epartm ent wrote; "April 21, 1996, Sunday 9:00 am - 13 ppm
trichlorophenol in air near tracks.""'* In direct contradiction to this is Olympus' statement
in their final report: "No organic vapors were detected by the OVA, organic vapor

Olympus, 1996b.
Incident Com m and Team Log. April 21, 1996. Appendix A
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monitor, on the derailm ent site or beyond the derailm ent site.”‘^^ The existence o f
conflicting inform ation in the public record about air monitoring and the chlorinated
com pounds raises further doubt about the credibility o f contractors, agencies, MRL and
the reporting o f inform ation to the unified com m and who was charged with making public
health decisions.
D espite scanty and conflicting data, Ellen Leahy made a statement about this
m eeting later in the day to the Unified Command; "There was a two hour meeting Sunday
morning. The decision was made to contain the odor and move some o f the soil out... get
the bulk out. The toxicologists feel there are true symptoms from the odor: nausea,
headache."

There is evidence o f dissension around the migration potential o f phenols,

prior to analysis o f all relevant data. EPA ’s Steve Way stated: "I totally disagree that the
compound migrated from the site." Someone else in the meeting commented: "To get the
people back into their hom es the issue o f the ‘other chem ical’ m ust be resolved There will
be data to resolve the issue.

The next day, on the 22nd, the Incident Command log

reflects that Scott W aldron said, "The other issue is no threat."’^®
Garon Smith m et w ith the technical task force on April 22, 1996. At this point
everyone was apparently in agreem ent that the chlorinated cross products did not migrate
more than 200 feet from the site as evidenced by soil sampling available at that time.
Smith, apparently abandoning his previous statem ent concerning the likelihood that the

136

Id.
13KIncident Com mand Log, 4/22/96.
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original plum e contained chlorinated by-products, reported: "Even if some trace levels
dioxins were produced, again, they posed no risk to the residents' return because they
w ould be restricted to the actual derailment site. We concurred, therefore, that the
chlorinated cross products criteria for re-entry had been satisfied.

Smith had earlier

suggested that the cresylic tank be examined for pre-existing dioxin and furan ring
assemblies. He noted that 3,4,6-trichloro-o-cresol was present and would form 2,3,7,8TCDD if dimerized.

No dioxin testing was conducted on site or from samples taken

inside the cresylate tank car, based upon a rationale designed by the EPA.
The conclusion that chlorinated phenols had not migrated from the site was based
on soil analysis, though some soil samples collected had not been analyzed yet. In
particular, two soil samples that are significant w ere not analyzed till May 1, 1996, after
the residents were home. Olympus sampled the cresylate stained soil on site and found the
following concentrations; 2-methylphenol detected at 7320 ppm, 4-methylphenol detected
at 7190 ppm , phenol detected at 6010 ppm, 2,4,6-trichlorophenol detected at 599 ppm.
These levels o f phenols and 2,4,6-trichlorophenol, specifically, are significantly higher
than the levels which the evacuees were told about at the informational meetings. If these
higher levels had been made public to the evacuees, as well as to the chemists who were
relied upon for technical assistance, perhaps different conclusions would have been
reached by evacuees and experts concerning the safety o f re-entry.

»» Incident Com mand N otes.4/24/96. Appendix A.
‘•“ Lisa Mosca. 1997. Video interview w ith Garon Smith, Missoula, MT.
Olympus Environmental Inc., 1996b.
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The chem ical reactions between chlorine and potassium cresylate created
chlorophenols w hich were detected on site; when tests were conducted o ff site, many o f
the results cam e up 'non-detecf. These tests for volatile and semi-volatile compounds,
however, were com pleted on April 20, 21 and 26: nine to 15 days after the release. The
non-detect results have never been adequately explained to the concerned public nor have
the follow ing questions been satisfactorily answered. First, how likely is it that
chlorophenol levels decreased (via volatilization) in the 9-15 days between air deposition
and soil and wipe testing? It seems probable that deposition o f organic compounds from
the cloud was not detected due to the delay in testing coupled with the intermittent rainy
weather at the site. Second, how likely is it that inhalation o f those chlorophenols the
morning o f evacuation and during subsequent re-exposures, including pet rescues and re
entry, caused injury? Inhalation o f chlorinated organics carried in the plume was one route
o f exposure, but the continued offgassing o f those air deposited organics inside and
outside hom es m ight have resulted in continued insult to already injured people. These
questions are critically im portant to spill survivors confronted with a melange o f health
effects which are not correlated with chlorine exposure effects as described by health
officials.
The health risks from chlorinated phenols and original petroleum components o f
potassium cresylate, such as benzene, are enormous. Official refusal to concede publicly
that exposure to more than chlorine occurred from inhalation o f the toxic plume and that
chlorinated organic products continued to linger in the affected area denied residents the
opportunity to understand potential risks and make decisions regarding their own health.
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M eanw hile, symptoms not attributable to chlorine continue to confound victims, health
officials, and m edical caregivers.

E arly Return
The N ine M ile and Six M ile residents were allow ed to return home on April 11th,
despite reports from the N inr M ile Valley o f health effects and chemical odors not
attributable to chlorine alone. Ponderosa and Southside Road residents were allowed to go
home on April 14th. N o guarantee o f safety was given. Reports o f smells and chemical
clouds/plumes continued for many weeks after the derailm ent from as far away as
M issoula and Arlee. Some people were exposed to the chemical residue in their homes, in
the outside environm ent, and from the accidental releases o f chlorine which took place
through April 28th. A fter April 28th, people continued to be exposed to the potassium
cresylate and its by-products, until it was moved on May 18th.
T here were three distinct smells that people com plained o f upon returning home.
One was a sw eet m edicinal smell, one was a pesticide like smell (often described to smell
like the com m ercial products, weed and feed, and M alathion), and the other was a
chlorine smell. The pesticide-like smell remains detectable to many at present.

The O fficial"E n d " o f the Incident. Just the Beginning fo r Spill Victims
The official incident was declared over on April 28, 1996 when all residents
except those w ith homes in the hot zone were allow ed to return home. The chlorine was
com pletely offloaded, presenting no risk o f further release. The potassium cresylate was
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in the process o f being excavated. This excavation exposed the heavily contaminated
soils to the air and, therefore, residents and others who drove by the derailment site. The
m ost heavily contam inated soils were to be shipped to a hazardous waste incinerator in
Texas, w hile the less contaminated were to be landfilled by Browning Ferris Industries in
M issoula. The contam inated soils shipped to Texas were contam inated at levels requiring
disposal under federal law.

All o f the cresylate contaminated soils were still on site at

the tim e o f re-entry, April 28, 1996, against the Health D epartm ent’s recommendations to
Incident Command. None o f the previously exposed residents, however, were told that
they were moving home adjacent to a federal hazardous waste site.
Residents were allowed to return to their homes in the exclusion zone after
the dam aged chlorine cars were off-loaded or stabilized and the risk from
contam ination was evaluated (by the EPA regional toxicologist on scene
and the M issoula City-County Health Department). Wipe and soil samples
were collected in the tow n o f Alberton and near other residences, and
analyzed to verify that chlorinated phenols contamination was not present.
Soil sam pling and analysis revealed chlorinated phenols at the wreckage
area and not beyond 2,500 feet. Analytical results have shown no evidence
o f residual contaminants that pose a threat to the surrounding
community.
The pressures brought to bear to end the incident proved stronger than the desire to
precautionarily protect public health and safety. Criteria for allowing re-entry were
devised by Incident Com mand under the guidance o f the Health Departm ent and selected
“m edical experts”
These criteria were developed under intense pressure to get people home as soon
as possible. There was little patience for precaution and none for delay not clearly
R esource Conservation and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C.A. §6951 et seq.
i«U R S, 1996.
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necessitated by the chlorine monitors. Re-entry was encouraged but not mandatory for
evacuated residents. Government officials and com pany spokespeople used the sheer
num ber o f tests done as an indication that all was well.

MRL spokesperson said “Our

position is basically... thus far, thousands o f tests have been performed.” *'*^ The company
w ent so far as to host a picnic next to the derailm ent site to welcome evacuees home. No
cleaning or decontam ination o f homes was provided. The official line was that everything
was perfectly fine: all o f the chlorine had dissipated, and any that was left could be dealt
with by airing out or cleaning surfaces w ith baking soda.

Furthermore, crucial tests o f

potassium cresylate and the contaminated soils were outstanding; decisions were made
despite pending lab results.
The removal o f the potassium cresylate and the tanker cars, which occurred after
re-entry was deem ed safe by health officials, was another route o f exposure according to
numerous personal accounts.

Ellen Leahy stated in reference to the scheduled

potassium cresylate soil removal: "Some people won't smell it at all, and some people
will, and som e that will smell it will be bothered by it, and others won’t be. "

People

were more than "bothered by it", they were experiencing ill health effects due to exposure
to potassium cresylate on top o f extrem ely high doses o f chlorine and other chemicals.
Ellen Leahy had previously stated in the Incident Com mand log that these health effects
A ppendix A , 4/27/96-4/29/96.
'45 jiPissoulian, 4/29/96. No more detour- last o f evacuees allowed back into their homes.
•■*4H ealth and Environmental Information for People Returning to Alberton. 1996.
Advisory fact sheet prepared by M issoula City-County H ealth Department and signed by
the Incident Command Team.
a CCEH and King, 1997,
'4* M issoulian, 5/14/96.
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were valid according to the toxicologists.*'*^
Y et prior to this, with the end o f the incident, all o f the agencies absolved
them selves o f responsibility and publicly stated that everything was fine. The majority
official opinion, that there had been no problem beyond chlorine in the evacuated area, set
the stage for w hat was to happen in the aftermath; numerous complaints would be made
concerning continuing contamination and illness but few would be believed or addressed
by officials, because, under the official them e o f the incident continuing ailments not
attributable to chlorine simply were not possible. This adherence to the sheer
impossibility o f what residents were com plaining o f made it easy for government officials
to ignore and reject com plaints as the psychosomatic, hypochondriacal rantings o f a
radical m inority which could be easily dismissed. For sickened residents, April 28, 1996
marked not the end o f the incident, but instead, the beginning o f a difficult battle to gain
recognition o f their injuries and desperately needed assistance to address the variety of
problem s—m edical, economic and social—stemming from the disaster.
Governm ent officials created a web o f non-accountability: the buck stopped
nowhere. Everyone had another agency to invoke for each decision made, and decisions
had been made jointly, so there really was no one to blame. This made it exceedingly
difficult for evacuees to access inform ation and assistance in their battle. They were
passed along from agency to agency until finally, three years later, at the behest o f Sen.
M ax Baucus, the EPA Ombudsman stepped in to reexam ine the incident’s handling. The
fact that officials clung so stubbornly to their version o f the incident forced residents to
Incident Command Log, 4/21/96. A ppendix A.
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fight for years to gain justice and official recognition that all was not well in Alberton and
there was m ore to the story than respiratory effects from chlorine.
The next chapters examine the impacts that non-disclosure o f the chemicals
involved and possible health effects had on the adequacy o f testing done on site, health
care provided to victims, and handling o f the aftermath by the M ontana Departm ent o f
Environmental Quality.
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C h a p te r 2. C hem ical T esting: Risks and R esults
B y and large, people want to be told about potential risks.
L ay people are not stupid or irrational.
There are a num ber ways in which the experts fail, either deliberately or inadvertently, to
inform the public. One is by not telling the whole story about the hazards they know best,
because they fe a r the information would make the public anxious, because dissemination
is not their job, or because they have a vested interest in keeping things quiet.
In any toxic release event, environmental and health testing is conducted to
determ ine w hat chem icals are present in humans, air, water and soil. Initial test results are
analyzed to assess the situation and determine what further tests are required. Test results
are powerful and considered the purest form o f unbiased data. Numbers are seen as
holding the answer to our problems, and we are often instructed to trust numbers above all
else, including our intuition, senses and best judgement.
Citizens are rarely warned, however, o f the pitfalls associated with testing and
numbers. The pow er o f numbers rests on the credibility and political power o f the data
gatherer. Citizens and advocacy groups are consistently accused o f having unreliable data
that invariably is touched by politics and emotion. Industry numbers are critiqued by
citizen advocates as skewed towards whatever results best serve the purpose o f that
particular industry. Government numbers are often viewed with suspicion by both citizens
and industry.
Many o f the problems seen in the Alberton situation revolve around issues o f
environm ental and hum an health tests which either were or were not done. The decision
not to test for something is a m ajor decision which m ust be exam ined as thoroughly as
150Fischoff, F; P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein. 1982. Lay foibles and expert fables in
judgm ents about risk. The Am erican Statistician 36(3);240-255.
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decisions to test and w hat to test for. Omissions are able to slip by quietly, while tests for
the wrong chem icals are often used to placate the public. A noteworthy characteristic o f
the A lberton incident was the notion that "enough tests have been done”. Numbers were
thrown at the com munity without much explanation or justification. Then the sheer
num bers of'sam ples' or 'tests' were held up as proof that the area was safe. Ellen Leahy,
director o f the M issoula City-County Health D epartm ent told victims “We have tested
2000 sam ples”.

The total number o f tests was purported to indicate evidence o f safety,

even though the majority were pH tests to identify traces o f chlorine gas deposition,
M ontana Rail Link’s spokesperson also relied on the number o f tests to assure safety and
marginalize com munity concerns:
"It's entirely safe for these people to return to their homes," said Lynda
Frost, M ontana Rail Link spokesman.(jzc) And although MRL, the local
and state health departments and the Environmental Protection Agency say
the area is now safe, a small group o f residents says they ju st won't go
back.. .None o f the evacuees were forced to return to their homes this
weekend. Frost said. MRL will continue to pay for their lodging, "we're
w illing to work w ith the group," she said....ACE wants an independent
tester-and perhaps two separate labs-to perform tests on their homes an
property, before they'll feel safe enough to return. "Our position is
basically...thus far, thousands o f tests have been performed," Frost said.
Those tests have been analyzed and A lberton has been deemed safe for
reentry.*®^

W ho performs the testing is also important. The decision o f what not to test for is
often m ade silently and with the intent o f not being disclosed. At Alberton, M ontana Rail
Link and its sister company, Envirocon, and then its contractor, Olympus Environmental,

151 Evacuee M eeting Notes. 4/24/96. Appendix A.
152j^iissoulian, 4/29/96.No more detour- last o f evacuees allowed back into their homes.
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Inc. controlled o f environmental sampling during the initial days o f the incident, April 1114. By the tim e the EPA entered the hot zone on April 14, on-site remediation and
assertions had been made by the EPA and county health department concerning health
risks based solely on the MRL's testing. EPA ’s Regional Toxicologist, Chris Weis stated
on April 14 “It is very safe to re-enter the area with respect to residual chemicals. We
think your hom e is safe. There is technical activity in the Hot Zone. The EPA is
continually m onitoring the activity. We have reviewed the evacuation plan. Things are in
order”. E l l e n Leahy, D irector o f the M issoula City/County Health Department reassured
evacuees "[w]e have been testing since the first release. Everything is okay. I f you find
anything questionable, please call.”’^
No government agency publicly questioned reliance on MRL data, nor did they
push the company to m ake improvements in testing or disclosure. Government officials,
to the public at least, appeared to support the company entirely and advocate for the
public only w ithin the framework established by the company in the first few days o f the
incident.

E v a c u e e M eeting Notes, 4/14/96. A ppendix A.

Id.
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The incident began with MRL on the scene with its subsidiary, Envirocon, doing
environmental testing. M issoula Regional HazMat Team members were told to leave the
site soon after their arrival on the morning o f April 11, 1996, before they could conduct

T he E P A perform ed quality assurance sam pling. Sam ples th at w ere collected by O lym pus
E nvironm ental w ere split w ith the EPA. T he E P A used P aragon L aboratories fo r analysis.
O ly m p u s E n v iro n m e n ta l collected sam ples o f soü, air, and w ater. O lym pus used Energy
L abs fo r analysis o f th e ir sam ples.
M a r in e E n v iro n m e n ta l perform ed m ost o f the a ir m onitoring o f chlorine and all o f the
air m onitoring for organic vapors. B ioSystem s provided the d ata loggers and probably
analyzed the data. N o rep o rt from M arine E nvironm ental has ev er b een m ade available to
the public.
E n v iro c o n is a su b sid iary o f W ashington C orporation, as is M RL. There is no w ritten
rep o rt from E nviro co n in the p u blic record. E nvirocon did the first on-site sam pling, site
clean up and rem ediation. E nergy Labs did the analysis fo r Envirocon.
G a ro n S m ith is a U niversity o f M ontana C hem istry P rofessor and did testing o f the
p otassium cresylate contam inated soil from sam ples provided by O lym pus.

Figure 1. Overview O f Prim ary Environmental Testing Contractors and Agencies.

sampling to determ ine contaminants o f concern. M arine Environmental was contracted by
MRL to do air m onitoring for chlorine and other chemicals. On April 13, 1996, Olympus
Environmental, hired by MRL, began work. The EPA Region 8 toxicologist and risk
assessor did not access the site until April 14, 1996. In the meantime, a variety o f tests had
been done by M RL's contractors and conveyed to the public as evidence that all was well at
the site and in Alberton. Chlorine air monitoring and pH level testing were the dominant
tests done and the only results made public in the initial days o f the incident. Olympus took
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the lead and was the sole testing entity on site until the EPA arrived on April 14. In their
final report, released in June o f 1996, they describe their work this way:
The objectives o f the sampling program were to collect data that could be
used to assess potential impacts to human health and the environment
through contact with the released chemicals in the soil, vegetation, water, air
(lim ited real tim e air monitoring) and solid surfaces... Continuous air
m onitoring was conducted by M arine Environmental Services. Additional
soils sampling, w ater sampling and air monitoring was performed by various
health officials and regulatory agencies including the M issoula County
H ealth D epartm ent and the USEPA.
Several important inconsistencies have been found in Olympus Environmental's
final report. Olympus reports that no organic vapors were detected in the air monitoring,
but there is direct evidence to the contrary from Ellen Leahy’s notes and M arine
Environmental's field logs. Olympus also reports that they did not find the white dust
(while other logs suggest that they did). Despite these significant inconsistencies and
omissions, D EQ and EPA relied on MRL and Olympus data to make decisions regarding
human health and safety.

General Factors Affecting, Testing
D uring the first two hours o f the derailment, chemicals were mixing and creating
secondary reactions which were possibly transported by the rain that morning. The total
am ount o f all types o f chem icals released and by-products produced during the spill is still
unknown.

Olympus Environmental, Inc., 1996a.
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The wind played an important role in the accuracy o f the testing. The Marine
Environm ental Fieldbook verified that when testing was done on one side o f a car leaking
product, the reading was low or zero if the wind was blowing in the opposite direction.
W hen technicians were testing in the direction o f the wind, the reading would be high.
According to several logs and reports, contractors hoped the wind would disperse the
chemical clouds that were hanging over the Alberton area. Dispersal did not mean that the
chem icals were neutralized and rendered harmless, as susceptible people could still be
injured by low dose exposures. The w ind also caused the chemicals to move erratically and
to collect in pockets. The inconsistent dispersal exposed some people and their property,
while leaving others unharmed. The mountainous terrain helped to prevent complete
dispersal o f the plume, and in general, the Alberton canyon tunneled the wind in a west to
east direction towards Missoula.
Elevation played a role in correct testing. Clouds containing the other chemicals
were likely well above the testing meters that were being used to test for ground-hugging
plumes o f chlorine

and it wasn't until April 14“', three days after the spill, that Marine

Environmental tested for chlorophenols. I f the clouds o f chemicals were floating higher
than the testing meters, then there would not have been an accurate reading o f what was
still in the plume.

ACCEH and King, 1997. Reports o f the initial cloud describe it as greenish and low
lying, typical o f a chlorine plume. Reports from several hours later, however, mention
a higher rain cloud looking plume which was bluish. This is consistent with the fact
that fires on site were reported several times that morning, and later denied, but never
proved not to have occurred. A fire could have created the numerous chemical by
products eventually discovered, as well as a non-chlorine plume.
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A ir Testing
The m ajor initial exposure route to the chemical cloud the morning o f April 11, 1996
was through the air. Injuries were sustained from inhalation o f chemicals and exposure o f
skin and eyes to the cloud. The scene was understandably chaotic that morning, as a result
no testing o f the chemical contents o f the initial plume was ever conducted. In addition, no
mixed chemical air modeling has ever been released to the public. Organic vapor
monitoring data and analysis performed by M arine Environmental has never been released
to the public, only to MRL in June o f 1996. None o f M arine Environmental ' s nor
Envirocon’s results are included even by reference in Olympus Environmental's report,
which stands as the sole M RL funded environmental testing authority.
Chlorine was the only chemical air monitored for during the entire incident, except
for the above m entioned publicly unreleased M arine Environmental data. Even this
chlorine inform ation was unavailable to the public in a useful format, such as a model o f
the chemical cloud that first morning. The shape and movement o f the initial cloud was
critical to exploring and understanding spatial variations in residents’ symptoms and
vegetative damage. M ontana Rail Link contracted a company from W isconsin to conduct
plume m odeling throughout the incident, however this information was not made available
to residents.
In fact, residents were repeatedly told that the m icroclim atic variations o f Alberton
Canyon m ade such m odeling impossible, or at least unreliable. W hen in truth MRL
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understood from the very beginning that plume modeling was crucial to their litigation and
held that inform ation secret. According the community group ACCEH:
Chlorine air modeling was withheld from the public as long as possible.
A CCEH received through a FOIA request the very air modeling we were
told did not exist. The air modeling docum ent is dated April 11, 1996
7:55 AM. Before many evacuees were even out o f the hot zone, facts were
available to EPA and MRL. These same facts were never presented to the
people suffering from direct exposure to the toxic plume. Parents,
responsible for young children, were not able to provide their physicians the
very inform ation physicians needed most: what chemicals and chemical
interactions were you and your children exposed to and in what quantity?
Knowing the levels o f chlorine leaking from the tanker car during offloading was
critical to the safety o f workers on site. Chlorine levels, however, were used solely to
determ ine the safety o f evacuees reentering the site for pet rescues or permanent re-entry
and for reopening o f the interstate. Chlorine concentration data was the only information
about air quality used by officials in their determ inations o f safety for evacuated residents,
even when other smells and symptoms were reported.
Chlorine concentrations were measured by ten continuous air samplers and
nine direct reading stations set up and used from April 12-28, 1996. These
instrum ents were read, m aintained and calibrated by MRL's contractor
M arine Environmental....On April 16, 1996 START accompanied Marine
Environm ental to their fixed and direct reading instrument locations.
START gathered independent chlorine concentration readings...to confirm
M arine Environm ental's readings o f estim ated chlorine contamination and
m igration during offloading o f Tank Car #3, and to determine if the Health
and Safety o f personnel within the exclusion zone were being
com prom ised.. .The EPA OSC and toxicologist reviewed air sample
locations .and reviewed the data gathered by those instruments daily. Air
quality health and safety issues were monitored daily by the EPA OSC and
toxicologist on scene.

‘” URS, 1996.
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Thus, there is no data upon which an assertion that air exposure to chemicals other
than chlorine had occurred. The only non-chlorine air m onitoring was done by MRL’s
contractor and never released to the public. The same fate o f nondisclosure by the
responsible party befell the crucial plume modeling. And finally, the EPA never made
public any plume modeling obtained through their involvement.

Soils Testing
The 17,000 gallons o f potassium cresylate released ended up on the ground adjacent
to the derailed cars. The cresylate was a liquid heavier than water, and therefore had the
ability to leach downward into the water table. Chlorine tanker car #3, which emptied
completely, was offgassing directly onto the pooled potassium cresylate, hence the
chemical reactions betw een chlorine and cresylate. The delay in testing the potassium
cresylate to assess its com ponents and potential health effects on evacuated residents and
responders is inexplicable. It seems likely that MRL would have asked their original
contractor, Envirocon, to sample the spilled liquid, but such testing was never disclosed.
MRL m aintained that chlorine was the m ain chemical o f concern, and apparently
directed their second contractor, Olympus Environm ental, to not fully test the petroleum
waste product pooling on a steep bank ju st above the Clark Fork River. On April 13,
Olympus Environm ental gave first m ention to potassium cresylate in their test plans.
“Liquid was spilled on south west side o f railroad tracks and confined to that area. No
visible evidence o f spill within 150 feet o f river. Principle impacts related to caustic
properties. Impacts will be adequately evaluated from pH analyses related to chlorine
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evaluation”'^* This petroleum refinery waste containing numerous toxic components was
not tested to assess its impacts or reactions, but instead simply tested for pH to indicate
presence o f chlorine. This plan worked until the EPA arrived on site.
W hen the EPA finally made it onto the site on the fourth day o f the incident,
April 14, 1996, they shadowed M RL's contractor on their testing rounds. EPA saw fit to
rubberstam p these testing regimes and analyze chiefly the same samples that Olympus
chose to test (which is referred to as a split sample). EPA took only one independently
selected sample, AB-SO-01.
The EPA OSC, USCG and START collected soil sample AB-SO-01 from
the stained soil in the depression south o f and adjacent to the railroad
track near the derailed potassium cresylate car (GATX 16194) during their
initial walk through o f the hot zone on April 14, 1996 to determine the
contam inants o f concern. Olympus Environmental, Inc., collected two
stained soil samples from the same area (SS-1 and SS-2) for the same
purpose.

EPA 's soil sample AB-SO-01 yielded some disturbing results which forced
changes in the chlorine only testing protocols to incorporate chlorine by-products like
chlorophenols and other hydrocarbons. The results showed detectable levels o f
benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, m,p-Xylene, 1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene, and 1,2,4Trimethylbenzene. The presence o f chloroform , n-propylbenzene and chloromethane
were detected below the detection level (and in the first two samples, very close to
detection levels).*^®

*** Olympus, 1996.
•*’ URS, 1996.
‘« U R S , 1996.
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These tests were concerned with volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds
formed in the reaction between chlorine and potassium cresylate.
The VOC analysis requested by START determined that chloroform
was present above the detection limit in surface soil-split sample
Pl(0.031ppm ), P3 (O.OOSppm) and P4 (0.35ppm). Chloroform is formed
in the presence o f organic precursors, water, and chlorine, all o f which
were present where these samples were taken. VOC analysis also
detected toluene (O.OOSppm), p-isopropyltoluene (0.007ppm) and
chloromethane (0.017ppm) in surface soil-split sample P4. Olympus
Environmental did not request a VOC analysis on these samples and
therefore a VOC result comparison o f the sample and split is not
made.'*’

It is important to note that Olympus did not request a Volatile Organic Compound
analysis o f the above described samples. This example perfectly illustrates the power
contained in the decision o f w hat to test for, or not. Had EPA not done a split o f that
sample and requested a VOC analysis, im portant information regarding hydrocarbon
contam ination would have been lacking. As it was, the absence o f EPA for the crucial first
three days o f the incident and their lack o f dialogue concerning the adequacy o f company
sponsored tests leads to the question o f what other information may be missing.
On April 16, three full days after testing potassium cresylate only for pH, Olympus
devised a "sampling and analysis plan to evaluate composition o f potassium cresylate
solution mixed with chlorine in area o f release at M ontana Rail Link Derailment, Alberton,
M ontana”. A t this point Olympus already knew and probably had always known that the
chlorine and cresylate had mixed, because it was obvious from the proximity o f the two
cars ruptures and em itted contents.
URS, 1996.
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O nce the presence o f chlorophenols and other hydrocarbons was established, the
next task was to determine if and how far these compounds had migrated o ff site. Since no
sampling o f the cloud had been conducted, the next best thing was to test for air deposition
in the form o f residual chemicals. This testing protocol was problematic for several
reasons. M ost importantly, the tim e delay between the original cloud and soil and surface
deposition testing, and the low number o f sites tested make the reliance on the results used
to state that the chem icals never impacted residents extremely suspect. Furthermore, the
patchiness o f the cloud’s movement through the affected area alone necessitated numerous
sites for soil testing. The lag tim e between suspected air deposition and testing made
extrapolation and precautionary readings o f data necessary. None o f this occurred.
On April 20, 21, and 26, 1996 START collected soil samples in the
wreckage area, all o f which are splits from M RL’s Olympus Environmental
sam pling efforts with the exception o f AB-SO-01. Soil sampling efforts
were conducted to determine the extent o f contamination (specially
chlorinated phenols).
Surface soil sample P4 was collected approximately 60 feet north o f
the M RL railroad tracks by Olympus Environmental and split with START
(Figure 3). 2,4,6 trichlorophenol was reported at 11 mg/kg in the Olympus
sample and at 8.1 mg/kg in the START soils split.
Due to high levels o f phenols detected on and around the site, further testing was
done to trace the m igration o f these compounds. This offsite testing was not done until
April 26, 1996 tw o days before re-entry and 15 days, many rainy, after the chemical release.
The EPA report confirms this timeline:
Because 2,4,6 trichlorophenol was detected at ppm levels in surface soils
sample P4, additional sampling was conducted to determine the extent o f
migration. Surface soils sample SI was collected from a residence southeast
•«U R S, 1996.
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of the wreckage area, and soil sample S2 was collected from a residence
southwest o f the wreckage area on April 26, 1996. The results from these
surface soil samples indicated that SVOCs were not present above the
laboratory detection limits. ..
In order to determine if SVOC (chlorinated phenols) deposition by air
transport had occurred, wipe samples were collected in the wreckage...[a]
wipe sample ( Wl ) was collected by START and Olympus Environmental on
April 26, 1996, from the porch located at the residence on Plateau Road
southeast o f the wreckage area. The results from the SVOC analysis
indicates that chlorinated phenols were not present above the laboratory
detection limits.
Only one wipe sample was collected and this sample was not correlated with plume
modeling to show that the cloud traveled over that residence. Residences farther from the
site should have been tested to determine the distance that phenols traveled, even if those
results were all below detect. However, these types o f questions are so critical to litigation
that MRL was unwilling to share such information or request detailed testing to shed light
on such concerns. EPA did not pressure Olympus to do more tests in this area, nor did they
undertake them on their own.
The act o f not testing for something is a seemingly passive, yet often well thought
out, method for obfuscating the truth about chemical contamination. Time is on the
polluter’s side, since the chemicals, particularly the volatile and semi-volatile chemicals of
concern in this case, will eventually dissipate to levels below detect. The longer tests are
delayed, the more likely it is that volatile compounds will have broken down leaving levels
which are “below detect”. Once the compounds are “below detect” only extrapolation is
possible to determine when and if the chemicals were present above detect. This is the
position which evacuees and their advocates were left in regard to soil testing. The
URS, 1996.
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presence o f chemicals below detect leads to the assumption that they likely were once
present in greater quantities, and this raises the question of continued possible health
effects even at or below detection levels in an already impacted population. Repeated
testing o f those same soils to trace breakdown and dissipation would have allowed for a
more scientifically rigorous extrapolation of what the highest levels were likely to have
been. Such testing never was conducted
In addition ‘‘[n]o indoor monitoring o f people’s homes was thought to be necessary,
even after months o f complaints from residents to the DEQ about the lingering and ever
present odors o f chemicals inside and outside o f evacuees homes. Private testing obtained
by some hot zone residents has revealed phenols in soil and inside homes”**” This calls into
question the adequacy and timing o f testing conducted by MRL and EPA.

Potassium Cresylate Impacted Soils
Evacuated residents returned when the area was deemed safe by officials and were
soon sickened again by exposure to the cresylate contaminated soils, which remained on
site against the urgings o f health officials. Odors and associated symptoms were reported
from: 1) the contaminated soils in and around the site; 2) exposure to the soils as they were
carried out by train to disposal (in reportedly not well prepared batches which leaked odors
and particulate matter); and 3) the empty railcars as they sat in a siding in Lothrop, a
community several mile east o f Alberton, for days before being taken to the scrap yard,
despite assurances that all o f the dangerous soils were to be removed and contained. These
ACCEH 1998,
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odors and illnesses would not have occurred had the Health Department insisted that, as
initially discussed, the bulk o f the contaminated soils be removed prior to re-entry. The
EPA left the scene after agreeing to the re-entry criteria and prior to removal of
contaminated soils. This removal was left to Montana Rail Link and its contractors.
According to MRL representatives, all o f the soil that was stained with
potassium cresylate was to be removed. A removal plan was prepared,
reviewed by EPA, approved, and in place as o f April 25, 1996, to excavate
the stained soils and the topsoil within the wreckage area by MRL contractor
Envirocon. Excavation began on April 25, 1996. The excavated soils were
staged on top of a high density polyethylene liner by Envirocon. A berm was
built around the area to prevent runoff o f contaminants. The contaminated
soil piles were located immediately south o f the stained ditch. As o f April
27, 1996, Envirocon had excavated and segregated the soils as described in
Table 3 below. (125 cubic yards o f highly contaminated surface soils; 60
yards o f lightly stained soils). Envirocon anticipated excavating a soil pit a
25 feet wide and 325 feet long to a total depth o f 7 feet.

Samples were taken o f the excavated soils, but the tests had to wait to be analyzed
and "addressed by the state o f Montana. As o f April 28, 1996, the state o f Montana
assumed responsibility as the lead regulatory agency in charge o f determining the extent o f
subsurface contamination and the final disposal o f the contaminated soil".^^^ The Montana
DEQ, newly on the scene and without direct cooperation with the EPA, assessed that MRL
was competent and in control o f the remediation.

Final Re-entry to Evacuated Area
The official end o f the incident came on April 28 at which time:

‘«U R S , 1996.
«« Id.
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Residents were allowed to return to their homes in the exclusion zone after
the damaged chlorine cars were off-loaded or stabilized and the risk from
contamination was evaluated (by the EPA regional toxicologist on scene and
the Missoula City-County Health Department.). Wipe and soil samples were
collected in the town o f Alberton and near other residences, and analyzed to
verity that chlorinated phenols contamination was not present. Soil sampling
and analysis revealed chlorinated phenols at the wreckage area and not
beyond 2,500 feet. Analytical results have shown no evidence of residual
contaminants that pose a threat to the surrounding community.

Re-entry was sanctioned by the Missoula City-County Health Department and the
EPA once each o f four re-entry criteria were met. These criteria were:
1) Chlorine Gas: The absence o f any further risk from chlorine gas.
2) Potassium Cresylate: The removal o f the ‘bulk’ o f cresylate contaminated
soils.
3) Chlorophenols: The absence o f chlorophenol migration off site at high
levels.
4) White Dust: The absence o f a harmful white dust.*®*
The decision to allow re-entry was negotiated between officials from government,
the company, the Department o f Transportation and responders. There was tremendous
pressure from all sides to allow residents back in and normalize the situation. The DOT
was extremely eager to reopen the highway, but could not do so until residents returned.
The decision to allow reentry was arrived at through a consensus-type process among
officials. The concerns o f some were overridden by the desires o f many. Residents were
told that the area was safe to re-enter and provided with guidance on throwing away
perishable food items and cleaning surfaces. Residents were to notify officials if chlorine

'«U RS, 1996.
‘«Incident Command, 4/22/96. Appendix A.
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pockets were discovered in closed areas. The outside environment was deemed safe for
children’s play, gardening and the like.
Soon after reentry, the residents’ troubles began anew. After April 28, 1996 the
hazardous soils sat on the site for several more weeks sickening area residents. Prior to
removal o f the soils, they were analyzed for chemical content and "temporarily stockpiled
on site.” Four of the six piles o f soils were deemed hazardous waste under federal law and,
as such, were required to be disposed o f in a hazardous waste incinerator and landfill. The
other two piles fell just below the EPA levels for hazardous waste and were shipped, more
cheaply, to the local landfill. All of the piles remained on site, were manipulated, loaded
onto rail cars and moved through the previously evacuated area. The soils were extremely
odorous and evoked numerous complaints from residents who were further sickened by
exposure to these soils. Residents were not notified that these soils were classified as
hazardous wastes. Instead, residents were told that remediation was moving forward
smoothly and all contaminants o f concern had been removed already from the site. The
EPA report clarifies that the soil which remained on site until May 18, 1996 was certainly
not uncontaminated
Detectable concentration o f Chlorophenols were observed in each of the six
samples. Chlorophenol concentrations from four of the six soil stockpile
samples exceeded toxicity characteristic standards and were classified as a
hazardous waste for disposal. The hazardous waste classified soils were
manifested, transported according to RCRA and DOT regulations and
disposed of by MRL at the Chemical Waste Management Thermal
Operations facility in Port Aurthor (sic), Texas. The non-hazardous
classified soils were disposed o f by MRL at the Browning Ferris Industries
landfill in Missoula, Montana.
•®URS, 1996.
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Dioxin Testing
The presence o f all ingredients necessary to produce to most toxic chemical known
raised serious questions at Alberton. Organochlorine dioxin precursors to dioxins such as
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol and other phenols abounded at the site. Whether the heat necessary
to allow the full reaction to dioxin was unknown. Rumors o f several fires on site and the
use o f heavy machinery and welding equipment made it possible. Moreover, dioxin
contamination o f oil refinery waste (potassium cresylate) is not uncommon. Therefore,
dioxin could be on site even in the absence o f a heat catalyst. For these reasons, victims and
dioxin experts from environmental non-profits requested dioxin testing to rule out the
possibility. EPA, however, decided not to test for dioxin and based their decision not to
test on the following rationale;
1) There was "not likely to" have been sufficient heat produced for the
formation o f dioxins the morning o f the spill.
2) Although dioxin could have been formed without elevated temperature, in
the presence o f free chlorine molecules, the "high pH o f the cresylate
solution would have increased the concentration o f potassium thiolate and
the potassium phenalate; both are free radical scavengers likely to have
significantly inhibited dioxin formation."
3) Since soil sampling did not identify the presence o f dioxin prescursors
(di- and trichlorophenols) in high concentrations far away from the site.
"[tjherefore, there is not evidence o f significant environmental transport to
these compounds (or dioxins) off the immediate site o f procut spillage. It
was judged implausible that toxic dioxin congeners were formed in high
concentrations as a result o f the collision or migrated into the adjacent
residential area.”
4) “All stained and cresylate-contaminated soils will be removed."
The EPA concluded by stating, “[b]ased upon these findings and removal
actions, dioxin sampling is judged to be unwarranted”*™
‘™URS, 1996.
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The EPA’s argument against dioxin testing is inconsistent and seems to protest a bit
too much, based on the evidence o f dioxin precursors on site and beyond. Residents of the
town o f Alberton were interested in whether dioxin was present on site; questions of
exposure and migration would follow from that initial assessment. To that end. University
of Montana professor o f chemistry Dr. Garon Smith recommended taking dioxin tests
inside o f the potassium cresylate car, as a start. This suggestion was not heeded. Moreover,
EPA’s assertions that the temperature was never high enough (200-300 degrees Fahrenheit)
to lead to the formation o f dioxin is questionable. There were conflicting reports o f an
April 11 fire on the scene and a grass fire at a later point. Also, the use of heavy equipment
(blowtorches, etc.) could have created combustion level temperatures at various points and
places on the wrecked cars.
EPA's argument rests on a preponderance of "unlikely” and "not likely” statements
which do not stand up to the evidence. Dioxin, the most toxic chemical known, is a
political hot potato and its presence, even at low levels on the derailment site, would have
raised a series o f questions concerning worker and resident safety. The primary question,
however, would have been; Why wasn’t dioxin tested for immediately upon recognition that
chlorine and organic compounds mixed? The longer EPA stalled such testing in the face of
strident demands by residents to do so, the greater the cost o f a positive dioxin test grew,
politically and legally. Dioxin testing, like all other testing, became a moot issue once
enough time elapsed and once the bulk o f the contaminated soils were removed. Like so
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many other questions concerning this incident, we simply may never know if dioxins were
formed on site.

Damage to Vegetation, Pet and Livestock Health
Government officials and Montana Rail Link repeatedly made statements early on
in the incident that there was no damage to v e g e t a t i o n . T h e s e statements, like so many
others made in an atmosphere of incomplete disclosure, were made not on the basis o f facts
or data, but simply in order to reassure residents regardless of the impact such faulty
information might have on their perception o f the spill and ability to make informed
decisions concerning re-entry. These statements were in fact later shown to be completely
without basis when the company hired a contractor to assess damage to vegetation and a
biology graduate student undertook a detailed study of damage to vegetation for his PhD
project. Officials never apologized or publicly corrected their earlier assertions. As was so
common in this incident, contradictory information co-existed and then replaced itself with
the ‘correct’ information as if by magic and with no one to blame.
Indeed, at the same time officials were reassuring the public that there was no
damage to vegetation, MRL’s own contractors were doing vegetative damage inventories of
the people’s properties and town parks. On April 16 the following observations were made:
“Lawns within town exhibit symptoms o f chlorine exposure and will likely experience
short-term dieback ” The extent o f damage was eventually summarized as:

Evacuee Meeting, Technical Committee and other notes. 4/12-4/14/96.
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Appendix A.

A majority o f the stressed vegetation appears to the east o f the actual spill
site. In general, damage to vegetation appears to begin at Milemarker 72.5
Eastbound on 1-90 and ends at approximately Milemarker 81.0 eastbound.
The highest elevation to which stresses Douglas-fir are visible is roughly
3400 feet above sea level. The extent o f damage varies greatly along the
elevational gradient. This is probably due to localized topography and
weather patterns.

This situation was analogous to the pet health situation. Officials went out o f their
way to tell pet owners that there were no ill effect to animals from exposure, despite no
evidence on which to base this. Once ill effects were reported by residents themselves,
officials stepped back and adopted instead the message that any damage was fleeting and
not serious.

Conclusion
The issues surrounding testing in Alberton illustrate the problem o f nonindependent scientific analysis and the large area o f discretion left to the analyzers in terms
o f what to test for. This set up the common problem in Alberton: lay people do not know
the proper tests that should be done; testers had agendas and pressure not to fully explore
possible contamination via testing and not to explain the omissions to the public; the
company and officials then used the existence o f sheer numbers o f tests and data as proof
that the area was safe and presented no health risk. In this way, the numbers o f tests
conducted and the repetitive pattern of non-detects obfuscated the fact that, more likely

‘^R eport to Montana Rail Link: Vegetation Damage Assessment for the Alberton
Chlorine Spill May 20, 1996 by Tim Meikle and Dr. David lanson, Bitterroot
Consultants, Corvallis, MT
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than not, the wrong things were tested for. Furthermore, the meaning o f non-detect was not
explained to the media or affected citizens, and the media then portrayed non-detect to
mean zero. This, o f course, was never corrected by the company or officials.
No blood serum samples for dioxins, phenols, cresols, and chlorinated phenols were
ever collected despite the knowledge o f an on-site chemical reaction and SVOC results
from the site at high levels (2,4,6 trichlorophenol 599ppm, 2-methylphenol at 7190 ppm,
and phenol at 6010ppm). The issue o f human health testing and medical management o f a
toxic disaster like Alberton is discussed in the next chapter. Like with environmental
testing, human health testing and diagnosis fell victim to the pervasive non-disclosure and
political vagaries o f the incident.
Most disturbing o f all was that the notion o f basic scientific inquiry was lost in the
Alberton disaster. The company controlled the site and did not ask questions or dig deeper
to ascertain unknown contaminants or by-products. Once the officials came on the scene,
the need to continue forward momentum to re-entry and the chlorine only message had
been adopted already by them so it was too late for them to turn back. They executed a half
turn and did not push any farther, despite lingering questions concerning the contents of the
initial cloud, air deposition of by-products and resulting health effects.
No one took up the inquiry purely in the name o f science to answer the fascinating
question o f what exactly were the people exposed to. Since the contents o f the initial cloud
were unknown and delays had undoubtedly led to loss o f product remaining by the time
samples were taken to assess off-site migration, a backwards approach to the problem was
the only way to solve it. The backwards approach would consist o f a thorough analysis of
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w hat the "ingredients” present at the derailment site could produce in the presence o f rain
and possibly fire. And finally, what chemicals or by-products produced that morning could
have created the health problems reported by victims?
Evacuees and concerned citizens have repeatedly demanded that this exact process
occur; they desire an outside scientist to come in and do a proper analysis and re-creation,
starting with the initial release, o f the chemical recipe o f the spill to answer the most basic
o f questions; What was released and how are the symptoms related to those chemicals?
and What are the holes in the existing data and theory o f exposure routes and effects?

EPA and ATSDR have been asked to fund and support such an effort, but neither
have agreed. It appears that until the community group raises enough money to hire an
independent scientist to review the documented data, the mystery remains.
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C h a p ter 3. Effects of Non-Disclosure on M edical C are Provided to Spill Victims
Viewedfrom the perspective o f traditional medicine, the health problems o f the
fam ilies were a collection o f incoherent anomalies. Viewed with reference to the
chemicals, their problems began to make sense. The chemicals provided a
fram ework fo r understanding their health experiences that accorded them a
legitimacy that professional medicine was unable or unwilling to give them.
It is not surprising to fin d the Woburn fam ilies preoccupied with their current and
future health. In fact, they harbor a feeling that they have not really survived, but
have only been given a reprieve, with a threat o f disease—even a death
sentence—over themselves and their loved ones.^^*
The medical management o f a toxic disaster is always challenging, and these
challenges increase with the number o f people affected, amounts, types and interactions of
the chemicals involved, and the level o f infrastructure and expertise existing in the area.
The mixed chemical spill in Alberton officially caused the evacuation o f approximately
1000 people, but the numbers of those affected increase when injured people outside o f the
official evacuation zone are included. Despite official attempt to label the incident a
chlorine spill, there were three chemical products released and a host o f by-products
created, all o f which potentially affected exposed victims. Alberton is a small town o f 354
in a rural county with three physicians and a ten bed hospital. The city of Missoula, 30
miles from Alberton, has two hospitals which serve as regional medical centers. Montana
has no medical school, public health or epidemiology programs. All of this factored into
the trouble victims encountered as they tried to get their exposure diagnosed and treated.
An area of major disagreement among evacuees and officials which continues today
is the quality and availability of health impact information and treatment options
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia,
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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concerning the chemical exposure. In keeping with the “chlorine only” official nature of
the incident, health information concerning chlorine was initially provided to evacuees in a
variety o f forms, mainly verbally, by the county health departments. Montana Rail Link
arranged a forum where local doctors addressed evacuees but focused exclusively on
respiratory symptoms from chlorine, what will be called “classic” symptoms here. Other
symptoms were rarely commented on or accepted as valid by the local medical community;
this attitude was adopted by Incident Command as well These “non-classic” symptoms of
concern were 1) long term health effects from chlorine, particularly non-respiratory
ailments; and 2) injuries arising from exposure to potassium cresylate and reactants from
the chemicals mixing.
Determining the true extent and content o f the chemical exposure proved difficult
for the evacuees because Montana Rail Link never made public the extensive plume
mapping used in the response, or other pertinent information such as aerial photography or
infrared imaging. Officials never made a public statement that chemicals other than
chlorine could be causing health problems. Indeed, to make such a statement would
conflict with years o f official posturing on what really took place in Alberton. Officials
were given plenty o f opportunity to revise their initial diagnosis o f the spill, but never did.
Such a revision would still be met with gratitude and relief by many evacuees who have
developed symptoms which, according to the official line, are “impossible” from the spill.
Community group members have pleaded for a réévaluation o f the spill, an unbiased,
scientific assessment o f what spilled and what health effects could result. This seemingly
simple request has been marginalized and rejected at every turn, because in its simplicity it
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exposes the grave, fundamental mistakes which were made in the handling of this toxic
incident.
A significant problem victims of Montana Rail Link’s chemical disaster was that
the exposure was not properly identified by medical personnel. Though some medical
professionals did attempt to find out more information such as Dr. Greg Moore, physician
for the Frenchtown Fire Department, who sent a fax to a colleague stating “Please let me
know if any other chemicals involved. I have seen some contact dermatitis not too typical
for chlorine”(emphasis in original). Montana Rail Link made no official or public response
to this inquiry. This is another glaring example of the responsible company’s failure to
disclose the components o f the spill to physicians, responders, and government officials,
who in turn were responsible for communicating information to victims. Incident
Command failed in its responsibility to insure that the information it was basing public
health and safety decisions on was accurate and complete. In the same way, most medical
professionals failed to insure that the information they obtained concerning the release was
accurate and complete prior to dispensing diagnoses and treatment. This cycle of
misinformation and lack o f accountability which caused harm to victims proved difficult to
break.
The lack o f a comprehensive assessment o f exactly what chemicals evacuees were
exposed to and at what levels on the morning o f April 11, as well as during pet rescues and
other hot zone re-entries and upon the return home, was a significant problem for sickened
evacuees. While the circumstances in Alberton unfortunately are not unique, they are
certainly preventable based on guidance provided to medical personnel in the relevant
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literature. The first step in medical management o f any toxic incident must be to
“[e]valuate the problem. At the veiy beginning, you need the most accurate possible
information on the following: (1) What hazardous substances are involved? (2) What are
their toxicities and safety hazards?...
In many cases "a specific exposure may not be identifiable and an expected health
outcome may not be apparent. A true hazardous substances emergency is best managed by
a specialist with training in toxicology, epidemiology, and public health, but such
specialists are in short supply and may not be on the scene when an incident occurs.

As

a result, local physicians without training in toxic chemical effects become involved in
treatment and diagnosis o f victims. When a physician is called in to manage a hazardous
substance incident, there are two “cardinal rules to be followed. The first is to keep
cool.... Secondly, i f you don't know, you shouldn't g u e s s . . . . added). Guidotti
(1986) provides a list o f questions which must be asked immediately following a hazardous
substance release to avoid guessing:
1. What toxic and hazardous substances have been identified?
(a) What are their concentrations in air, water, and soil?
(b)What are the known health hazards at these concentrations?
(c) What are the potential hazards o f fire, explosion, or chemical
interaction?"’^*

Guidotti, T.L. 1986. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American
Journal o f Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
Id.
Id.
Guidotti, T.L. 1986,Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American
Journal o f Preventive Medicine 2(3): 148-154.
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Had these questions been asked on April 11, 1996 by local medical personnel, and
in turn been accurately answered by Montana Rail Link, medical providers and victims
alike would have been alerted to the presence o f more chemicals than chlorine and the high
likelihood o f chemicals reactions.*’^ Instead, physicians and medical providers accepted
the (lack of) information provided by the responsible party, Montana Rail Link, at face
value and proceeded to call the incident a “chlorine spill” and assess injuries based on this
misinformed assessment.
There is guidance offered to health care providers in the absence o f accurate
chemical information. It is suggested that exposed individuals who are not acutely ill
receive a “general medical evaluation... when the nature o f the exposure or probable
response is not known. The suggested evaluation is performed on the second day following
exposure and emphasizes the early detection o f dermatologie, pulmonaiy , hepatic, renal,
and neurologic sequelae.” '®" Alberton victims were never given general evaluations for
chemical injury, and, as a result, much information about the chemical components of the
exposure that could have been determined through such human health testing was lost.
Recognizing thaf'[c]orrect identification of the substances involved is essential and
requires technical expertise of a different sort than that o f most physicians",'®' particularly

Strong questions from the medical community early on would likely have pushed
Montana Rail Link and the government agencies into a position o f greater disclosure.
'®" Guidotti, T.L. 1984. San Diego County’s community right-to know ordinance; Case
Study o f a local approach to hazardous substances control. Journal o f Public Health
Policy.396-409.
'®' Guidotti, T.L. 1984. San Diego County’s community right-to know ordinance: Case
Study o f a local approach to hazardous substances control. Journal o f Public Health
Policy:396-A09
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those in a rural area. Thus, ‘‘[t]he successful medical management of a major incident
depends upon a rapid and complete evaluation for the acute and possible long-term health
hazards and this is likely to require the urgent deployment to the scene of specialists from
the key disciplines" including clinical medicine, pathology, epidemiology, biochemistry,
environmental sampling and toxicology.
This technical expertise was in short supply in Alberton, and lacking in the crucial
first four days o f the incident, with the exception o f company contractors performing
environmental testing. The EPA toxicologist did not survey the scene firsthand until four
days after the original release, at which point some evacuees had received treatment for
assumed chlorine symptoms and been released. The Agency for Toxic Substance and
Diseases Registry (ATSDR) researchers had not arrived on the scene either. Local doctors
and health officials were telling evacuees that the effects from chlorine were fleeting and
mainly respiratory. This information was amended when more information concerning the
chemicals was made public, but it was never replaced with adequate new information
concerning long-term chlorine and non-chlorine health effects. In addition, ATSDR’S
chlorine plume modeling, provided to the EPA and MRL on the morning o f the derailment,
was never released to the medical community. This plume modeling would have given
guidelines to physicians for potential patient exposure levels.
Most hospital doctors have little previous experience in dealing with chemical
emergencies. This creates the likelihood for the “mishandling o f the rare but devastating

Baxter, J.1991. Major chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
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release. Some major incidents in the future, as in the past, may well not be immediately
recognized for what they are until large numbers o f people have been exposed or inordinate
delays have occurred before an adequate response has been mounted.”*®^ There is always
the risk that the medical response to an uncommon but major incident might be delayed or
mismanaged because the epidemiological, laboratory, and toxicological skill needed
rapidly to evaluate and advise on the hazard are not available locally.’*^ In Alberton, this
problem was compounded when local officials were also unwilling to ask questions and go
against the interests o f a powerful, locally based company.
Despite local doctors’ inexperience and lack o f knowledge concerning the
chemicals involved and potential health effects, they came to be relied upon as “experts” by
Incident Command, and in some cases were hired as “experts” by MRL who conveyed their
assessments to victims. Local arrogance and refusal to bring in outside help, had negative
effects on spill victims. Based on what is publicly available, it is clear that government
officials were privy to only that information which M ontana Rail Link chose to share in the
first four days o f the incident. Officials, in turn, provided that information to local medical
personnel, who based their diagnoses and treatm ent on that same incomplete information.
The first four days o f the incident, during which tim e the terms and definitions (such as
“chlorine only”) were set, was controlled solely by MRL, the responsible company. Only
when govenunent officials were allowed on site, on April 14, was it even possible for

Baxter, J.1991. M ajor chemical disasters; Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
Baxter, J. 1991. M ajor chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
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physicians to be informed o f the mixing o f chemicals, as MRL previously obscured this
possibility from the public and medical community.
In order to remedy these conditions where responsible parties are given leeway and
not questioned as vigorously as public welfare demands, Baxter suggests that "[a] team of
experts may need to be deployed to make an urgent clinical and epidemiological
assessment o f the health impact and to ascertain the sources and extent o f a toxic exposure
in the population."'*^ Government officials have a responsibility to improve in this arena, as
"[t]he many agencies and professional groups concerned need to develop much closer links
and identify nationally the sources o f expertise available in an emergency."'*^ Such a team
would be best comprised on non-aligned doctors and scientists, those who are not
politically beholden and who would not be swayed by local politics or fears o f offending
local power structures. Had such a team arrived and paid no heed to company directives
concerning entry to the site, spill victims may have had a better chance to gain recognition,
diagnosis and treatment o f their symptoms early on.
Even with a correct identification o f the chemicals involved, however, information
on health effects is likely still to be incomplete. A majority o f chemicals in use today have
not been studied for human health effects at varying exposure levels, or in combination
with other chemicals. “M aterial Safety D ata Sheets...are almost always incomplete in their
descriptions o f the compounds' toxic effects. Since many chemical formulations are
proprietary mixtures, the data sheet may not identify specific chemicals or their
Baxter, J. 1991. M ajor chemical disasters; Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
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proportions."^*’ Even if the identity o f the agent is known, knowledge about its human
toxicity may be sparse.
The National Research Council estimated that only 2% o f at least 60,000
chemicals that are used widely have been comprehensively studied for toxic
effects. Many o f these chemicals were studied in animals; far fewer were
studies in humans. The few compounds that have been studies for chronic,
low-level effects have very rarely been evaluated for neurologic,
neurobehavioral, immune, endocrine, reproductive and pulmonary effects.
Rarely have they been studied in combined exposures, which actually exist
in the real world.
Thus, the lack o f identification o f the chemicals involved and their by-products,
coupled with incomplete information available on hum an health effects o f those chemicals,
made the correct assessment o f health effects in Alberton victims nearly impossible. In the
absence o f baseline information or complete toxicological information concerning the
chemicals involved, early detection and establishment o f a record o f all health effects is key
to future understanding. Health officials failed in this facet o f medical management as well.
When the substance is not known or involves a complex mixture, the
appropriate medical evaluation may be difficult to determine....[in those
cases] the clinician should at least consider the possibility o f acute effects
involving those organ systems most commonly involved in toxic injury: the
respiratory, renal, hepatic, dermatologie, and nervous systems. In San Diego,
California, an advisory committee to the County Department o f Health
Services has recommended that [an]., evaluation be performed on or about
day 3 in cases where the putatively exposed person is not acutely ill and the
identity o f the exposure is not known.

Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal
o f Preventive M edicine 2(3): 148-154.
'** Ziem and Davidoff. 1992. Archives o f Environmental Health.
Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal
o f Preventive M edicine 2(3): 148-154.
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Such a comprehensive evaluation was not done in the Alberton case. Patients were
not tested for anything except for respiratory damage despite evidence o f reported
symptoms inconsistent with chlorine effects, which supported the hypothesis that exposures
involved substantially more than chlorine. In addition to respiratory damage, eye and skin
bum s were seen as the only other possible symptoms from chlorine exposure. Basic tests
for general chemical injury were not recommended, indeed some patients had difficulty
even obtaining referrals to have additional tests done or second opinions given if chemical
injury were mentioned.
According to the literature on the medical management o f disasters, the onus for
determining the chemicals involved and possible health effects must rest also on the
physicians. This failure created a myriad o f problems for victims o f the spill. Medical
professionals, instead, accepted the company’s assessment o f the situation in the face o f
conflicting information and visible symptoms in their patients. Sick individuals faced
disbelief and ignorance from those who were supposed to care for them. Victims reported
time and again that their physicians refused to acknowledge that any symptoms not
ascribed to classic effects o f chlorine could in any way be related to their exposure. Instead,
m ost physicians were passive acceptors o f company sanctioned information, to the point
that patients who researched on their own and suggested tests to their own doctors, were
often rebuffed and marginalized. Physicians often diagnosed confounding symptoms as
“psychological' problems.

While serious psychological effects may certainly result from

Spill victims reported numerous occasions where their attempts to gain meaningful
diagnosis o f chemical injury were stymied by physicians who did not believe exposure to
chlorine had occurred, or that chlorine was capable o f causing long-term health effects.
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exposure to a toxic spill and evacuation, invoking them universally minimizes the reality
o f physiological as well as psychological symptoms.
The sickest residents quickly learned that nearly the entire medical community in
Missoula, save one ophthamologist, had bought into the ‘chlorine only' myth and could not
be trusted to make unbiased diagnoses or to assist their patients in determining the cause o f
their ailments. Many patients turned elsewhere for help; they enlisted the help o f
naturopaths, osteopaths, and other more progressive caregivers. They located physicians
and researchers who listened to victim s’ concerns and tested beyond the chlorine myth. All
o f these practitioners worked outside o f western Montana. Victims traveled to Billings,
Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Denver for expert medical treatment and testing.
These tests showed evidence o f chemical injury to the brain, immune and other
systems far beyond what would be expected from an exposure to chlorine.*^' Another
problem confronting Alberton evacuees was the lack o f information on long-term health
effects resulting from their exposure. This lack o f information was detrimental to the
progression o f medical evaluation and treatment. "The successful management o f a major
toxic release will therefore depend upon a rapid and complete assessment o f the health
hazard, a process which must begin as soon as possible and be updated as the emergency

Many o f these victims were prescribed anti-depressants.
ACCEH has compiled test results and health information for a number o f spill victims.
They are considering completing a community health survey to assess ongoing symptoms
and diagnoses.
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unfolds. This assessment should include long-term as well as immediate health effects.
Unfortunately, however;
the greatest area o f ignorance in a toxic release may relate to potential long
term health hazards, as there may be few if any immediate casualties...
Chronic injury to any organ system in the body may occur and the
establishing o f epidemiological databases on exposed and control
populations should be considered from the outset. ...The risk o f long term
effects from chemical injury, such as carcinogenicity, teratogenicity, and
other target organ damage, m ust also be considered from the outset. Such
long term effects can occur even in the absence o f severe acute effects in the
exposed population...

Follow-up o f victims’ health in the long term is critical for better understanding the
impacts o f chemical exposure. Indeed, tragic events such as Alberton provide unique
opportunities to study the effects o f various chemicals on human health. ”..[I]t is very
useful to establish a central registry o f individuals exposed...This registry can become
invaluable for future epidemiologic studies, to establish eligibility for disability benefits at
some future date, and to support later legal action. " Medical professionals in M issoula did
not suggest or pursue this notion. Nor did any o f the government agencies even compile a
list o f all people exposed during the incident; recognizing the extreme importance o f this
type o f information, the community group has attem pted to compile a list o f all evacuees in
order to track them and their health problems. Clearly, an “[ejpidemiologist should be
involved early so that relevant data on the exposed population are not lost, and long-term

Baxter, J.1991. M ajor chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
Id.
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follow up can be instituted.

The mere presence o f epidemiologists, however, does not

insure quality studies which will be o f use to victims and medical providers. Any studies
conducted are useless and even harmful to victims, unless done completely and done well.
For example, the lack o f complete information concerning the content o f the Alberton
exposures allowed all officially sanctioned health studies (by ATSDR and MCCHD) to
look at classic chlorine symptoms only. To spill victims, these studies wasted a lot o f
money asking the wrong questions about health effects resulting from the incident.

This

is unfortunately not uncommon in toxic disasters where "...epidemiological follow-up in
most o f these events has been incomplete or not even attempted.
Since medical officials were first not aware o f and then were slow to disclose the
actual components o f the spill and as a result diagnosed patients as affected by chlorine
only, a backwards approach to toxicology and epidemiology occurred in Alberton. Victims,
including many who re-entered for pet rescues, began reporting symptoms inconsistent with
chlorine effects within days o f the initial release. Victims quickly grew frustrated at health
officials inability and/or unwillingness to address these symptoms. Officials finally
acknowledged these complaints and requested testing o f the potassium cresylate and
discovered the chemical reactions and by-products. The conclusion they arrived at,
however, was that the other chemicals hadn’t migrated from the site in levels high enough
Guidotti, T.L. 1986.Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American
Journal o f Preventive M edicine 2(3): 148-154.
ACCEH wrote numerous letters to ATSDR commenting on the agency’s continued
testing for classic chlorine symptoms only. Several o f these are in the administrative
record in Missoula.
Baxter, J.1991. M ajor chemical disasters: Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
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to damage human health. Officials did not discuss or disclose the possibility that other
chemicals could have been in the initial cloud; furthermore, they never disclosed possible
health effects from the contaminated soils, beyond odor concerns, which remained
stockpiled on site for a month after evacuees were allowed home.
This lack o f disclosure and lack o f information allowed doctors to stick to the
chlorine only diagtiosis o f the spill, as they said they had no ‘p ro o f o f any other exposures.
This completed the circle o f official ignorance and non-disclosure which effectively shut
victims and their concerns out. Health officials required proof to believe that a symptom
which did not fit the parameters o f a chlorine exposure was real, but the environmental
testing done on site had not comprehensively looked for such p ro o f Thus, weeks elapsed
after the derailment with victims reporting various health effects and getting no assistance
from medical personnel who, moreover, did nothing to push government officials to find
the actual components o f the spill.
The mistakes made by medical personnel in the Alberton incident are two-parted:
first, health effects from other chemicals involved in the spill, and combinations o f
chemicals, were not acknowledged or treated; and second, only classic symptoms
(respiratory, dermal and ocular effects) from chlorine exposure were considered. These two
areas o f omissions caused victims endless frustration in trying to understand and gain
treatment for their symptoms.

Long Term Health Effects o f Chlorine Exposure
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Chlorine has always been considered to have deleterious impacts to the skin, eyes,
and lungs. For this reason, investigations into other possible types o f damage from chlorine
inhalation did not occur until the 1970s. Before then, investigators thought they knew what
they were looking for and usually found it, and o f course did not find what they did not
look for. For example, in 1947, approximately 1,000 persons were exposed to high
concentrations o f chlorine gas when it leaked into the ventilation system o f a Brooklyn
subway. Researchers stated that “[t]here were no deaths, and, by the methods used for
evaluation, none had detectable residual damage.”

The limitations which evaluation

methods place on information obtained is evidenced repeatedly in toxicological research.
In Alberton, ATSDR decided to study only classic respiratory symptoms, thereby finding
only those types o f symptoms and marginalizing as 'anecdotal' any other health problems.
In 1969, fumes leaked from a filtration plant in Cleveland, killing two people. A
team o f researchers were surprised to find that a single acute exposure resulted in
measurable permanent abnormality. They found evidence o f lesions in two sites o f outside
o f the lungs: the kidneys and brain. Lesions o f this type had not been previously described
in fatal chlorine poisoning. The results o f the study o f patients with brain injury resulting
from acute chlorine caused the researchers to state: “At this moment we must beg the
question o f how inhalation o f gaseous chlorine gives rise to the renal and cerebral lesions
observed here.”

Adelson, L. and Kaufman, J.1971. Fatal chlorine poisoning: report of two cases with
clinicopathologic correlation. American Journal o f Clinical Pathology 56:430-442.
Adelson, L. and Kaufman, J. 1971. Fatal chlorine poisoning: report o f two cases with
clinicopathologic correlation. American Journal o f Clinical Pathology 56:430-442.
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This question opened up a new realm o f chlorine toxicity research. The Alberton
evacuees were lucky in that one o f the researchers to attem pt to answer Adelson's and
Kaufman’s question came to M ontana to study what is the largest assemblage o f chlorine
injured people in recent history. Dr. Kaye Kilbum, whose body o f research includes
showing links between asbestos and the deadly lung disease we know now it causes, saw
Alberton as an exceptional research opportunity. Unfortunately for spill victims, neither
M ontana Rail Link nor government officials felt the same.
For their part, spill victims were thrilled to have a bona fide chlorine expert arrive
on the scene and offer the testing and diagnosis for which they had been begging for weeks.
Dr. K ilbum found evidence o f non-classic chlorine symptoms, all o f which would have
escaped unrecorded by the M issoula medical community had he not done his study. He
found that "97 residents 7 weeks after exposure to a chlorine spill differed from 202 adults
and 135 children who were unexposed to chemicals. There were 81 adults ages 18-63 years
and 16 children ages 8-17". His results indicated neurological abnormalities including
abnormal visual fields, abnormal hearing, abnormal balance, elevated finger writing errors,
and evidence o f memory problems such as delayed verbal recall.
His results led him to the conclusion that “[i]t appears that chlorine damages the
central nervous system (CNS) within 7 weeks. Follow-up studies are planned in one year to
evaluate the rates o f deterioration o f these important functions using patients as their own
controls.” '^

Kilbum, Kaye H.1996. Persisting neurobehavioral and pulmonary impairment after
chlorine exposure. USC School o f Medicine.
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Unlike other health officials, Kilbum and his team o f researchers openly listened to
victims’ complaints and recorded the following assessment o f the situation and resulting
symptoms:
Derailment and puncture o f a tank car carrying chlorine and one carrying
"spent" potassium cresylate created a noxious aerosol over Alberton,
M T...R ecurrence and/or persistence o f voice changes, skin burning,
respiratory symptoms coupled with difficulty recalling and concentrating,
trouble sleeping, headaches and other complaints led to neurobehavioral
investigation 7 weeks after the spill. Many residents remained displaced
because o f recurrence o f chest tightness, headaches, nausea, and memory
disorders within minutes when they returned home. An odor described
frequently as "like pesticide sprays" persisted at the derailment site and in
Alberton for two months or more.^°®
His “97 adult subjects had significant impairment o f neurobehavioral function
compared to regional and to national reference groups. They shared exposure to the
chlorine-creosote mixture created by the derailment.. .Thus, overall these subjects who
were exposed briefly to chlorine and perhaps other chlorinated chemicals from on site
combinations have chronic neurobehavioral impairment particularly o f unconscious and
automatic functions o f the nervous system."
The Alberton results are similar to those obtained by K ilbum in other chlorine exposure
cases;
At intervals from one to three years after the acute exposure, all had
shortness o f breath, six had chest pain, four had asthma, and three had cough
with sputum. Six also had memory loss, four each had decreased ability to
concentrate, difficulty sleeping, dizziness, and loss o f balance, and three had

Kilbum, Kaye H .1996. Persisting neurobehavioral and pulmonary impairment after
chlorine exposure. USC School o f Medicine.
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excessive fatigue, loss o f strength, depression and irritability.
Neurobehavioral testing showed....^®*
It is information o f this type which was ignored and rejected by officials in the
Alberton incident, despite pleas by exposed citizens to explore every possible avenue for
diagnosing and treating their ailments. The tenets o f medical management o f toxic chemical
incidents requires a look at all possible symptoms; notably, systemic toxic injury. This was
ignored as if it were a baseless idea for weeks, months and years. It was only when positive
test results came back in from tests sponsored by attorneys, that the sought after proof was
gained and spill victims had data to show that they were not “crazy hypochondriacs” and
that their bodies had not lied.
The diagnosis and research o f toxic injury is still relatively new, but everything now
widely accepted was at some time. Government officials and medical providers sounded
much like industry as it rejects any data that threatens the profitable status quo by labeling
it “biased” or unproven. This view was immediately adopted towards any doctors working
with plaintiffs attorneys to gain damages for injury, regardless o f their stature and
credibility field o f toxicology. The same officials, however, were noticeably silent when it
came to questioning or monitoring the scientists, doctors, and environmental samplers on
Montana Rail Link's tab who were running the show.
Chemical injury such as M ultiple Chemical Sensitivity (MCS) is politically
unpopular and has been slow to be accepted as a disease. It is marginalized, and those

Kilbum, Kaye H. . 1995. Evidence that inhaled chlorine is neurotoxic and causes
airways obstruction. International Journal o f Occupational M edicine and Toxicology
4(2):267-276.
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suffering are labeled as hypochondriacs or suffering from psychological or psychiatric
disorders. This is done in spite o f the fact that “[ijt is an axiom o f medicine that, when
investigating the origins o f illness, physiologic causes must be ruled out before ascribing
psychologic etiologies. This has simply not been done for illnesses associated with lowlevel chemical exposure.

Missoula doctors made this mistake with Alberton residents

when they reportedly prescribed anti-depressants to patients with real, but undiagnosed
pain. Health officials seemed more comfortable focusing on the stress and psychological
effects o f the spill, yet at same time did nothing to address the root o f the stress by
providing patients with accurate information. Patients instead left doctors’ offices with
undiagnosed and misunderstood health problems, a condition which only leads to more
stress. Health officials and doctors did not dig very deep to uncover the truth about the
Alberton exposures, and committed a grave disservice to their patients.
The evacuees were generally hungry for any and all information concerning health
effects and trusted government officials and the medical community to be looking out for
their best interests. This trust gradually eroded as evacuees grew aware o f the holes in the
information provided and pushed for more information. Throughout the incident runs a
common theme o f evacuees asking for more information and o f officials providing
unsatisfactory pieces o f information. This lack o f information to address their needs led
directly to the formation o f a community group whose mission was to address health
concerns o f evacuees. The group came to rely on a handful o f local and regional physicians

Ziem, G. and Davidoff, 1992. Archives o f Environmental Health.
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who were willing to look beyond the officially sanctioned diagnosis o f 'short term chlorine
symptoms' and assist and support their patients in the search for the truth.
Flexibility is o f the utmost importance in insuring disclosure. It is highly important
that health care providers do not become beholden to any set conclusion or particular
interest group in an incident; their focus and goal must be to provide victims with the best
information in a honest manner in order to best make decisions impacting public health and
welfare. The atmosphere for making these decisions must remain free o f political agendas
and industry pressure: the health and well-being o f the affected population is o f the utmost
importance. Even if information is incomplete or if the atmosphere is politically
uncomfortable, the responsibility o f medical providers is clear: "If an emergency forces
action before the material is identified, the only prudent move is to assume the worst...
"In a typical incident there are innumerable false reports, doubts, and updates. The
physician involved must be prepared to constantly revise his or her opinions. In a serious
incident, doctrinaire adherence to one's first impression may lead to disaster."^®'*
“The mental health consequences o f evacuation are only now beginning to be
appreciated; large-scale population evacuations are very rare and carry a high cost in stress
and safety problems..Any incident provokes rumors and misinformation, which must be
controlled to avoid panic or misguided interference in public safety measures." It seems
obvious that the best way to accomplish this is to be honest and work hard to insure that

Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal
o f Preventive M edicine 2(3): 148-154.
Guidotti, T.L. Managing incidents involving hazardous substances. American Journal
o f Preventive M edicine 2(3): 148-154.
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full disclosure o f risks occurs and that the affected community is assisted in understanding
those risks. It has been shown that people prefer to know the truth, even if that truth is
negative or disturbing. In a toxic event, the medical community has a distinct role to play,
and does a disservice by accepting at face value everything that the responsible party says
regarding health risks. The affected population
at a recent (1988) disaster in Cornwall, UK was given advice which was later described by
an investigatory committee set up afterwards as "contradictory, confusing and sometimes
inappropriate'. Yet similar criticisms can be made o f the management o f many previous
major incidents around the w orld...the evaluation o f the health hazard can be slow and
inadequate, leading to difficulties for doctors who have to manage the patients and for
decision-makers who have to direct the emergency response or give advice to the public.
A similar situation occurred in northern California in 1991 when a train derailment
dumped the pesticide metam sodium into the Upper Sacramento river, at the same time
producing an airborne plume. As is common, little information was known o f the health
effects from metam sodium. “This lack o f knowledge resulted in conflicting reports by
various governmental officials, when informing residents o f the dangers o f metam
sodium.
A central element o f responding to such an event “is the importance o f accurate and
early health information on the adverse effects o f particular chemicals.” This is due to the
Baxter, J. 1991. M ajor chemical disasters; Britain’s health services are poorly
prepared. British M edical Journal 301:61-62.
Freed, D., Bowler, R., and I. Fleming. 1998. Post-traumatic stress disorder as a
consequence o f a toxic spill in Northern California. Journal o f A pplied Social
Psychology 28(3):264-281.
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fact that "chemical spills, with unknown long-term endpoints and relatively unknown long
term impact on health, are even more devastating and more likely to cause long-term
impairment in health” than natural disasters.^®’
The discovery o f leaking drum o f toxic chemicals in a residential district in San
Diego led to a series o f events similar to Alberton and other chemical disasters where
disclosure is slow or incomplete.
The exposure caused much concern among the nearby residents. Fears were
expressed that other, more dangerous substances may have been undetected
or may have volatilized, leaving no trace. Rumors circulated o f a
miscarriage and chronic illnesses in the families exposed. Public agency
pronouncements on the safety o f the site were made and then rescinded in
the face o f new information. Uncertainly over the identity o f the chemicals
found and the significance o f the presence o f PCBs led to skepticism that
reassurances o f safety had a valid medical bases. Doubts were raised
regarding the training and com mitment o f county health authorities to deal
with such incidents. Residents o f the area who had health problems they
suspected might have due to exposure were urged through the media and
direct communication with county representatives to seek care at the
county’s network o f community health clinics. On doing so, they discovered
that the clinic’s physicians lacked the expertise or access to the information
which might have reassured the. Caught o ff guard in its first major incident
o f this sort, the County Department o f Health Services had no standard
procedures that applied and rapidly lost the confidence o f the community .
This series o f events is similar to what occurred due to the lack o f disclosure in
Alberton; knowledge o f the chemicals involved was the foundation upon which all
decisions affecting public health and welfare were made. Due to incomplete disclosure.

Freed, D., Bowler, R., and I. Fleming. 1998. Post-traumatic stress disorder as a
consequence o f a toxic spill in Northern California. Journal o f Applied Social
Psychology 28(3).264-281.
Guidotti, T. 1984. San Diego County’s community right-to-know ordinance: Case
study o f a local approach to hazardous substances control. Journal o f Public Health: 396409.
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that foundation was incomplete, causing the collapse of public confidence in officials. This
loss of trust and confidence added to the stress levels which victims were already
experiencing during and after the incident.
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C h ap ter 4. A fter A pril 28: M ontana D ep artm en t of E nvironm ental Q uality
Involvem ent and O ngoing H ealth Problem s

A public interest scientist recounting a conversation with an epidemiologist;
JVe both agreed that we should take the conservative approach only to fin d out that in
every case we disagreed on what the conservative approach was. To him,
“conservative ” m eant that we must be very cautious about concluding that Love
Canal was an unsafe place to live. The evidence had to be compelling because
substantial financial resources were needed to correct the problem. To me,
“conservative " meant that we must be very cautious about concluding that Love
Canal was a safe place to live. The evidence had to be compelling because the public
health consequences o f an error were considerable.
The “democratic paradigm " starts fro m the victims ’perspective, values safety over
profit, requires less than conclusive p r o o f to take action, and provides those likely to
be affect with an active voice in determining risk and making decisions.^^
The Alberton train derailment and mixed chemical spill incident was declared
officially over on April 28, 1996 when all evacuees were allowed to return home. All
remediation o f the site was done by Envirocon, M ontana Rail Link’s contractor and
subsidiary. Beginning on April 28, the M ontana State Department o f Environmental
Quality took over as the oversight agency. From that point on, the EPA was no longer
officially involved and the Memoranda o f Understanding between various agencies for the
period o f evacuation came to an end. Among other things, this resulted in the M ineral
County Health Department replacing the M issoula City/County Health Department as the
lead health agency. The Mineral County Health Department consisted o f one employee, the
County Sanitarian, who had not been involved with Incident Command or any decisions
regarding health and safety during the incident.
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia,
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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Six days prior to the end o f evacuation, on April 22, 1996, Envirocon had begun
excavating the potassium cresylate stained soil from the ditch. The potassium cresylate
stained soil was stock piled on site until May 18th. Soil samples collected from the
stockpiles o f the excavated potassium cresylate stained soil were analyzed for benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes (BTEX), volatile organics and semi-volatile organics.
These soils were profiled and, when necessary, manifested by MRL and transported o ff site
for disposal. 125 cubic yards o f the soil was deemed hazardous waste under federal law and
had particular disposal requirements; that soil was shipped to Port Arthur, Texas for
incineration. The remaining 1485 cubic yards o f soil did not contain toxic levels high
enough to necessitate disposal at a hazardous waste incinerator; this portion was moved by
rail and truck to be landfilled at the BFI site in Missoula..
The delay in removing contaminated soil until May 18 gave residents 20 days at
home while remediation activities, including large scale earth moving o f federally
designated hazardous waste, was occurring. Residents living closest to the derailment site
drove past the site daily in order to get to town or the main road. The delay in removing
contaminated soil also went against the M issoula City/County Health Department’s
recommendation that the bulk o f contaminated soils should be removed prior to re-entry.
The presence o f the hazardous soils in proximity to a recently injured population resulted in
a new spate o f health concerns in residents moving home. The insult is enormous to a
previously exposed population then required to live adjacent to what was in effect a
hazardous waste dump for three weeks.
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On May 6, 1996 the Mineral County Commissioners sent a letter to Tom Ellerhoff,
Administrative Officer o f the Montana Department o f Environmental Quality, expressing
their concerns to the lead agency for clean up and follow up to the incident.
We hope that as part o f the investigation and cleanup, MRL will work to make
sure this type o f accident never occurs again, whether in M ineral County or
anywhere else where there is a MRL rail line. We also hope that MRL will put
great emphasis in removing the contaminated soils and wrecked rail cars as
soon as possible so as to relieve the stress on Alberton area residents affected
by the original spill. We believe that as long as the contaminated soils are
present on the site, there is potential for local residents to experience some
health affects, primarily due to the fact that those initially exposed could have
heightened sensitivities to chemicals in general, and particularly to those
chemicals involved in the original incident. Again, we would like to thank you
for your responsible attitude and your work toward investigating and cleaning
up the remains o f the Alberton Derailment spill. (Emphasis in original)^’®
Numerous residents complained and reported health concerns attributable to the soils.
Garnering response to health complaints proved exceedingly difficult in the post
evacuation phase, as the DEQ considered the health issues resolved and that the re-entry
decisions had indicated the safety o f the area for residents. In addition, the MCCHD, the
primary health department during evacuation, was officially no longer involved, due to the
cessation o f the Memorandum o f Understanding, despite the fact that the affected area
straddled the county line. So people were now referred to M ineral County, with its single
employee Health Department. M ineral County had not participated in the decision making
regarding health issues nor been privy to re-entry consideration or relevant data. For
victims, the pull-out o f all authorities with whom they had grown familiar created major

Letter from Mineral County Commissioners (Charles, E. Rock, James S. W amken, and
Judy A. Stang) to Dan Watts, MRL. 5/6/96.
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difficulties in getting community concerns heard and disparities in the treatment of
residents and more powerful entities became apparent.
On May 7th, 1996, MRL applied for and received emergency exemption from the
Departm ent o f Transportation, to move, clean, and repair the potassium cresylate car and
the four chlorine tank cars. These tankers were loaded onto flatbed rail cars at the site and
sidetracked in Lothrop, two miles east o f the derailment site. Lothrop, or South Alberton,
is a small residential community along the track, and some Lothrop residents experienced
an increase in their symptoms when these rail cars were sidetracked in front o f their homes.
Hazmat crews in full gear decontaminated the potassium cresylate car while it was in the
Lothrop siding, but residents were unprotected from the spray and fumes o f this clean-up
process. These residents complained, and MRL moved the five cars east to the next siding,
where again complaints were made, and this moving went on till these cars were
sidetracked in M issoula in a residential neighborhood. Some residents o f that area attended
an ACE m eeting in M ay 1996 and shared their concerns about these railcars. They
described a pesticide odor emanating from the tankers, and they were suffering from
nausea, headaches, fatigue, and disorientation. Their skin was red and visibly burned from
the exposure to the tankers.^'*
One woman remembers the pesticide smell coming from the rail yard at this time.
She purposefully would stay away from the track area to avoid exposure. Another family
living adjacent to the tracks, became so ill from their exposure that they moved out o f
M issoula, leaving their home o f twenty-five years. This family went on to file a claim
ACE, 1996.
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against MRL. These accounts are noteworthy, as they illustrate how powerful even a
minimal exposure to trace amounts o f the chemical mixtures from the derailment caused
severe health effects in some people.
Residents in the previously evacuated area confronting the same residual chemicals
trackside Missoula residents were exposed to, in the contaminated soils stockpiled on site
near their homes in Alberton. Yet prior to soil removal from the site, not only spill victims
complained (who were told by insurance claims adjusters that the smell was harmless and
that they were particularly sensitive to all smells), but previously unexposed workers
assigned to the area began to complain. This apparently warranted DEQ response, while
residents’ concerns had not. On May 3rd, 1996, Plum Creek Lumber Company called
Montana State Department o f Environmental Quality (DEQ), and complained o f the smell
emanating from the derailment site. Plum Creek reported their loggers, who were working
in the Adams Creek drainage north o f the derailment site, were suffering ill health effects
from the smell. DEQ Administrative Officer, Tom Ellerhoff replied in writing on May 9th,
1996. His letter states, “After conferring with the M issoula County Health Department and
MRL, Plum Creek decided to relocate the loggers until the contaminated soil has been
removed from the site. The DEQ supports Plum Creek’s decision, and believes the
temporary relocation would be in the best interest o f all concerned'\emp\nas\'& added)^'^.
Alberton residents were never informed o f this situation, nor was the option of
temporarily relocation offered or suggested to them during this time, despite the fact that

Letter to Dale Kerkvliet, Plum Creek Lumber Co. From Tom Ellerhoff, 5/9/96; Re.
Relocating logging crews while cleanup occurs at the Alberton Derailment Site
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people were living in homes closer to the site than the area in which the loggers were
working.
Ten days later, in response to questions from an Alberton resident concerning the
contam inated soil on site and health problems associated with it, Tom Ellerhoff had this to
say:
"The contaminated soil will not remain at the derailment site. The Montana Department o f
Environmental Quality is working with MRL and its contractors to ensure the site is
cleaned up and reclaimed to a level that meets appropriate state and federal standards. If
you have any other questions about the cleanup, feel free to contact me at any tim e.”^*^ Mr.
EllerhofFs files reflect dozens o f calls from people complaining about the persistent odor
and illness they were associating with the smell and the chemicals released. There are no
notes reflecting that he recommended that any resident temporarily relocate.
The removal o f the soil finally began on May 18, 1996. The removal was delayed at
the request o f the Alberton Public School so it would not affect school attendance. Instead,
removal began the day after school was out, on graduation weekend. One Alberton family
had fifty people attending a graduation party, and the hostess reported everyone having
headaches, nausea, and fatigue. The hazardous soil was moved by rail car to Port Arthur,
Texas. Residents who live along the tracks reported that the boxcars were not properly
covered which allowed contaminated soil to blow out o f the rail cars and dust their
property, as well as pets and children who were outside that day. A Southside Road resident

2" Letter to David Stenberg, Alberton Resident, 5/13/96 from Tom Ellerhoff; Re;
Clarification o f the Cleanup and Reclamation o f the Alberton Derailment Site).
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who was fishing along the banks o f the Clark Fork River, said he was knocked unconscious
by the passing train. He suffered tremendous memory problems. Some area residents
relapsed into illness from the soil removal, other residents got sick for the first time with
this exposure. Those who complained loudly to MRL were sent to hotels in M issoula while
the removal took place.
One evacuee who had not returned home and was still in a hotel at MRL's expense,
reports that one o f MRL’s claims adjusters called her and told her specifically not to come
to Alberton during the soil removal—she should stay at the hotel through the first o f June.
An employee at the local restaurant in Alberton has related that this is when she first felt
severe ill health effects. She reported that hazmat workers would come from the site for
lunch and their presence, in gear worn on site, would make everyone in the cafe ill, and that
the odor o f pesticides was overwhelming for hours after the workers left. At some point, the
restaurant offered delivery to the site rather than having the workers come in. The
owner/operator o f a local hotel made similar observations. Some o f the clean-up crew
stayed in his hotel and he was aware that some o f his housekeeping employees became ill
after cleaning up their rooms.
The site was remediated to the EPA residential exposure soil residual levels, which
means that the level o f cleanup process was considered to be o f a residential standard rather
than o f a merely rural level, which was all that was actually required. The residual
contamination that exists at the site is said to pose no current or future human health risk.
According to the DEQ "contaminant levels found o ff site fall well within the range o f
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risks” which DEQ considers acceptable for clean up levels or sites upon which no action
will be taken. In a June 4 memo to Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ employee Aimee Reynolds states;
based on sampling conducted by Olympus Environmental, Inc., an MRL contractor,
some residual levels o f phenolic compounds remain at the site..The MDEQ has
performed a health evaluation on the levels o f chemicals still present at the site and
has determined that the risks associated with these levels are negligible for several
reasons ...The site is not a residential site, and will never see the type o f everyday
usage that a residential site would.
One question does remain unanswered at this time. There is a slight possibility hat
these residual levels could be transmitted to groundwater in the area. Therefore, to
be protective o f the one residential well which is potentially located downgradient of
the site, MDEQ has required MRL to install three monitoring wells at the site.^''*
Ground water monitoring wells were placed on site; within the past year a resident
adjacent to the derailment site reported an unusual taste and smell in her groundwater, but
according to MRL’s contractor, no evidence o f above detect levels o f contamination were
found.
During the summer several small fires were reported on the site, and the Alberton
Volunteer Fire Department reported they received calls that a white smoke was coming off
the site. The Fire Department has said there never were actual fires, ju st smoke, and that
their members would get ill after responding to one o f these calls.^^^
The calls from residents complaining o f persistent odor and illnesses associated with
the initial and ongoing exposures to the contaminated soil, supposedly remediated site, and
chemical residues in buildings, continued into the summer. Those complaining were treated
differently by DEQ, depending on their perceived status and power, ju st as Plum Creek
apparently warranted different treatment than ordinary residents. State Senate
^"Memo from Aimee Reynolds to Tom Ellerhoff re: Alberton Train Wreck- Evaluation
o f Health Risks Associated with residual chemical levels
ACCEH and King, 1997.
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Representative Spook Stang called Tom Ellerhoff on May 31, 1996, and complained o f the
noxious odor detectable from the site as he passed by on the interstate. Mr. Stang's call was
immediately referred to Randy Cox, the attorney representing MRL in the derailment.^*®
DEQ summarized its view o f the situation in a D raft Press Release entitled
‘Alberton Derailment Site Reclamation and M onitoring’ to be released over the summer.
“The MDEQ and Missoula and Mineral county health officials continue to receive periodic
complaints o f odor from mercaptans in the potassium cresylate... The odor is often
characterized as smelling like a pesticide...People who are sensitive to the smell appear
more apt to detect the odor than those who are not.”^” This last statement was used
repeatedly by the DEQ to minimize and marginalize the complaints o f residents. It is
obviously undermined by the Plum Creek situation, but since residents were never
informed o f that situation, this statement maintained the publicly disclosed status quo.
Chris Weis, EPA Regional Toxicologist was sent the draft for comments. He replied,
"Tom, the odors which people may be reporting are more likely phenolics. They smell a bit
like pesticides and the human nose is extremely sensitive to them. Mercaptans, which smell
skunk-like, are very distinctive and are probably not a likely source o f odors. Both are a
possibility given the situation.” (Edits to DEQ PR by Chris Weis) It is alarming that despite
numerous complaints and reported illness attributed to the odor-producing substances, the
DEQ was not yet sure o f this information, and furthermore, had not yet asked EPA for
assistance in determining the root o f the problems. Instead, DEQ and the two health
Tom E llerhoff (DEQ) Notes. 10/16/96.
DEQ Draft Press Release ‘Alberton Derailment Site Reclamation and M onitoring’. No
date. From placem ent in files and content, likely written May-June 1996.
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departments worked to minimize people’s complaints and advised them in various ways in
an inequitable fashion, all in the absence o f actual knowledge concerning the source o f the
odor associated symptoms, and health effects.
Despite the removal o f contaminated soils, according to DEQ's notes, the complaints
o f illness continued throughout the summer. On May 31, 1996 State Senator Stang called
and “1. Wanted to make sure the state had taken sampling results 2. Said he could smell
pot. Crys.” That same day a female resident called to report that she was "still getting sick "
On June 2, 1996 an Alberton resident called and reported that his family was sick
and that he "hasn’t smelled mercaptans since he changed the carpet on his porch.”
Residents’ complaints were never investigated by DEQ, and all o f the residents complaints
to DEQ support the theory that other chemicals besides chlorine became airborne in the
initial cloud and were deposited throughout the town outside and in homes. The DEQ
ignored all residents’ statements like that above and did not consult with the EPA or health
departments to determine what could be causing such scenarios. Residents were never
instructed to replace carpets, draperies or other household items which would have
absorbed toxic chemicals from the cloud. On June 5 the same gentleman called back and
Tom E llerhoffs notes state “ l)W ife sick; 2) kids sick/he’s sick; 3) very ticked off'.
Also on June 5, a Missoula attorney representing property owners above the spill site
told Tom Ellerfhoff that she had visited the site on Sunday, June 2, 1996 and "her husband
and children said they could smell the mercaptans. She also talked about neighbors
complaining that their water was tasting funny, I suggested that she work with the Mineral
Co. Sanitarian to get their wells tested. Also said I had called the Mineral Co. and MCCHD
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and neither reported any large scale groups complaining about being ill.” This illustrates
perfectly how residents’ complaints were ignored and marginalized, since in the officials’
eyes apparently not enough people were sick or complaining to warrant investigation.
E llerhoffs meeting notes from a June 6, 1996 meeting with the head o f the DEQ,
Mark Simonich recorded "Two areas o f concern 1) remediation o f the accident site; 2) why
does the place still s m e l l . W h i l e DEQ did discuss these problems among themselves, no
discussion with the community or attempt to remedy the problems ever occurred.
On June 13, an employee hired to clean some trailers used during the spill response
and cleanup called Tom Ellerhoff with the following issues:
1) Wanted to know if the 'white dust’ was harmful
2) He was asked to re-carpet a trailer that Rail Link used at the...site
3) Checked EPA report for 4/28/96 and talked to Chris Weis
A) Such in homes in town were analyzed an showed non-detectable for chlorinated
phenols and cresols.
B) Suggested he take whatever precautions he deemed appropriate.

This lack o f information, guidance and accountability on the part of DEQ was
incredibly damaging to evacuees. They were unable to get a response or assistance from the
one agency still actively involved in the situation. Montana Rail Link’s friendliness to ill
residents had waned and personal injury lawsuits were beginning to be filed to recoup
losses in property value, health, employment, emotional well-being, and more. The railroad
company was also proving uncooperative to state and local officials. On October 1, 1996,
DEQ notes state that:

2'* Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from meeting with Mark Simonich, Aimee Reynolds, and
Bill Potts re: what else is the dept going to do. 6/6/96.
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Missoula County has outstanding expenses totaling an estimated $750,000 which
Rail Link has not paid.... The agreement was that this bill would not be paid until
Missoula County was paid by Rail Link, Rail link, has, to date, not paid the bill and
is questioning the costs billed to Missoula County by the State...It is in the best
interest o f the State to cooperate and assist Missoula County in convincing Rail Link
o f its responsibility to reimburse Missoula County for their response, cost, which
include the State’s costs.^’^

Montana Rail Link was required under CERCLA to pay for costs incurred by the
responders. “Recovery o f Costs. An emergency responder has the right to recover from the
responsible party the emergency responder’s full costs directly related to a hazardous
material incident.”
On October 16th, 1996 Jack Hunt, Safety Officer, for Missoula Electric Co-operative
called DEQ. According to E llerhoffs notes, "Jack said two o f the coop’s meter readers had
headaches after reading meters in the Alberton, MT area last month....They reported it was
a warm day, dry and there was some blowing dust....One person...reported a fertilizer scent.
The other... said he didn’t smell anything out o f the ordinary, [but] he did develop a
headache ”
Like the Plum Creek situation, DEQ did not inform residents o f this situation and the
company was afforded a response far exceeding what any Alberton resident ever received
for similar and worse complaints. Per DEQ’s recommendation and with their assistance,
Mr. Hunt was referred to MRL. MRL then hired Olympus Environmental Inc. to begin air
monitoring in the area because o f the complaints o f the utility company. Ellerhoff has
stated that the DEQ did not oversee the testing and has no knowledge of the results o f the
Letter from Doug Booker, Administrator, Centralized Services to MG Prendergast,
The Adjutant General. RE: Recap and Status o f Rail Link Train Derailment -Alberton.
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air monitoring. They, in effect, let the two companies, Montana Rail Link and the Missoula
Electric Co-operative, settle it between themselves. Once again, the plight o f resident
remained unchanged and they remained in the dark about ongoing chemical injury that was
creating the need for further testing and results. In the meantime, the Montana Department
o f Environmental Quality protected the interests o f businesses far greater than it protected
the health o f Montana citizens by providing Plum Creek and the Co-op preferential
treatment. DEQ also favored Montana Rail Link’s interests in minimizing liability by
failing to investigate or respond to ongoing health complaints in Alberton.
The correspondence between State Senator Stang and Tom Ellerfhoff continued on
October 17, 1996. Ellerhoff responded to Stang’s concerns with more assurance that not
many people were complaining. It is interesting that a visit to the Mineral county
Sanitarian, Denise Moldroski, by the Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE) did not merit
serious consideration. The group continued to be marginalized, despite the 100 or more
people it represented and was in contact with, and its wealth o f information concerning day
to day life and health problems in Alberton. Officials never deemed this information
important enough to fully explore, and instead chose to assume it was false and not
credible. This attitude is shown in Tom E llerhoffs notes o f a conversation with Sen. Stang:
After we talked, I called the state's Epidemiologist, Todd [Damrow]. and Ms.
Moldroski [Mineral County Sanitarian] to find out if they had been receiving calls
from Alberton residents. Dr. Damrow said he had not. Ms. Moldroski said the only
people who had contacted her recently were three persons from Alberton
representing a public interest group...Since July 1, 1996 I received three or four calls
from people identifying themselves as Alberton residents. They were concerned
with health matters reportedly due to the release....
Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Sen. Spook Stang. 10/16/96.
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On November 7, 1996, Ellerhoffs notes state that a female “alleged Alberton, MT
resident" called with health complaints. He “[t]old her how to get information on MSDS
(Material Safety Data Sheets) sheets and said what we really needed was substantive
information from people living in the area. She said she’d send it."^^‘ MSDS sheets on the
chemicals spilled had been distributed during the evacuation. Alberton residents had
already far exceeded the scanty information provided by MSDSs by virtue o f their own
research. Instead o f DEQ taking control and meeting victims needs by investigating health
concerns, meeting with the affected community for follow up or any other proactive,
involved act, it continued to brush off residents and put the onus on them to prove health
effects and educate themselves about health problems which no official would
acknowledge as actually existing. The residents had already begun this work. The
community group (ACE) conducted a health survey to record symptoms and compiled all
available information on the chemicals they were exposed to. They reached out to national
environmental health experts for assistance, including Linda King o f the Environmental
Health Network.
On November 7, Ellerfoff also talked with MRL employee Jacquie Suhame.
Ellerhoff “explained Jack Hunt’s (MEC) concerns. 1 asked if MRL would 1) call Mr. Hunt

Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Beverly Ridenour. 11/7/96.
Environmental Health Network is a non-profit organization based in Norfolk,
Virginia. Linda King, chemically injured herself, advocates for communities affected by
toxic chemicals. EHN has published several reports documenting the trends and patterns
in the impact o f toxic incidents on communities. King has also been heavily involved in
efforts to reform the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR).
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2) Interview the MEC employees and 3) consider having someone accompany them when
they read meters again.

This follow up to the Electric Co-op employees health

complaints far exceed anything offered to Alberton residents.
On November 15, 1996, Ellerfhoff spoke with the EPA toxicologist, Chris Weis.
According to E llerhoffs notes:
1) Said he was receiving calls from Alberton Public Interest people
2) I explained:
a) What was happening w/ MEC and MRL
b) Indicated we also were receiving similar calls and checked with MCCHD and
Mineral Co. Sanitarian.
D) Also advised to do as the speaker Linda King advised and record all alleged
problems.
3)1 said we wanted to see MRL’s final report before doing anything further.
Chris said EPA would also wait.^^“
On November 20, DEQ participated in an "Alberton Derailment Conference Call."
The concerns o f Missoula ophthamologist Dr. Neumeister were discussed, as were the
characteristics o f active members o f the community group (ACE), such as Lucinda Hodges.
Concerns o f Dr. Rick Newmeister(sic)- May be seeing some long-term effects of
exposure. Has some medical questions, however, doesn’t seem to think anybody
can help him with them... [he said] 'they’re the kind o f questions that don’t have
answers’
Linda King
a) Who contacted her-what do we know about her involvement???
b) What do we know about Lucinda Hodges-article provided by Todd Damrow
1) Best guess says she contacted Linda.
2) What do we know about her group?
DHS follow up with Dr. Newmeister-he thinks he is seeing evidence o f long
term effects from the chlorine exposure (maybe other substance???he doesn’t
know)
Other Topics??
^“ Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Jacquie Suhame, MRL. 11/7/96.
Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conversation with Chris Weis, EPA Region 8
Toxicologist. 11/15/96.
136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

A) Lack o f information about the caustic solution potassium cresylate.
These notes indicate that DEQ and the other agencies involved (including EPA and
ATSDR) were aware o f the incompleteness o f information regarding health effects and the
chemicals responsible for those symptoms, notably potassium cresylate. This conversation,
which acknowledges a “lack o f information” about potassium cresylate and reports by a
local doctor o f unexplained symptoms, is remarkable in that it occurred seven months after
the same government agencies determined the Alberton area safe to re-enter and all health
symptoms to be attributed to chlorine and likely to resolve quickly. The agency officials
acknowledge these looming uncertainties critical to the health o f affected residents. But the
officials dedicate as much time to investigating the coordinator o f the local community
group, Lucinda Hodges, and one o f the few experts who had offered to help residents with
health problems, Linda King. The suspicion leveled at these two women, coupled with the
lack o f respect and credence given Alberton residents by DEQ during the aftermath,
demonstrates the level confidence these agencies had in the resolution of the Alberton
disaster and how much there was to hide.
The summer and fall months following the re-entry o f the evacuated area were
characterized by a constant stream of health complaints by residents and newcomers to the
area alike. These reported symptoms were taken seriously in an inequitable fashion, with
vocal Alberton residents active in the community group (ACE, then ACCEH) receiving the
least attention and credence for their complaints. The DEQ, as the lead agency for the
remediation, and the state agency in charge o f environmental and human health concerns.
^ Tom Ellerhoff, DEQ. Notes from conference call re; Alberton Derailment. 11/20/96.
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was responsible for all Alberton related issues in the absence o f federal involvement after
April 28, 1996. Unfortunately, although DEQ was the recipient o f much information and
countless reports of illness in Alberton which demonstrated the lingering effects of
chemicals other than chlorine, they did next to nothing. DEQ assisted some people with
complaints (most notably, businesses) while it counseled locals to contact local health
departments. After dissipating the concerned public through bureaucratic inaction, DEQ
would then dutifully ask local health departments if they were receiving complaints and
then time after time conclude that simply not enough people were complaining to warrant
concern or action. Residents and their complaints disappeared into what they often called a
black hole, between agencies. There was no one to turn to who was accountable, and no
official or agency had any answers to even the most basic o f residents’ questions regarding
the cause o f their symptoms and what Montana Rail Link and the government were going
to do to remedy the situation.
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C h a p ter 5. The Challenge of H azardous M aterials T ransportation: Solutions for
A ccident Prevention
Another conspicuous feature o f the law on the transport o f hazardous substances is
its failure to achieve the primary goal o f risk reduction. [Unfortunately],
alternative sources o f law only partially have filled the vacuum. The role o f the
states is not well defined and perpetually at issue. Even the tort remedy fo r injured
parties and the environment is imperfectly established.
The regulatory framework of hazardous materials transportation largely fails to
offer the means to achieve disclosure or gain assurance o f safe practices or accident
prevention goals. Hazardous materials transportation is a large, risky business in which
"safety records are unimpressive and show few signs o f improvement.”^^’ The body o f law
regulating hazardous materials transport is complex and confusing and has failed “to
achieve the primary goal o f risk reduction.”

It is described even by practitioners as "ill-

fitting" and "ramshackle" and "so complex that no one understands it at all" and "a source
o f regulations so byzantine that some firms do not even try to comply with them"'.“ ^
A main reason for the complexity o f hazardous materials transportation law is the
variety o f authorities acting at different times in different contexts. These include

William H. Rodgers. 1992. Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances.
Chapter 7. West Publishing Company. Note: The tort cases arising from Montana Rail
Link’s toxic spill at Alberton are underway. The Missoula Independent
(www.everyweek.com) has been covering the cases well. A case decided in the spring of
2001 found no negligence by MRL because they had not broken any Federal Railway
Administration safety regulations. As a result, MRL was not held responsible for causing
the toxic spill or the resulting injuries. The derailment and chemical spill were then
considered an accident, which prevented victims from receiving punitive damages from
the railroad.
Id.
Id
229 I d
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transportation laws, specific railroad laws^^® and solid waste laws. Further confounding
matters is the interstate commerce clause o f the Constitution which can preempt state and
local attempts to improve safety of hazardous materials transportation.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) : Placards, Manifests and Tracking
RCRA^^‘ calls for the promulgation o f standards "applicable to transporters of
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter, as may be necessary to protect
human health and the environment.

EPA defined "transporter" as any person "engaged

in the offsite transportation o f hazardous waste by air, rail, highway, or water.
Subsection 3003(a) o f RCRA created so-called "cradle-to-grave" monitoring of the
vast network o f hazardous waste exchange between facilities via transporters by requiring:
(1) recordkeeping concerning such hazardous waste transported, and their source
and delivery points;
(2) transportation o f such waste only if properly labeled;
(3) compliance with the manifest system...; and
(4) transportation o f all such hazardous waste only to the hazardous waste
treatment, storage or disposal facilities which the shipper designates on the manifest
form to be a facility holding a permit...

Railroad safety is regulated by a number o f laws, the major ones being the Railroad
Safety Act o f 1970, revised by the Rail Safety Improvement Act o f 1988 and the Federal
Railroad Safety Act.
42 U.S.C.A. §6951 et seq.
232 42 U.S.C.A. §6951 et seq.
233 Rodgers, William H. 1992. Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances.
Chapter 7. West Publishing Company.
234 42 U.S.C.A. §6293(a)
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The key component o f RCRA transportation rules is the placarding and manifest
system, which allows EPA to track all waste t r a n s p o r t . T h e problem o f multiple laws was
addressed in RCRA by a call for EPA to “coordinate” with the Department of
Transportation, and insistence that the RCRA regulations "be consistent" with the
requirement o f the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act and its implementing
regulations. EPA stated that for the purpose o f all other components o f transportation
safety it had "expressly adopted certain regulations o f the Department of Transportation
(DOT). ... These regulations concern, among other things, labeling, marking, placarding,
using proper containers, and reporting discharges.
Under RCRA, transporters are required to take several actions in the event o f a spill
or discharge o f hazardous waste. First, the transporter must notify the National Response
Center o f the hazardous release, take “appropriate immediate action to protect human
health and the environment”, follow direction to initiate “necessary” removal actions, and
report in writing about the incident. The clean up standard is simply stated;
A transporter must clean up any hazardous waste discharge that occurs
during transportation or take such action as may be required or approved by
Federal, State, or local officials so that the hazardous waste discharge no
longer presents a hazard to human health or the environment.
Each train presents a different assemblage o f hazardous materials. And that
assemblage changes as the train adds and removes cars at stops. For example, the
manifest from the Alberton incident provided the comprehensive information on what
the train was carrying, destinations and ownership o f each cargo, and the order of cars on
the train. Citizen activists warn that manifests are not updated as frequently as they
should be during the course o f cargo loading and unloading throughout a trip. As a result,
the information most critical to emergency responders is sometimes wrong, making
determinations o f materials involved in derailments difficult.
^ 45 Federal Register 33149, 33151 (May 19, 1980).
2)7 40 CFR §263.31.
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1975 Hazardous Material Transportation A ct (HMTA)
The first broad legislation aimed at reducing hazardous materials transportation
risks came in the mid-70s as environmental concerns grew.
Social concern is gathering more over a transient peril to public safety in the
transportation o f hazardous materials...Citizens are becoming less tolerant o f the
toxic traffic rumbling through their towns and competing for space on their
highways. With ebbing confidence, the public is peering past the innocuous
appearance o f trucks and trains hauling chemical cargoes to perceive them as
rolling bombs.
This characterization was based on the fact that lives are at risk daily by
transportation covered by the HMTA. Crashes involving HMTA-regulated substances kill
more than 100 people in a typical year- more by an order o f magnitude or two than die as a
result o f RCRA or CERCLA related activities. Congress addressed the increasing challenge
presented by dangerous commodities in transit by enacting the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act o f 1974 (HMTA)^^^. Congress declared the purpose o f the HMTA “to
improve the regulatory and enforcement authority o f the Secretary o f Transportation to
protect the nation adequately against the risks to life and property which are inherent in the
transportation o f hazardous materials in commerce.”^'*®
The HMTA vests broad authority in the Secretary o f Transportation to adopt
measures necessary to secure protection from hazardous materials. Uniformity o f these
measures with other laws was a major goal. Legislative history o f the HMTA reflects
Stuart C. Thompson, 1987. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act: Chemicals at
Uncertain Crossroads. Transportation Law Journal 15:411-433.
23» Pub. L. No. 93-633, title I, 88 Stat. 2156 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§1801-1812 (1982)).
2^®Pub. L. No. 93-633, title I, 88 Stat. 2156 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§1801-1812 (1982)).
142

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Congressional concern that the fragmented state or federal hazardous materials law prior to
the Act failed to address many risks critical to safe movement o f these goods. A primary
motivation in passage was to close this gap by charging a single federal agency with
overseeing hazardous materials safety to “...preclude a multiplicity o f state and local
regulations and the potential for varying as well as conflicting regulations in the area of
hazardous materials transportation."^^* Unfortunately, the HMTA did not rectify the
problems o f hazardous materials transportation sufficiently; public concern grew and it
became necessary for Congress to act again

1990 Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety A ct (HMTUSA)
After fifteen years o f mounting public concern and Congressional hearings
concerning hazardous materials transportation since its passage, the HMTA was amended
in 1990 and renamed the Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act o f 1990
(HMTUSA).^'*^ A Amended again in 1994,^“*^ HMTUSA was designed “to provide adequate
protection against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation o f hazardous
material in commerce by improving the regulatory and enforcement authority of the
Secretary o f Transportation."^'*^

^-** Id.
Pub. L. 101-615, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. as ch. 51Transportation o f Hazardous Material, §5101 et seq.).
2'*^ Pub. L. 101-615, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. as ch. 51Transportation o f Hazardous Material, §5101 et seq.).
Frank P. Grad, 1995. Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act o f 1990.
American Law Institute- American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education.
February 16. Columbia University School of Law.
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The Congressional findings for the 1990 amendment gave clear indications of the
intent to provide broader, more effective protections from the dangers presented by
hazardous materials transportation, and to create a body o f law tending toward national
uniformity. The findings noted that:
approximately 4 billions tons o f regulated hazardous materials are transported each
year and that a half a million movements o f such materials occur each year; that
accidents involving the release o f hazardous materials are a serious threat to health
and safety ; that many states and localities have enacted laws and regulations which
differ from the federal requirements, creating a potential for unreasonable hazards
in other jurisdictions and "confounding" shippers and carriers who try to comply
with multiple and conflicting regulatory requirements; because o f the potential risks
to life, property and environment posed by unintentional releases o f hazardous
materials, "consistency in law and regulations governing the transportation of
hazardous materials is necessary and desirable" in order to achieve greater
uniformity and promote public health, welfare and safety at all its levels; federal
standards are necessary and desirable to regulate the transportation o f hazardous
materials in intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce;
As revised, HMTUSA constitutes a nationwide code governing transportation of
hazardous material. In regulating hazards arising out o f transportation, the Secretary o f
Transportation is granted authority to act proactively to bring civil action and “issue orders
in situations which represent a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe
personal injury or a substantial endangerment to health, property or the environments 'may
occur before the reasonable foreseeable completion date o f a formal proceeding begun to
lessen the risk o f that death, illness, injury or endangerment'".^"^ Unfortunately, such
proactive action has been rare and, as a result, states and localities have found it necessary

Pub. L. 101-615, §2, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3244 as discussed in Grad, 1995.
Frank P. Grad, 1995. Hazardous Material Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990.
American Law Institute- American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education.
February 16 .Columbia University School o f Law.
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to enter the fray o f hazardous materials transportation regulation.

Prevention Solutions fo r Communities: The Problem o f Preemption
As states and lesser jurisdictions continue to realize the inadequacy o f the
federal scheme to meet their needs, they become more proactive enacting
laws and regulations to shield their constituents from the ills perceived in
hazardous materials transportation. The issue further is joined by industry,
which contends unilateral local efforts place an onerous burden on
commerce, often in conflict with the Constitution and federal statutory
law.""’
Limited, but still effective, options are available to a locality desiring to minimize
risk and prevent accidents involving hazardous materials transportation. All hazardous
materials transportation law is federal, any state or local action can be preempted by
superseding federal law. The Constitutional framework for federal preemption is found in
the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. Congress has the power to
regulate commerce between states, nations and Indian tribes, and the Constitution and the
laws o f the land [federal laws] are given supremacy over all other laws.""® Accordingly,
under the Supremacy clause, when state police powers conflict with federal commerce, the
state laws may be nullified, or "preempted".
In addition to Constitutionally provided preemption, some federal transportation
laws address preemption in more detail. HMTA, and then HMTUSA, directed that a state
or local provision will be preempted by federal law if compliance with both the state/local
requirement and any requirement o f federal law is not possible, or if the state/local
Stuart C. Thompson, 1987. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act; Chemicals at
Uncertain Crossroads. Transportation Law Journal 15:411-433.
U.S. Constitution. Supremacy Clause. Article VI, Clause 2.
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requirement as applied or enforced creates an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution o f federal law.^'*®
HMTUSA specifically preempts five covered subjects which include the placarding
and manifesting of hazardous materials. Explicitly preempted are; (i)designation,
description and classification o f hazardous materials; (ii) packing, labeling, and placarding;
(iii) shipping documents; (iv) written notification, recording and reporting o f unintentional
releases in transportation; and (v) packages and containers.
This direct statutory preemption reflects the judgment o f Congress that the
requirements o f uniformity are sufficiently compelling to warrant eliminating the statutory
processes for determining preemption. In the interest o f procedural efficiency, this
approach was widely accepted during drafting and hearing o f the bill.
The natural impulse within the locality is toward regulations calculated to reduce
the apparent risks and amounts o f HazMat transport. ..Here the role o f preemption is
to maintain regulatory ceilings (rather than floors) which best balance legitimate
local concerns against broader societal impacts. The question is to what extent
should a state or locality be able to serve its own welfare by detracting from the
broader general welfare?
HMTUSA went further than HMTA in elevating the cause of uniform national
regulations. Nonetheless, a variety o f preemption cases have been brought to the courts.

Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293338.
HMTA §4. See also § 104(a)(4).
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293338.
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When a state or locality considers a mechanism to regulate hazardous materials
transportation, that measure must be permitted by the DOT under HMTUSA. Approval
occurs only if the state or local action is not preempted by federal law. Any state or locality
or any person "affected by any [state or local requirement]" may apply to DOT for a
determination o f preemption. DOT must provide notice o f the application by publication in
the Federal Register. Following publication, the applicant is barred from seeking judicial
relief on the same issue until DOT's final action, or 180 days after filing the application,
whichever comes first. Any party authorized to apply to DOT for a preemption
determination may also seek a preemption determination in court. Thus, the only restriction
is the 180 day delay. Finally, a state or locality always retains the right to challenge a DOT
preemption finding in court.
DOT can waive preemption if: (1) the requirement in issue affords public protection
equal to, or greater than, that afforded by the Act or DOT's regulations, and (2) it does not
unreasonably burden interstate commerce.^^^ Whether a state /local requirement affords "an
equal or greater level o f protection" than that afforded by federal regulations is largely
factual. Conversely, whether a requirement "unreasonably burdens" commerce (as
compared to whether it simply "burdens" commerce) almost always involves a subjective
judgment.

This subjective judgment includes a balancing between the benefit of the

state/local requirement and the costs and loss to efficiency caused by the requirement. DOT
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293338.
Todd Wallace. 1986. Preemption o f Local Laws by the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act. University o f Chicago Law Review 53:654-681.
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then considers the balance in relation to "the need for uniformity" and the prevalence or
absence o f the requirement in other jurisdictions.
Among the more contentious preemption issues have been those involving local
routing bans or constraints on radioactive materials based on population density. The City
o f New York asked the Department o f Transportation to utilize the safest alternative mode
o f transportation for moving nuclear materials through the city. New York asked DOT to
barge nuclear materials, rather than use the city’s highways that run directly through highly
populated areas. The court denied the city’s request as an unacceptable preemption of
federal authority.^^'* Other cases asserting state and local regulations prior to HMTUSA
fared better.^^® Cases under HMTUSA have faced a stricter preemption standard in which
the court notes the major purpose o f HMTUSA to be development of a uniform, national
method o f regulation o f hazardous materials t r an s p o r t a t i o n . I n a noteworthy exception to
the case law, Massachusetts sought to establish a bonding requirement of at least $10,000
per hazardous materials transporter operating within the state. The court allowed the bond
to stand, for among other reasons, that bonding was not one of the categories explicitly
triggering preemption.^^’
City o f New York v. Department o f Transportation, 715 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1983); cert,
denied (for lack o f jurisdiction), 465 U.S. 1055, 79 L.Ed.2d 730, 104 S.Ct. 1403 (1984).
See New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass 'n. v. Flynn, 751 F.2d 43 (CANH 1984); City
o f New York v. Ritter Transp, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 663, a f f d 677 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
See Public Service Co. o f Colorado v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 30 F.3d 1203, 24
ELR 21286 (9'*' Cir. 1994); Chlorine Institute v. California Highway Patrol, 29 F.3d 495,
24 ELR 21273 (9^ Cir. 1994); Northern State Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton
Sioux Indian Community, 781 F. Supp. 612 (D.M inn.l991), afTd 991 F.2d 458, 23 ELR
20944 (8* Cir. 1993).
Commonwealth o f Massachusetts v. United States Department o f Transportation, 320
U.S. App. D C. 227; 93 F.3d 890 (1996).
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In conclusion, the onus is clearly on states and localities to navigate the intricacies
o f preemption by devising measures that satisfy the requirements. While burdensome, it is
incumbent upon states and localities to discuss options with experts in this field to
determine and pursue measures protective o f human health and safety.

Railroad Preemption: More stringent requirements
State and local regulation o f railroad safety involves even greater obstacles. DOT
regulates general railroad safety under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA)^^*. The
FRSA preemption differs from the HMTUSA standard and reflects the traditionally greater
concern for national uniformity in rail safety regulation as compared to highway safety
regulation. As a result, a state rail safety regulation becomes ineffective upon DOT’s
issuance o f a regulation "...covering the subject matter o f such state requirement." More
stringent state requirements are allowed when “necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any federal law, rule,
regulation, order or standard, and when not creating an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
Where state or local requirements afford "equal or greater" protection, HMTA
exceptions are available for those that "[do] not unreasonably burden commerce." Under
the FRSA, an otherwise preempted "more stringent" state requirement remains effective if.
45 U.S.C. §§421-441 (1983 and Supp. Ill 1985). It has been recommended that the law
be revised to provide that all federal preemption for hazardous materials transportation
be subject to HMTA, not vary by mode. See Hillman, 1993.
Steven C. Goldberg, 1987. State and Local Nuclear Transportation Permit and Fee
Requirements. Transportation Law Journal 15:389-410.
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as a first condition, it is "necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local hazard.
Regardless o f the severity o f that hazard, the state must then run two further gauntlets on
the path to an exception. It must demonstrate that its requirement is "not incompatible"
with any federal requirement and does not create " an undue burden on interstate
commerce.
FRSA preemption is a more difficult test. Putting aside the possible ambiguities of
"to the extent practicable", the fact is that FRSA preemption literally covers the entire field
o f railroad safety. Does this mean that FRSA preemption extends to railroad safety laws
governing the rail transport o f hazardous materials? Conversely, does it mean that in regard
to rail transport, HMTA preemption is superseded by the FRSA? Under current case law,
the answer to both questions is "Yes".^^*

Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials
Transport Act; Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293338.
Jordan Jay Hillman, 1992.Federal Preemption Under the Hazardous Materials
Transport Act: Assessing Standards and Procedures. Transportation Law Journal 20:293338.
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Chapter 6. The Right-to-Know in Theory, Law and Practice
Indeed, knowledge makes a difference. One large population survey
determined that the level o f concern fo r environmental toxics rose with the
number o f information sources. Another study fo u n d a positive correlation
between information about [a] nuclear plant and the opposition to licensing
i t 262

Full disclosure o f risk has been recognized as crucial to improving safety and
reducing risk and is known as community right-to-know. Right-to-know begins with
citizens gaining access to information previously held secret by industry. A feedback loop
is created, beginning with citizen acquisition o f information and leading ultimately to
accident prevention and safer industrial practices through public pressure on government
and corporations
The crucial role o f community right-to-know in preventing toxic releases through
citizen access to information has been written into law. Right-to-know law is based on the
premise that in order to advocate for accident prevention and improved corporate conduct,
the public first must know what the dangers are. Right-to-know (RTK) provides the public
with the information necessary from which to build demands for improved operations,
hazard reduction, and accident prevention. Information regarding risk is necessary for
concerned citizens to form arguments for prevention and improved safety. Reluctance or
refusal to share such information with the public jeopardizes public safety and hobbles
attempts to prevent accidents. Only under public scrutiny and pressure will companies
undertake changes not motivated by profit. And right-to-know information is the tool with

Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia and
community action. University of California Press, Los Angeles.
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which to create public pressure, an essential link in the feedback to accountability.
Unfortunately, transporters are exempt from most o f right-to-know law.
Government bodies responsible for upholding the right-to-know, notably Local Emergency
Planning Committees (LEPCs), often fail to enhance the application of the spirit of right-toknow laws to transporters in the through creative means. This chapter will discuss the rightto-know in U.S. law, the omission o f hazardous materials transporters from that law, the
inadequacy o f transportation regulations to improve safety and reduce risks, and methods
for communities to improve the right-to-know for hazardous materials transporters and gain
access to key information which leads to accident prevention.

Bhopal: Catalyst fo r Disclosure
The concept o f community right-to-know was first included in U.S. law following a
series o f toxic disasters. On December 4, 1984, a deadly cloud o f methyl isocyanate, used
in pesticide manufacture, settled over the 800,000 sleeping residents o f Bhopal, India. More
than 2,500 people died, and over 200,000 were injured, with 17,000 o f those permanently
disabled by exposure to the toxic chemical.

The toxic cloud was released from a storage

tank at a Union Carbide plant. Nine months later, another toxic chemical used to make
pesticides, aldicarb oximine, was released by another Union Carbide facility in Institute,
West Virginia, exposing thousands o f people. Fortunately, the Institute release resulted in

Sidney M. Wolf. Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: the Surprising
Success o f the EPCRA. Journal o f Land Use & Environmental Law, Spring, 1996.
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no fatalities, but the similarities between the two disasters served as a wake-up call for
citizens and lawmakers.
In both accidents local authorities were uninformed about what was happening and
what chemicals were involved. Authorities were confused about how best to protect
citizens. In Bhopal, the Union Carbide facility had an abysmal safety record, poorly trained
employees, and local residents had no information regarding what was produced or used at
the site. The alarm system that should have been set off by the release had been deactivated
several years earlier, so as not to cause panic. When the alarms finally sounded, panicked
workers fled the plant, running past buses parked for use in the event o f an evacuation. At
the same time, local residents ran towards the plant, thinking that assistance was needed
there to put out a fire. Local Bhopal authorities were not formally informed o f the leak for
two hours, and plant managers initially denied any problem. When a toxic release was
finally admitted, plant officials gave no information concerning the content, location, or
movement o f the poison cloud.^^
In Institute, West Virginia, residents smelled the release before they were informed
o f any problem. The alarm did not sound until a full twenty minutes after the initial release.
When it did, people were unsure how to r e s p o n d . T h e r e are numerous other examples of
toxic chemical releases onto unsuspecting communities which are injured as a result. A
1985 EPA survey estimated that over 7,000 toxic chemical releases had occurred in the US

Rebecca S. Weeks. 1998. The Bumpy Road to community preparedness; the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act. Environmental Lawyer.
Sidney M. Wolf. Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: the Surprising
Success o f the EPCRA. Journal o f Land Use & Environmental Law, Spring, 1996.
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in the previous five years, with 139 people killed, 1,478 injured, and 217,000 evacuated
from their homes/*^ In the mid-1980s, with the recent disasters and survey information
fresh in the public mind, Americans became increasingly concerned about the presence of
chemical facilities near their homes.
Americans were hungry for information about chemical plants in their towns, but
found it nearly impossible to obtain information from corporations. The chemical industry
was reluctant to inform even government officials about chemicals used on site. In Camden
County, Georgia, "the local Union Carbide plant did not tell county officials that the plant
used methyl isocyanate even after an official updating emergency plans had specifically
inquired about hazardous materials at the site. In addition to lacking information about the
types o f chemicals used at the plant, neither Camden County nor Union Carbide had an
evacuation plan in place for nearby residents. This scenario repeated itself across the
country.
As citizens and officials became increasingly frustrated with the dearth of
information on toxic chemical use at facilities, grassroots pressure resulted in numerous
state and local laws designed to provide workers and communities with necessary
information on chemical hazards. Worker protection laws, such as the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA)^^* were designed to inform workers of the types of hazards to
which they might be exposed in the workplace. New Jersey passed a Toxic Catastrophe

=“ EPA, 1985.
Rebecca S. Weeks, The Bumpy Road to community preparedness; the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-know Act. Environmental Lawyer, June 1998.
29 U.S.C. §651 et seq.
154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Prevention Act in 1985, which required facilities using over a threshold amount of
hazardous substance to submit information concerning risk management and hazard
reduction.^^® EPA established the Chemical Emergency Preparedness Program (CEPP) to
raise community “awareness o f the potential for accidents involving extremely hazardous
substances, and to foster development o f state and local emergency plans."

The

chemical industry joined in by developing the Community Awareness and Emergency
Response (CAER) program to encourage “planning and information exchange between its
member companies and their surrounding communities.
Congress was influenced by these efforts and incorporated portions of each into its
remedy for problems in emergency planning and accessibility to information concerning
toxic chemicals: the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).
Although passed as Title HI o f the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act o f
1986 (SARA), EPCRA was designed to be a free-standing law apart from CERCLA and its
amendments.^^^ The purpose o f EPCRA is to “establish programs to provide the public
with important information on the hazardous chemicals in their communities and to
establish emergency planning and notification requirements which would protect the public
in the event o f a release o f hazardous chemicals.

Van R. Delhotal, The General Duty to prevent accidental releases o f extremely
hazardous substances: The general duty clause o f Section 112(r) o f the Clean Air Act.
^™U.S. EPA. 1988. Chemicals in your community: a guide to the emergency planning and
community right-to-know a c t EPA Doc. 550-K-93-003.
Id.
Sidney M. Wolf. Fear and Loathing about the Public Right to Know: the Surprising
Success o f the EPCRA. Journal o f Land Use & Environmental Law, Spring, 1996.
:^H .R Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 281 (1986), reprinted in, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.2835, 2895.
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The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
True to its name, EPCRA has a two-parted mandate: to improve planning for
response to emergencies and to enhance the community right-to-know about risks.
Fulfilling each segments of the mandate relies on information disclosure. The effectiveness
o f response to emergencies increases with the amount and specificity o f information
provided to emergency responders. The public’s understanding o f risk and ability to
encourage safer practices is dependent upon access to information about industrial
practices in their communities.
To protect the public through information disclosure, EPCRA focuses on four major
areas: 1) planning for chemical emergency responses (§301); 2) providing emergency
notification of chemical accidents and releases (§304); 3) reporting of hazardous chemical
inventories (the Right-to-Know provisions) (§311-312); and 4) reporting o f toxic chemical
releases (§313). Public access and enforcement are additional areas of concern. EPCRA
left most o f the details for emergency planning to state and local governments, but
established an infrastructure for doing so. EPCRA mandated that each state form a State
Emergency Response Commission (SERC), which in turn was to delineate emergency
plaiming districts and appoint Local Emergency Planning Commissions (LEPCs). These
state and local bodies were tasked with assembling emergency response plans as well as
gathering and disseminating information on risk and response.
EPCRA focuses on facilities and transporters using certain toxic chemicals over
thresholds set by EPA . Section 302 describes a list of 366 "extremely hazardous
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substances".These "threshold planning quantities" are defined and facilities exceeding these
limits are subject to the provisions o f EPCRA. Section 311 requires the dissemination of
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to emergency responders, SERCs and LEPCs to
increase knowledge o f chemicals used in and being transported through communities.
Perhaps the most wide-reaching program instituted by EPCRA is found in Section 313, the
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). TRI requires facilities to account for toxic chemicals
produced, disposed of and transported on and off-site. TRI is a powerful tool which gives
citizens the opportunity to know the cumulative pollution and risk affecting their
communities At the release o f the TRI data each year, community groups use the
information to show which industries are the dirtiest, where improvements have been, and
geographical variations in pollution. Mining operations were recently required to submit
data to the TRI, making metals-rich western states such as Montana soar up the list because
o f heretofore uncounted tonnages o f mining waste and pollution. Finally, EPCRA Section
326 includes a citizen suit provision which allows citizens to sue SERCs, states and
facilities for failing to abide by the law. An example o f a citizen suit targeting EPCRA
notification under Section 304, the only portion not exempting transporters, in Montana
Rail Link’s toxic spill in Alberton will be discussed later in this chapter.
In sum, EPCRA deputizes state and local decision makers with the knowledge and
the means to mitigate and help eliminate the impacts of chemical releases. By transferring
information from industrial facilities and other businesses to local governments and
citizens, EPCRA serves as an essential tool for communities to control the risk associated
with the production and use o f hazardous chemicals. Unfortunately, transporters of
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hazardous materials are exempt from all sections o f EPCRA except for Section 304,
emergency notification. In the case o f the Montana Rail Link chemical spill at Alberton,
local community groups pursued Section 304 compliance.

Enforcing EPCRA: Citizen Suit alleging Montana Rail L in k ’s failure to notify under §304
Transporters are exempt from all right-to-know legislation, save §304 o f EPCRA,
the notification requirement. During the Alberton derailment incident, Montana Rail Link
failed in their duty to comply with §304. The omission o f information required by that
section including identification o f the chemicals released and potential acute and chronic
health effects, led to ongoing problems for spill victims in their quest for medical diagnosis
and treatment.
Section 304 requires emergency notification and written follow-up to the SERC and
LEPC o f a release into the environment o f a reportable quantity o f either an "extremely
hazardous substance” under §302 o f EPCRA, or a CERCLA "hazardous substance subject
to the emergency notification requirement of §103 (a) o f CERCLA, o f "EHS' or a
"hazardous substance" under CERCLA from facilities and transporters. This notice is
required immediately via telephone, radio, or in person to 911 or the community response
coordinator. §304 § 1 1004(b)(1). In addition to notifying the SERC and the LEPC, if the
substance is a CERCLA “hazardous substance, the facility must notify the National
Response Center, which may be made by telephone. A follow-up written notice to the
SERC and LEPC is also required "as soon as practicable" after the release. § 1 1004(c). This
is the only section o f EPCRA which does not exempt transportation o f substances subject
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to the requirements o f the law.
Notice o f a release must include:
the name of the chemical
whether the chemical is extremely hazardous
the location, amount, time and duration o f the release
whether the chemical was released into the a i r , water, soil, or a combination of the
three
the acute or chronic health effects o f the substance
advice on proper medical attention
precaution, such as evacuation
the name and telephone number o f the facility contact
On April 19, 1996, eight days after the initial release during which time residents
had been allowed into the evacuated area to feed animals without any disclosure
concerning chemicals other than chlorine or by-products, a Missoula community group sent
the following notice to the Montana SERC, Department of Emergency Services Office:
Re: Request for public information concerning the Montana Rail Link derailment
near Alberton, Montana and release o f chemicals
Under Section 324(A) o f EPCRA, MRL is required to provide notice o f the
accident.. .Pursuant to this request, the notice information requires that the
following be disclosed:
1) The time and date when your office was contacted by Montana Rail Link or other
responsible party concerning the train derailment as required by section 304(b) of
EPCRA
2) The amount, estimated or known, of chemicals released from the derailment;
3) The chemical name, estimated or known quantity involved in the release;
4) Time and duration for chemical release, and the known media that the chemicals
were released to;
5) The known and anticipated health effects, acute and chronic health effects,
resulting from the release o f chemicals, and advice regarding medical attention
necessary for exposed individuals;
6) Proper precautions to take as a result o f the release; and
7) The name and telephone number o f the person or persons to be contacted for
further information.
Notice o f Intent to Sue Montana Rail Link for violation o f EPCRA §304. Cold
Mountain Cold Rivers. 4/24/96.
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When the §304 notification information was not provided as the end o f evacuation
drew nearer with no sign o f full disclosure, formal notice was given on the intent to file an
§304 EPCRA lawsuit. The suit was brought by a local environmental group. Cold
Mountain, Cold Rivers, and an attorney, from the Western Environmental Law Center in
Eugene, OR, who had previous experience in EPCRA litigation. The lawsuit was brought,
according to the attorney, because "Without this information neither the public nor the
agencies responsible for protecting the public health have the information necessary to fully
determine the extent o f this catastrophe”^’^
More specifically, the community group’s goal was “...to get the company to
disclose the extent o f ecological contamination and health risks associated with the spill of
toxic chemicals near Alberton, Montana.”

The notice o f intent to sue alleged that

“..Montana Rail Link has failed, and continues to fail, to comply with section 304(c) of
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. section 11004(c). CMCR is informed and believes that Montana Rail
Link has released large quantities o f extremely hazardous substances, including, but not
limited to. Chlorine...in excess o f statutory thresholds and subject of the emergency
notification requirements of EPCRA”.^”
The response from the SERC indicated a lack o f understanding of the intent o f §304 and its
crucial importance for right-to-know.

Charlie Tebbutt, Western Environmental Law Center. 4/24/96. Press Release. Group files notic
sue Montana Rail Link to disclose information on chemical spill in Alberton, MT.
Darrell Geist, CMCR 4/24/96. Id.
4/24/96 Notice o f Intent to Sue, Cold Mountain, Cold Rivers and Western Environmental Law
Center.
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Written report o f ‘Followup Emergency Notice” (EPCRA subsection 304(c) is to be
made ‘as soon as practicable after a release...” “Since CMCR and WELC were
notifying o f intent to file suit even before the incident was over (the WELC letter is
dated April 24, 1996) it seems rather obvious that the intent o f their “intent to file
suit” is not consistent with the intent o f the law and subsequent regulations.
Furthermore, relief in this matter would see...to be nothing but data, which should
be forthcoming “as soon as practicable after a [the] release” incident is over. I see
this as a non-issue for the SERC, certainly worth no one’s effort at this point.

This response is flawed for several reasons. First, the seven pieces of information
outlined in the letter to the SERC are required in the initial notice which may be given
verbally immediately following a release. The written follow-up notice is then to occur “as
soon as practicable after a release.” This memorandum demonstrates the confusion
between the “release” and the “incident”. The chemical release, to which EPCRA refers
and addresses in Section 304(c), occurred on 4/11/96 for all three chemicals of concern,
and continued intermittently for chlorine and perhaps byproducts. The Alberton “incident”
was not declared over until residents were back in their homes. This is exactly why CMCR,
WELC, and numerous citizens advocated for full disclosure of chemicals spilled as soon as
possible following the release o f those chemicals and prior to the end of incident, then
evacuation.
This information was integral to the any decision making pertaining to the health
and safety issues of re-entry. The argument that Montana Rail Link and responders were
too busy with the technical aspects o f halting further release o f chlorine and cleaning up the
site to provide relevant information was baseless, but somehow succeeds. Evacuees were
allowed to re-enter without full disclosure under EPCRA ever occurring, particularly as
4/30/96 To Tom Ellerhoff, SERC Co-Chair From; Fred Cowie, SERC Staff
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related to potassium cresylate, its components, and by-products in reaction with chlorine.
Long-term health effects information was never provided for any o f the chemicals, and
short term information was provided only for chlorine.
The legal action to enforce Section 304 o f EPCRA is an important tool which, if
successful, makes clear the responsibility Montana Rail Link had to inform spill victims,
the public and government agencies about all chemicals released in its April 11 derailment.
With limited right-to-know tools available for enforcing hazardous materials transporters, it
becomes critical that citizens hold transporters accountable to the few right-to-know
provisions which explicitly apply to them.

The Risk Management Program: Oll2(r)
The other major piece o f right-to-know legislation is §112(r) o f the Clean Air Act
Amendments o f 1990, know as EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP)^’^. The
framework for the Risk Management Program is found in OSHA’s safe workplace
standards, the general duty clause in the Clean Air Act Amendments (1990) which “directs
owners and operators o f stationary sources to identify hazards that may result from
accidental releases, to design and maintain a safe facility, and to minimize the
consequences o f releases when they occur”^®° , and the mandate of EPCRA. The Risk
Management Program(RMP) goes further to combine these measures in a program
requiring facilities to extend safe workplace goals to the surrounding community. Under

280

Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990. PL 101-549, Nov. 15, 1990, 104 Stat 2399.
Yj
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§112(r), facilities must assess their potential impact on surrounding communities, disclose
that information to the affected community and address how risks will be reduced. The
RMP is comprised o f four main elements: 1) hazard assessment with off-site consequence
analysis; 2) accident prevention program; 3) emergency response plan; and 4) risk
management plan
The final rule and notice o f the Risk Management Program was given on June 20,
1996^** and the first plans were due from facilities by June 20, 1999. Facilities must submit
the plans to Risk Management Plans to both the EPA and the LEPC. The RMP applies only
to stationary sources, so once again transporters o f hazardous materials are exempt from a
key right-to-know provision. Other exemptions include explosives or naturally occurring
hydrocarbons such as oil or gasoline. There are an estimated 66,000 facilities nationwide
which must comply. The rule applies to a list o f 140 chemicals, including 63 flammable
substances and 77 toxic substances with threshold limits for each listed substance. The four
chemicals which force most facilities to comply with the RMP are chlorine, ammonia,
sulfur dioxide, and propane.

The majority o f facilities must complete the following to

comply with the RMP: 1) register to the program; 2) conduct a hazard analysis; 3) compile
a five-year accident history; 4) prepare an accident prevention program; 5) prepare an
emergency response plan; and 6) submit a risk management plan. ^
A facility must conduct a hazard analysis for each chemical on the list it has on-site
40C.F.R. 68§112(r)(7).
Printed Materials, American Water Works Association Teleconference: How to
comply with the USEPA’s Risk Management Rule, 10/22/98.
2“ Peterson, Jim; Glenn Ford, Jennifer Blair-Cockrum, USEPA RMP training for
Missoula LEPC and facilities, Missoula, MT, June 9, 1998.
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above the threshold level. The hazard analysis includes a worst-case release scenario which
involves the total quantity o f the largest single vessel, container or pipe released over ten
minutes in weather conditions with maximize the off-site impacts. A more likely to occur
alternate case scenario based on accident history data and more typical meteorology must
also be modeled. For each release scenario, facilities must complete an off-site
consequence analysis outlining how far the chemicals released would go and what
vulnerable sites such as hospitals, schools, residences, waterways, and natural areas would
lie in the path o f the toxic cloud.
The prevention program requires facilities to outline tools for prevention in order to
identify problems and opportunities. The goal with accident prevention is to encourage
companies to look at the root cause o f accidents, and view every accident as not an isolated
incident, but rather a symptom of larger, more fundamental problems that must be
rectified. The five-year accident history provides additional data to examine for trends in
performance. To improve accident prevention, industries are required to describe safety
information, operating procedures, training for emergency situations, maintenance,
compliance audits, and incident investigations. All o f this information can then be assessed
in sum to identify areas to be focused on for improvement.
The RMP requires the emergency response program to include procedures to be
used on-site by employees in case o f a chemical release, a notification system to inform the
public and emergency responders o f an incident, opportunities to practice response
procedures and test knowledge o f them, coordination with local emergency responders, and
appropriate medical procedures in case o f an accident.
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Finally, the risk management plan submitted to the EPA and Local Emergency
Planning Committee (LEPC) incorporates all elements o f the program. It includes the offsite consequence analysis, the five-year accident history, the prevention program, and the
emergency response plan. These risk management plans are the final products and form the
basis for public discussion and risk communication. The crucial role o f LEPCs to play as
the only local recipients o f the plan will be discussed further, along with opportunities to
apply risk management planning to transporters.
Much o f the power o f EPCRA and Risk Management Planning rests with the Local
Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). Fortunately, LEPCs have the ability to redress
transporter exemptions by requesting voluntary participation from transporters in a number
of efforts to enhance emergency response and public safety. The functions, successes,
failures and opportunities for LEPCs are discussed in the next chapter.
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C h ap ter 7. Local Em ergency Planning Committees: Im portant Tool for Right-toKnow
I f the “regulation through information " strategy o f Title 111 (EPCRA) is to be
effective in reducing chemical risks, the LEPCs must succeed in alerting the public
to chemical hazards and in providing them with the information they need to hold
industry and its public sector regulators accountable.
The overall objective o f these changes is not only to increase the capacity o f the
LEPCs to fu lfill their risk communication role, but, more importantly, to make the
LEPCs genuine community organizations that can serve as mechanisms through
which the public can help make decisions about how to respond to the chemical
risks that exist in their community.

In the face o f preemption and a complex web o f hazardous materials transportation
law and regulation, creative approaches to prevention and right-to-know are necessary and
LEPCs are the venue to accomplish this work. It is clear from the legislative history that
Congress viewed public participation as an integral component in planning and
enforcement o f EPCRA: “Congress relied on strong public action to 'ensure prompt actions’
by state and local governments."

By transferring information from industrial facilities

and other businesses to local governments and citizens, EPCRA serves as an essential tool
for communities to control the risk associated with the production and use of hazardous
c h e m ic a ls .M iic h o f the power o f EPCRA at the local level, however, rests with the
Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs). Formed under §310 of EPCRA, Local

Rich, Richard, W. David Conn, William L. Owens. 1993. “Indirect regulation” of
environmental hazards through the provision o f information to the public: the case of
SARA, Title III. Policy Studies Journal 21 ( 1): 16-35.
^«Weeks. See H R. Rep. No. 99-253, at 113, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C A N. 3276, 3375.
Gottlieb, Robert ed. 1995. Reducing Toxics: A new approach to policy and industrial
decisionmaking. Island Press, Washington, D C.
166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) are well equipped to research and implement a
variety o f tools to educate the public about risk, encourage transporter cooperation in
accident prevention and improve public safety. LEPCs nationwide have been examined for
their compliance with EPCRA and effectiveness at implementing community right-toknow. LEPCs come up short throughout the country, and Missoula’s LEPC is no exception.
This section will explore what LEPCs must do, what they can do, and what they
should do. How LEPCs can attain the goals set forth in the recommendations will be laid
out in detail. To date, many LEPCs have undertaken the emergency planning segment of
their mandate and ignored the community right-to-know component. This was
understandable in the time immediately following passage o f EPCRA when LEPCs were
tasked with drawing up emergency response plans. Today, LEPCs that complied with
EPCRA deadlines for completion and revision o f emergency response plans face the
challenge o f fulfilling their right-to-know mandate, which is less straightforward than
drafting a response plan, but equally important. There are numerous resources available to
LEPCs once they decide to fulfill their right-to-know obligations.^*^ Identifying and
specifying risks is necessary to fine tune emergency response, prevent accidents and
educate the public.

These include: The Right-to-Know Network at www.rtknet.org; the resources o f the
Jefferson County LEPC and guidelines for § 112(r) compliance at www. gablehouseepel.com; EPA’s Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office’s extensive
resources on accident prevention, right-to-know and the Risk Management Program at
W W W . epa. go v/s wercepp.
Finally, Many LEPCs have their own webpages which outline their efforts to increase
community right-to-know. For example, see Deer Park County, Texas and Harford
County, Maiyland.
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LEPC Responsibilities Under EPCRA
LEPCs were formed by EPCRA to devise emergency response plans for accidents
involving facilities and transporters handling hazardous materials in the local area.
Facilities are directed, upon request, to provide LEPCs with information necessary to
complete response plans, including Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). Under Section
312, LEPCs annually compile an inventory of facilities using hazardous materials; these
inventories describe the hazardous chemicals used by the facility. Facilities must submit
information on chemicals used including type, maximum and average amounts of the
chemical, storage information and location of the chemical on site.
EPCRA directs each LEPC to include representatives from the facilities covered by
EPRA, media, elected officials, law enforcement, civil defense, fire fighting, community
groups, first aid, health, local environmental, hospital and transportation personnel. LEPCs
fail to cast the net wide for membership and the limitations caused by narrow membership
have adversely affected public disclosure because the direction o f a LEPC is determined in
large part by its membership. For example, the Missoula County LEPC historically
included few to no representatives o f the public interest or non-profit environmental
sector.^** The Missoula LEPC added four “at large” citizen representatives, but did not
specify that any of those citizens be from a community or environmental group, despite
direction from EPCRA to do so.

Annie Szvetecz. 1996. EPCRA as a tool for community involvement in environmental
management o f polluting industries. Univereity o f Montana, Missoula.
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LEPCs must appoint a chairperson to establish rules for the committee to follow,
give public notice o f its activities, and establish procedures for handling public requests for
information. The LEPC is also required to publish an annual notice of the public
availability o f its emergency response plan and other data, such as inventory forms, in local
newspapers. Emergency plans were due by October 17, 1988, and must be reviewed
annually.
EPCRA Section 303 requires LEPCs to gather appropriate information to develop
and update emergency response plans. "Upon request from the emergency planning
committee, the owner or operator of the facility shall promptly provide information to such
committee necessary for developing and implementing the emergency plan”.^®^ This
statement designates authority and responsibility to the LEPC to collect any and all
information, including but not limited to, that which is required by EPCRA. The
assumption is that the LEPC cannot adequately develop and implement the emergency
response plan without all o f the information regarding chemical storage and release from
these facilities.
The information gathered for emergency plans and the ability o f LEPCs to update
and augment that information for accident prevention and public education is too often
underused.
Facility compliance with reporting requirements and LEPC compliance with public
education and emergency planning is essential to the health and safety of industrial
workers, emergency responders, and citizens o f the community. Many facilities still present
2^ EPCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1 1003(d)(3).
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unnecessary risks of a chemical accident by not providing the required information on
chemical production, storage, use and release.^^” LEPCs also may be compromising the
quality o f emergency response planning and implementation by failing to obtain missing
information. A facility or LEPC that refuses to fully comply with EPCRA denies citizens a
legal right to that information. There is debate about how effective LEPCs are and many
ideas about how they can better do their job. In the next section, the Missoula LEPC is
examined in light o f Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill at Alberton and ensuing questions
about the risks presented by hazardous materials transport through the region.
LEPCs in Action: A Case Study o f the Missoula County LEPC's coverage o f transportation
and risk management
Since transporters are exempt from the two main and strongest right-to-know
provisions in existence, innovative strategies to reduce hazardous materials transportation
accidents and increase public disclosure o f risks are necessary. LEPCs are the logical place
for such work to start in local communities. Unfortunately many LEPCs, including
Missoula's, are unclear about right-to-know issues and their relevance to risk reduction.^^'
The author joined the Missoula LEPC as a city at-large representative in the spring of 1997.
In the first year following the Alberton train derailment, the LEPC had taken no action to
reduce risks posed by Montana Rail Link by initiating discussion or requesting information
to assess risks and develop accident prevention strategies. In November of 1997, Montana

EPA 1990.
Sandberg, Stephen and Monika Heinbaugh. 1997. What you don't know can hurt you:
A perspective on Missoula C ounty’s right-to-know efforts. The Environmental
Organizing Semester, University of Montana.
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Rail Link intentionally derailed a runaway train just 20 miles east of Missoula in Clinton,
MT. There was a 45 minute time span during which the train, laden with hazardous
substances including several chlorine tankers, was hurtling backwards towards Missoula
with no crew member on board. During that time, responders, law enforcement, and
government officials, including the health department, were not kept apprised of the
situation by the railroad in a manner which allowed them to make any decisions concerning
how to best protect the public. This incident, while luckily involving no release of
hazardous materials, clearly illustrated the disorganization surrounding response to
potentially large scale rail disasters in the greater Missoula area.
In December o f 1997, the author wrote a memo to the LEPC suggesting means to
improve Montana Rail Link’s accountability to the LEPC and public, with the goal of
improving safety and preventing accidents, by asking MRL to disclose information useful
for emergency response before or at an upcoming January meeting with the LEPC. The
memo suggested that the Right-to-Know Subcommittee o f the LEPC work to identify
hazards, convey information to the public and prevent future accidents by:
1) Requesting MRL to identify hazardous chemicals and volumes o f those
chemicals transported through Missoula City and County on a monthly basis, with
breakdowns by week, season, and time of day when possible.
2) Revisit the Missoula County Hazardous materials Response Plan and amend the
“Severe Case” transportation hazard analysis to reflect a derailment on the scale o f the
Alberton derailment.
3) Create and publicize the evacuation plan for Missoula City/County in the event
o f a “Severe Case” transportation incident. If such a plan is untenable, explain why.^^^

292 sieck, Hope. 12/3/97. Memo to LEPC Right-to-Know Subcommittee re: Montana Rail
Link safety history and proposed LEPC activities.
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The memo suggested that Montana Rail be requested to provide the LEPC with the
following information:

1) History o f rail accidents and root causes for those accidents for entire company
history.
2) Current status o f operations. Including volume o f rail traffic through Missoula
City/County per time period and quality and type o f hazardous materials transported
(including radioactive materials).
3) Accident mitigation measure undertaken. Including employee training, safety
inspections, etc.
4) Plans to improve performance and means to rebuild public confidence in
operations.

The LEPC was reluctant to ask Montana Rail Link for such information. Instead, at
the January 1998 meeting to discuss the Clinton runaway train incident and how to improve
safety and response, responders and government officials spoke o f a lack o f communication
on the part o f the railroad company and an utter lack of information. This poor
communication resulted in an inability to proceed with population protection measures
such as evacuation, road blocks or even aimouncements via the media with pertinent
information and likely scenarios. Responders were frustrated and dismayed by the problems
and difficulties presented by rail disasters. Govermnent officials and citizens present were
stunned by the lack of information provided by the railroad company in light o f the
enormous risks posed by their business. The attitude of deferral to Montana Rail Link
continued even after this second major derailment, as some officials and responders acted
as if Montana Rail Link would be doing them an enormous favor to cooperate with them

Sieck, Hope. 12/3/97. Memo to LEPC Right-to-Know Subcommittee re: Montana Rail
Link safety history and proposed LEPC activities.
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and provide them with basic, up to the minute information in the event of an emergency. It
became clear that no procedure was in place for informing local responders or the health
department about a potential disaster and that the LEPC did not comfortable actively
pursuing accident prevention or increased right-to-know.
As a result, work began between concerned community members, Alberton spill
survivors, and several City Council members, some o f whom also sat on the LEPC. The
LEPC reported to the City Council Committee on Public Health and Safety and several
members o f that committee took an active interest in the LEPC’s shortcomings with
Montana Rail Link. Citizens drafted a resolution addressing hazardous materials
transportation to address many of the points raised in the LEPC memo in hopes o f creating
LEPC accountability. The resolution outlined the risk from hazardous materials
transportation to citizens o f Missoula: nineteen derailments involving hazardous materials
by Montana Rail Link between 1991 and 1997, the numerous near and actual releases in the
area from petroleum pipelines, and the costs o f hazardous materials response to citizens
and local government. The resolution noted that the study of root causes o f accidents and
the lessons learned, “termed prevention, can avoid all these costs to health, welfare and the
environment.” The final whereas stated that “prevention activities incidentally inform and
benefit emergency response, lowering the cost and consequences of such emergencies.”
The resolution went on to conclude;
Now, therefore, we the Missoula [City Council, Board of Health] call on our
agencies and staff to actively promote prevention; and specially call on the
Missoula LEPC to:
1) exercise its authority under section 303(d)(3) o f the federal Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA, codified at USC
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110039(d)(3)) to receive such information from facilities as those mentioned
above as is necessary for developing and implementing the local
Comprehensive Emergency Response Plan in a manner that will help
PREVENT such accidents as those mentioned above. The information
received from these facilities should include such things as the identity of
hazardous chemicals and their amounts stored or used in or transported into
or through the County in a period o f time; root cause accident investigations;
risk analyses, accident reports, inspection records, investigation and
enforcement files, correspondence between the carriers and facilities and
regulatory agencies regarding accidents, derailments and chemical spills
involving hazardous materials; and accident mitigation measures considered
or undertaken, including inherently safer technologies and relevant
equipment repair and maintenance and employee training records;
2) Use its moral authority on transportation and other organizations not
covered by EPCRA 303(d) information collection authority;
3) Revise the Missoula County Hazardous Materials Response Plan and
amend the “severe Case” transportation hazard analysis to reflect an
accident o f the consequence o f the 4/11/96 Alberton MRL derailment, create
and publicize the evacuation plan for Missoula City/County in the event o f a
“Severe Case” transportation incident. If such a plan is untenable, explain
why.
4) Fully carry out its other explicit or implied responsibilities for community
Risk Management Planing (to handle the risk of chemical releases from
major stationary facilities in the County, under the 1990 federal Clean Air
Act Amendments), including the effective communication o f risk to the
public.^^'*
The resolution was not passed through City Council and frustration grew among
victims o f Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill and concerned citizens. Even ’with the
momentum o f a major rail disaster and a near miss, the culture of the LEPC and local
government continued to prefer to cultivate “relationships” with industry. The public and
government inevitably lost out in this “relationship” as the result o f an uneven power
dynamic. Thus, the public was left with a dearth o f information and no commitment or

Montana Coalition for Health, Environmental and Economic Rights, Cold Mountain,
Cold Rivers, Alberton Community Coalition for Environmental Health. 1998. Proposed
Missoula City-County Resolution on community right-to-know.
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action from local government or the LEPC to rectify the situation or work to reduce risks.
Montana Rail Link and the LEPC created an atmosphere where any discussion of Montana
Rail Link’s safety problems was considered an unfair allegation betraying an anti-railroad
agenda. LEPC members and government officials trod lightly around the company, never
asking for anything specific, and always resting happily on the laurels that the current
“relationship” with the company was much improved from the time when MRL did not
even notify the local government or responders o f accidents and failed to reimburse the
county for expenses incurred in the Alberton derailment.
Section 303 Authority. Moral Suasion and Hazardous Materials Flow Studies
The LEPC has the authority to do considerable work toward accident prevention in
the realm o f hazardous materials transportation. Under §303 of EPCRA they have the right
to ask for any and all information to construct emergency plans. The current Emergency
Response Plan consists only o f general information concerning hazardous materials
transported by rail through Missoula.^^^ Although transporters are exempt from most
portions o f EPCRA, LEPCs have the authority to ask for information they feel necessary to
devise comprehensive response plans. The Missoula LEPC should use its authority fully to
gather specific information from hazardous transporters regarding amounts, timing, and
frequency o f shipments. This detailed information can greatly assist emergency planning.
LEPCs have considerable moral suasion when working on behalf on public health and
safety. Industry generally does not find it in its best interest to obstruct the work of LEPCs,

Missoula County Office o f Emergency Management. 1996. Missoula County
Hazardous Materials Response Plan.
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particularly when the public is supportive of those endeavors. If hazardous materials
transporters are unwilling to share information with LEPCs in the name of improved
emergency planning and enhanced community right-to-know, funding is available from the
Department o f Transportation for LEPCs to compile that information.
LEPCs are eligible for hazardous materials emergency planning grants from the
Department o f Transportation under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform
Safety Act. These grants often fund “hazardous materials flow studies”^®®. A flow study
collects data on shipments o f hazardous materials that originate from, are destined to, or
pass through the county. A flow study also identifies the transportation routes likely to be
used for the transportation o f hazardous substances to and from facilities and the time of
transportation. The information gained from hazardous materials flow studies assists
emergency planning efforts by providing additional detail. The information also furthers
accident prevention by disclosing to the public the level of risk in their community. LEPCs
conduct these flow studies using volunteers or paid staff stationed at weigh stations,
railroad crossings and yards. The placard number o f each truck and train car passing is
recorded along with the time and place of movement. A database is compiled which
provides a comprehensive picture of what hazardous materials are moving through the
community, by what mode o f transport, and when.

Information on and applications for USDOT-HMEP Grants are available from the
State Emergency Response Commission offices. In Montana, several counties including
Butte-Silver Bow and Fergus County have conducted flow studies. See Appendix B An
example o f an application for a flow study in Missoula County.
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Trends for time of day, week, season and year are able to be determined, a level of
detail which allows emergency responders to plan better. For example, a community may
have heavy flow of hazardous materials, particularly chlorine and sulfur by train on
weekday evenings but not on weekends. Radioactive materials may pass through by truck
every second Wednesday o f the month. This type o f information allows responders to chart
out the likelihood o f certain risks at certain times, yielding a level of knowledge for a truck
accident with hazardous release on a second Wednesday or a Monday evening train
derailment which was not possible before. Furthermore, any level of detail about type,
pattern and volume o f hazardous material transport is an improvement over the current lack
o f information and greatly improves response. Finally, before undertaking a flow study,
LEPCs first should ask transporters to voluntarily provide the information sought. If
transporters are willing, the LEPC may not have to collect data, but instead only compile
and analyze it.
The Role o f Local Government
The Missoula City and County governments can play a role in reducing risk by
encouraging the LEPC to follow through on its mandate and the outlined measures to
insure voluntary compliance with laws and programs which will provide much needed
information to the public and responders. Resolutions like the one discussed can provide
solutions and guidelines which are specifically suited to Missoula’s needs. Formation of an
Accident Prevention Task Force, which would have the authority to call in industry and
transporters and ask for updates on safety improvement and risk reduction, and would work
closely with the LEPC and compile and analyze information collected by the LEPC. This
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task force could undertake the risk communication for Risk Management Planning and in
general. A staff member would be necessary and could be shared by the LEPC and task
force. Currently, the infrastructure is lacking for the LEPC to utilize and make public the
information it receives. Once RMPs arrive at the LEPC, this will be exacerbated. There is a
lack o f funding and a lack o f cooperation among those charged with protecting the public
and reducing risk. There is a great need for a liaison to assist with communication between
those working on these issues, and to insure that overlap does not occur. It is not for lack
o f ideas that the LEPC has not acted on this, it is due to inertia, the slow to change culture
of LEPC and local government, lack o f funding, and entirely volunteer composition with
limited time to implement ideas.
Recommendations for Enhancing the Right-to-Know and Accident Prevention Functions of
the Missoula LEPC
The Missoula LEPC can do several easy things to establish an infrastructure which
will allow it to do better at risk communication, work towards accident prevention, and act
as a liaison between industry and the public, and convey information more effectively to
the government and the public.
•
•
•

•

•

create a website describing the LEPC and what it does, including subcommittees;
include on the website Tier I and Tier II, TRI, RMP information, along with
summaries of what each means;
develop an educational outreach module which LEPC members can take to schools,
churches, public groups, events, and fairs to let the public know what the LEPC
does;
produce an updated LEPC manual for new members and interested persons,
describing in more detail EPCRA, what LEPCs can do, what the LEPC is doing,
RMP, etc;
create a plan by which the LEPC will review and follow up on Risk Management
Plans upon receipt.
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Clearly, with infrastructure building and a dedicated staff person to accomplish
these goals to establish an infrastructure to assist LEPC members, the Missoula LEPC not
only can fulfill its mandate but also work beyond its mandate to insure risk reduction and
accident prevention, and full disclosure for Missoula County. Despite its shortcomings, the
Missoula LEPC is considered to be one o f the best in Montana, a state where few counties
have active LEPCs. Any work by the Missoula LEPC could be shared and imported to other
counties, with great results for the public and responders throughout the state.

LEPCs' Important Role in 112(r) Risk Management Plans
Another source of information for LEPCs to use in emergency planning and
accident prevention are the Risk Management Plans submitted by local industry. Local
emergency responders will greatly benefit from the level o f detail contained in the Risk
Management Plans, and the Missoula LEPC should work to involve and educate them. It is
likely that responders and other LEPC members will have questions and ideas o f how
facilities can improve upon their plans in the next version, due three to five years later.
LEPCs should take action to educate themselves about the Risk Management Program in
order to better comment on the received plans. It makes sense for LEPCs to take a
leadership role in assisting facilities to comply and the public to understand the meaning of
the information and implication contained in the Risk Management Plans.
The Risk Management Program presents LEPCs with new opportunities to deal with
accident prevention and risk communication. An advocate for LEPC leadership in RMP
discussions says this;
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[M]any communities will be surprised, if not horrified, by the number of
overlapping circles [representing the off-site consequences of a toxic release] that
are present, especially when some groups will characterize these as "death zones" in
the case o f an incident.... Worst case scenarios present obvious opportunities and
problems for facilities and LEPCs. LEPCs are reasonably expected to have some
view o f the risks in the community. As soon as these worst case scenario maps are
publicized, which is guaranteed to occur, elected officials and members of the
public are likely to be concerned and want to know what sorts of plans exist to deal
with this threat.
It is at this point that LEPCs can rise to the occasion and act in the public interest to
use this newly available information to encourage accident prevention and continued
disclosure on the part o f industry. Gablehouse continues:
LEPCs can use these scenarios to demonstrate to the public and elected
officials that risks are present and that resources should be devote to planning for
these risks. LEPCs can use the scenarios to increase awareness among the public
and other regulated facilities that EPCRA exists and that the program is useful to
eliminating risks in the commimities.^’®
For facilities, the RMP process may be threatening, since for the first time they are
required to disclose specific information about the risks their companies present to the
neighboring community. For the first time, facilities will admit to and discuss in detail the
risks presented. Most importantly, facilities can, for the first time, be held accountable for
reducing those risks through implementation and continued improvement of their risk
management plans. LEPCs have an important role to play and should assist in
communicating risk to the public and acting as a liaison between the concerned public and

Gablehouse, Timothy. 1998. What to Expect from Your LEPC and What It Will Expect
o f You. Presented as part of: How to Comply with the USEPA’s Risk Management Rule.
American Water Works Association Satellite Teleconference.
Gablehouse, Timothy. 1998. What to Expect from Your LEPC and What It Will Expect
o f You. Presented as part of: How to Comply with the USEPA’s Risk Management Rule.
American Water Works Association Satellite Teleconference.
180

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

accountable corporations to insure that risk is reduced via accident prevention. Although
hazardous materials transporters are exempted from the Risk Management Program, there
are components of the RMP which the LEPC should ask for voluntary compliance with.
Transporters should supply five year accident histories, root cause analysis, safety training
plans and other information specific to the situation covered by the RMP. Here again, like
with EPCRA section 303, LEPCs have an enormous amount of moral suasion to hold sway
over transporters in the name o f improving public safety. All o f the information required by
the Risk Management Program will greatly assist emergency planning and ultimately lead
to accident prevention through increased community right-to-know.
The problem presented by hazardous material transportation to a locality
necessitates creative solutions. The LEPC plays a large role in any creative solution, since it
bears the greatest power under law to access transportation information. Beyond the LEPCs
actions to gain more information, share it with the public and responders, and pressure
transporters to increase preventions and safety measures, there exist voluntary and moral
suasion methods to enhance community right-to-know and public safety.
Many LEPCs throughout the county are working to enhance community right-toknow and prevent accidents. The City o f Deer Park, Texas LEPC has a Transportation
Subcommittee which did a pipeline and commodity flow study with funding from USDOT. They found “an average o f one hazardous materials vehicle every three minutes” on
the highways through their town. From the study they were able to get information on the
materials most likely to be shipped and days o f heaviest shipments. The Harford County,
Maryland LEPC’s web site includes a page entitle “You have the right-to-know” which
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describes how citizens can obtain information from the LEPC concerning chemical risks in
the community. The Chester County , Pennsylvania LEPC describes the role of LEPCs to
“Collect, manage and provide access to information on hazardous chemicals; educate the
public about risks; work with facilities to minimize risks.” The concept of right-to-know is
already well developed and widely implemented widely by many LEPCs nationwide. The
Missoula LEPC should follow this lead and take action to get information about
transportation risks relevant for planning, provide the public better access to this
information and use the information to reduce accidents in the Missoula valley.
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Conclusions. A Transform ed Community and an Ongoing Search for Answers
Closure cannot be achieved until EPA can actually tell me and list exactly
what my fam ily and I were exposed to on April II, 1996 and the years
following while we lived in Alberton, and hold the polluter- Montana Rail
Link- accountable and responsible.
Debra Griffin, Montana Rail Link chemical spill victim
I want to know exactly what was spilled, exactly how much, what mixed and
what the after effects are going to be fo r me and my family. I am tired o f
hearing about short-term health effects because it has been almost five years
and we are still sick.
Beverly Ridenour, Montana Rail Link chemical spill victim
A s we near the 5th Anniversary I keep thinking o f the gifts MRL has
given me and somehow it is the little things I think about like
trifocals, gray thinning hair, those hard to lose pounds, the ache in my
hip, and that basket o f mending in Alberton that is sitting by my sewing
machine as i f we will really come home and I will mend our clothes. The
big things, I guess, are too big fo r the mind to dwell on; losing our
home, Jesse's health, Mark's brain. Trask's education, the friends and
fam ily I will never know again, the community that will never be whole
again. Alberton fo r me will eternally be the town that sits ju st south
o f Paradise in more ways than one, and chemical injury is truly the gift
that keeps on giving.
I think that sums up why we are still here working so hard after all
these years.
Lucinda Hodges, Montana Rail Link spill victim and coordinator of ACCEH

Five Years Later in Alberton, the Town Just South o f Paradise
Five years after Montana Rail Link’s toxic spill in Alberton, Montana all is not well.
The community group, ACCEH still works tirelessly to gain justice for spill victims. Five
years later, they are still seeking the truth about what they were exposed to, at what levels
and for how long. They are still asking whether toxic materials linger in Alberton and still
make people sick. They are still wondering what the future will bring for them and their
children. They still are plagued by fear of what poisons affected their bodies and what
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impact is still to come.
Five years later, these questions remain. They remain because Montana Rail Link
failed to inform government officials about what was spilled. They remain because the
EPA failed to enter the hot zone and test the spilled chemicals until four days after the
derailment. These problems remain because no one with power was asking the right
questions or acting in the public interest.
The Alberton Community Coalition for Environmental Health has waged a
campaign for answers for all five years. Members of this group have worked through
illness, relocation, lawsuits, frustration and anger. They have worked diligently, fueled by a
need to understand what happened to them and a desire to make sure that the same fate
never befalls another community. ACCEH is powered by the passion to prevent others from
having to go through what they and other Alberton survivors did. ACCEH endeavors to use
the information and experience gained by the Alberton community to teach, warn and
instruct others about the risks o f toxic chemicals moving through their communities.
ACCEH has struggled with local, state and federal agencies for answers. Its files
bulge with countless letters to the EPA, Montana Department o f Environmental Quality,
members o f Congress, the Agency for Toxic Substance Disease Registry and others. These
letters reiterate the basic questions: What chemicals were we exposed to and what are the
possible health effects?
The example o f ATSDR was not treated in this paper, although the experience
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spanned nearly the entire five years and numerous information and documents e x i s t I n
brief, ACCEH worked to ensure that the Agency of Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
(ATSDR) completed health studies that addressed these questions. Like the other examples
o f how a lack o f disclosure set in motion a cycle of actions which denied spill victims
adequate information and health care, ATSDR based its health studies on the officially
sanctioned “chlorine only” assessment o f the Alberton disaster. As a result, ATSDR studied
respiratory, dermal and ocular effects o f chlorine on Alberton victims. In doing, the federal
agency charged with investigating toxic incidents ignored the myriad other symptoms and
data indicating that chemical injury from chemicals other than chlorine was rampant. A
letter to ATSDR summarized the situation:
The fact that ATSDR is limiting its scope o f possible chronic health effects
attributable to chlorine is alarming, but more inexcusable is the fact that
ATSDR ignores evidence o f non-chlorine health effects entirely. Time after
time, your agency has heard from residents o f other health effects which
cannot be traced to simple chlorine exposure. You have received complaints
o f memoiy loss, fatigue, joint pain, chronic pain, weight fluctuation,
multiple chemical sensitivity, lupus, fibromyalgia and other auto-immune
disorders and immuno suppressive conditions. Your agency has turned a
deaf ear and a blind eye to what are clues to what really happened at
Alberton: it was a mixed chemical spill with far greater health implications
than chlorine. Affected residents are not going to disappear or stop pressing
for a comprehensive revisitation o f what was released that morning and how
it could have affected their health.^"®
For an excellent critical analysis o f ATSDR's actions in other Montana communities
see: Lilly Tuholske. 1993. Ignoring the Obvious: The Agency fo r Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry's Failure to Monitor Public Health on the Clark Fork River Superfund
Sites. M.A. Thesis, University o f Montana. Additional resources detailing ATSDR’s
failure to fulfill its mission to protect public health is found in the Environmental Health
Network’s papers entitled Inconclusive by Design and Restoring the Public Health Focus
o f Superfund.
Sieck, Hope. 1997.Comments Submitted to ATSDR on the Phase I Study Report on
the Alberton Chlorine Spill, Alberton, MT.
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And so it went, with agency after agency and issue after issue. In this way, the
failure to disclose the chemicals spilled, chemical reactions and resultant health effects
plagued victims throughout the past five years. The failure to disclose key information
acted like a firewall between spill victims and the truth about what happened to their
health. Still, ACCEH persisted and recently, a piece of the wall was broken through.
In March o f 1999, Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) supported ACCEH’s request that
the Ombudsman o f the Environmental Protection Agency undertake an investigation of the
Alberton incident. Senator Baucus wrote:
The community is concerned that they did not and do not have
sufficient information regarding the nature of the material that was released,
and risks posed by that material, because efforts by the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry have focused principally on the release of chlorine. This has
hampered efforts to diagnose and treat symptoms that may not be
attributable to chlorine exposure and to take necessary precautions against
continued exposure.
Members o f the community have been seeking information and relief
from EPA and ATSDR since soon after the time of the spill, nearly three
years ago. Still, their concerns have not been satisfied. In view of the
longstanding nature o f this situation, and the continuing health problems, I
urge you to conduct an evaluation o f testing and other measures that have
been taken in cormection with the spill, and to provide recommendations for
future action.
The EPA Ombudsman, Robert Martin, conducted his first hearing in Missoula in
November 2000. Over one hundred people attended and scores testified about their
exposure to the chemicals, their health problems and how their lives were irretrievably
altered the night o f April 11, 1996. Tears flowed and anger was palpable. Montana Rail
Link did not attend the hearing. The Ombudsman made several findings at the close of the
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hearing. He asked EPA to undertake a full characterization of the Alberton site. This
characterization is to include soil, water, air, and human health sampling to assess what the
effects o f the spill were and what toxic chemicals remain. Such a characterization would
answer demands that the “mystery be solved” through independent expert analysis and lay
to rest many o f the lingering questions. The Ombudsman also announced plans for a
second hearing for which 30-day notice will be given to ensure that those invited to the first
hearing will be able to attend. Lucinda Hodges, coordinator o f ACCEH said “We are
extremely pleased with Mr. Martin’s investigation and look forward to a second hearing.
We simply want to know what we were exposed to, what our health prognosis is, and why
we were lied to by Montana Rail Link and government officials. The Ombudsman is our
last hope to get truth and justice for the sick people o f Alberton.”

Effects o f a Toxic Disaster on a Community: Natural versus Human-Causes Disasters
Toxic exposure directly assails several fundamental social beliefs: that
personal control over one's destiny is possible; that technology and science
are forces ofprogress only; that risks necessary fo r the good life are
acceptable; that people get what they deserve; that experts know best; that
o n e ’s home is one's castle; that people have the right to do what they wish
on their own property; and that government exists to helpff^
A toxic disaster like the Montana Rail Link derailment and chemical spill
permanently alters a community. The people o f Alberton and the fabric of the town were
fundamentally impacted by the disaster. Lives, health, homes and jobs were lost. The sense
o f security and safety in one’s home and town was lost. Unfortunately, communities across
Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia,
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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the nation are similarly affected by toxic chemical disasters.
Human-caused disasters differ from natural disasters in how society views the
victims and the impacts on the victims. Human-caused disasters result in greater, longerlasting, and different kinds of stresses and health effects than those associated with natural
disaster.

^ ^ ^ ,3 0 3

word disaster is rooted in the Greek word for star; until the prevalence of

technological disasters, a disaster was simply a calamity which fell from the stars, harmed
people and disappeared. Implicit also in this etymology is a lack of blame. Natural disasters
are often deemed “acts o f God”, even those which are clearly exacerbated by human
influence such as the flooding of homes knowingly built within floodplains or the burning
o f homes built in fire-prone forests.
Leveling Blame
Human-caused toxic disasters are by definition technological in origin. A toxic
disaster is viewed as a technological failure o f our tenuous control over the risky endeavors
that enable us to enjoy a high standard o f modem living. The resulting "loss of control”
contrasts with a “lack o f control” over natural disasters.^*^ Flood victims view the onslaught
o f water as "an act of God” from which they need to rebuild. Residents at Love Canal
instead “regarded their disaster as stemming from corporate greed and government
cormption.”^^^ The human causation of a toxic disaster leads to assignation of blame and
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological
impacts o f residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
Bowler et. al.
Baum, Andrew, Raymond Fleming and Jerome Singer. 1983. Coping with
Victimization by Technological Disaster. Journal o f Social Issues 39(2): 117-138.
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological
impacts o f residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

distrust o f the agents o f the disaster. It also can lead to greater emotional distress than a
natural disaster.^”* Surprisingly, “the polluter often appears to receive less than its share of
blame...Anger and blame may be mollified where the polluter is a major source of local
employment.”^®’ This held true in Alberton, a town formed by the railroad in which a large
percentage o f the population has ties to the railroad companies.
Communities tied closely to corporations often accept levels of risk as a necessary
evil. For example, at Love Canal "The community also understood that the goal o f industry
is profit and that Hooker [Chemical Co.] was acting in a manner consistent with its goals by
using the cheapest methods of disposal.” At Alberton, some residents referred to the
derailment as "an accident” and seemed to accept the risk to their community. Indeed, the
statistics o f hazardous materials transportation and accident rates make some risk of
derailment and chemical exposure necessary for the perpetuation o f hazardous rail
transport. Other residents, however, sought answers for why the derailment had occurred
and questioned the transport o f such deadly chemicals on trains at all. These people sought
chlorine-free products and explored the connections between their consumerism and their
injury. In this way, Alberton residents recognized the derailment as stemming from
corporate greed, but at the same time acknowledged that MRL and government officials
may not have had Alberton, MT specifically in mind when they obtained permits to haul
chlorine and failed to upkeep track. But Montana Rail Link knew that eventually some

Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia,
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological
impacts o f residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
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community would pay the price for their profits. This realization is what spurred the
community onto reaching out to other trackside towns to inform them o f the risks and the
realities o f those risks.
Duration: B rief vs. Chronic
While natural disaster is often o f brief duration, human-caused disasters such as
toxic exposure may be chronic and indefinite.
A site may be contaminated so that it will remain unsafe for generations due
to the persistence o f the toxic hazards; individual effects may also cross
generations..Because it is not clear what damage has occurred to property or
finances, or what long-term health effects may develop, it is difficult to
inventory losses
As a result, the affected community is left in a vacuum
to fend for itself... the effects may not surface for quite some time. As a
result, recovery to a “post-disaster equilibrium” is difficult if not
impossible.^®®
In Alberton, no spill victim has returned to their “normal life” as it was before the
spill. As long as questions remain and health effects continue to evidence themselves, not
only is return to the way things used to be an impossibility, but any certainty about the new
life also remains elusive.
Control: Experts vs. Victims
Toxic disasters differ dramatically from natural disasters in that they require
“experts” to interpret the harm to victims. The victim o f a flood knows what damage the
water did and may require assistance only to repair or recover from that damage. The
victim o f a toxic spill, on the other hand, often cannot see the chemicals or understand the
science behind the assessment of harm.
Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological
impacts o f residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
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Experts specially trained to measure and detect toxic substances are usually
involved in the process o f discovery and announcement. Victims become
dependent upon others to help them understand the situation and to help
create solutions. However, because the effects o f human-caused disaster
may not be readily visible, not only is the occurrence subject to differing
interpretations, but key decisions (e.g. regarding testing, protective
measures, and remediation) may be based on these interpretation...
Therefore, consensus about the cause, course, and possible outcomes of the
crisis is less likely than with natural disaster. Furthermore, because there
may be no visible damage, each family is forced to make its own
determination o f the significance o f contamination. The lack o f shared
beliefs about what has happened opens the way for conflict within the
community and between the community and potential helpers.
Toxic victims find themselves living in a world newly populated by local, state and
federal agencies all charged with assessing and rectifying the situation. Their lives “are
captured by agencies upon which they become dependent for clarification and assistance.”
When those government officials fail them, victims are left nowhere to turn except to
action.
And action is often required because the pace o f relief for toxic disaster victims is
often excruciatingly slow, as seen in the Alberton situation five years after the chemical
release. Natural disasters are responded to swiftly and methodically: FEMA and the Red
Cross enter, are the precedents for medical care, insurance benefits, legal proceedings,
relocation, private and government relief all exist. Victims are housed, clothed and fed, and
insurance and the government provided funding for people to rebuild homes and repay
damages. Precedents for relief efforts do no exist in human-caused disasters. “Solutions
such as clean-up, storage o f waste, and permanent or temporary relocation are often

Edelstein, Michael R. 1988. Contaminated Communities: the social and psychological
impacts o f residential toxic exposure. Westview Press, London.
191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

unavailable or experimental and subject to change on short notice.”^*®
None o f this certainty exists for victims o f toxic disasters. This uncertainty is
compounded by the uneven way victims are treated by the responsible company and
government officials. At Love Canal, residents reacted against treatment by the New York
State Department o f Health in a similar way to residents at Alberton. Love Canal residents
felt that Department o f Health official “did not pay serious attention to the task of
providing information to them and working through the implications o f the information.”
As a result, residents “felt that they were being treated not as rational, respected adults but
rather as though they had somehow lost their mature good sense when they became victims
o f a disaster they had no way o f preventing." It is in this way that toxic victims become
“"disabled”, as suddenly they are dependent upon professionals to expertly handle various
areas o f life.. .What is lost is their ability to participate directly in understanding and
determining courses o f action important to their lives.”
The challenge is to reclaim this ability. Public officials must work to address this
issue, which may be difficult as long as strong ties to industry remain. The main tool for
reworking these relationships between victims and the governmental officials and experts
charged with helping them is the right-to-know. Access to full information creates trust and
empowers individuals and communities to make decisions integral to their health and
safety. Right-to-know is a basic tool, a basic right, which has been denied at great cost to
scores o f injured people in numerous communities. Without full disclosure o f information.

Brown, Phil and Edwin J. Mikkelsen. 1990. No Safe Place: Toxic waste, leukemia,
and community action. University o f California Press, Berkeley.
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situations like Alberton will occur again and again, leaving destroyed communities and
broken lives in their wake. With full disclosure, victims o f toxic disasters can start their
healing process with the information they need in order to make informed decisions about
their future. With full disclosure, individuals and communities can make the decision that
the risks presented are too great, and begin work to create change and bring about
prevention o f toxic disasters through risk reduction.
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APPENDIX A
Chronological history o f the Alberton mixed chemical spill and evacuation,
April 11-April 29, 1996.
Selected from the public record (Missoula County Clerk and Recorder's Office,
Missoula, MT) and media accounts.

April 11,1996
‘/// ffî/tÆ 'M issouIian 4/11/96, A-l-A-10.
"Gov. Marc Racicot declared an emergency in Missoula and Mineral counties, which
allows the National Guard and other state agencies to assist if necessary .... An 18-car
train derailment next to the Clark Fork River west o f Alberton ruptured three tank cars
containing chlorine gas early Thursday and sent 105 people to area hospitals-two in
critical condition.
The DOT described the 63 mile freeway closure as the largest and longest in the region's
history. The injured were taken to hospitals in Superior, Missoula and Butte ... Initially
officials believed that a single tank car was leaking, but after closer examination
Thursday afternoon, they determined three o f the four tank cars containing liquid 01 were
leaking."

Inform ation O fficer's Log- 4:00 P M Briefing to the Incident Command, 4/11/96.
Montana Rail Link representative Paul Adams shared the following information with the
Incident Command, composed at that point by Scott Waldron (Chief of Frenchtown
Rural Fire Department and Incident Commander), Bill Reed (Missoula Rural Fire
Department), and Paul Laisy (Missoula County Sheriff s Department).
" Train originated in Pasco, WA going to Houston TX 70 cars, 20 derailed. I sodium
chlorate; I hazardous waste; 4 chlorine, I leaking.
Small fire at site- assessment is being made right now- out 45 minutes or so. do not
know about further leakage besides one car vapor dispersion- cloud in air...'
Tank cars can hold 23-27,000 gallons- not sure how ftill cars were.
No river threat- 100 yds. from river.
4:35 There is no fire. Not sure if there ever was.
Have heard from EPA, CG, OSHA, FRA.
5:40 3 cars are leaking; 1 car is bled out completely."

Inform ation O fficer's Log, 4/11/96.
A news release prepared at 6:00 PM that day was based on the information contained in
notes prepared by on-scene responders and Montana Rail Link company officials. Those
notes contained the following:
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"It will be 48 hours before anyone will be able to get to site. Animals are fine! No foliage
damage. No plume of gas moving to Missoula. "

April 12,1996
Incident Command Notes 10:00; 11:15 Command S taff M eeting, 4/12/96.
"Kcres 'Caustic car'=car 5- has leaked approx 1/3."
"spelling chrysilic sodium UM 1760"
It was noted that an "[E]nvironmental inspection will need to be done" and that the
"[UJItimate goal is safe (underlined) lift o f evac. and people returning home."
"A Pet Rescue Plan is being organized."
"There has been environmental monitoring of the soil and water today. There has been no
damage to the water. There is some caustic chemicals on the ground (sic)."
"How long will the evacuation last? Possibly 14 days There has been no reports (sic) of
any animal deaths. A home re-entry plan will be presented before evacuees are allowed
home. A plan will be in place to monitor the air in the homes."

Technical G roup M eeting Notes, 4/12/96 AM
"Pet Rescue/Feed- May begin tomorrow. Another assessment will be done at daybreak.
After that, the decision will be made whether or not to begin the operation ... The plan is
to have three buses set up, each with an industrial hygienist, haz-mat technician and
MRL representative. They will take residents into the area to allow them to feed and/or
pickup pets. They are also considering letting farmers, ranchers in to pickup livestock."
"EPA personnel have been at the Nine Mile Road Command Post asking questions. Chip
Raber will ask Dan Watts to give them the information they need. "
"There is no Potassium Cresylate on the ground. Everything has soaked in, and there is
no free product on the ground"
"Sodium Chlorate car- the end is broken open. The product should be covered to keep the
moisture out."
"12 empty chlorine tankers, 2-full caustic tankers, and 2 empty caustic cars are en route
to the site from both Oxychem and Georgia Pacific."
"Kris Kok o f Envirocon will be going out this afternoon to assess the area and begin
water testing.

Technical G roup M eeting Notes, 4/12/96,1800.
"Kris Kok from Envirocon went out to the site this afternoon to do water and soil testing.
There was no elevated PH in the river. The fire road to the north is mildly acidic. It is not
serious. There was no ground sampling done on the immediate site. No more sampling
will be done tonight... They are in the process o f removing the rest of the train now."
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"Marty Rau will have enlarged photos o f the area to distribute by morning. MSDS sheets
have been distributed. EmTech has copies if anyone needs one."
"Hulcher has two tractors, one boom and one bucket, set up. They will stage them for
first thing in the morning for pulling out the old rail and moving the cars out."

'Train derails near Noxon' M issoulian, 4/12/96, B1-B4.
1200 feet o f track damaged/ half hour after Alberton derailment. No hazmats in the 16
cars and three locomotives that derailed.

'Aftereffect o f chlorine s p ill largely unknown -Environmental i/T^ac/. 'M issoulian,
4/12/96.
"At least for now, the chemicals spilled .. . do not appear to be a major threat to the water
and air in the areas, officials said late Thursday. But the railcar's worth of liquid chlorine
that vaporized into an acidic cloud hovering over the Clark Fork River west of Alberton
is a serious chemical that can cause damage and death in the natural world.. .”
"The big things are the unknowns, said University o f Montana chemist Ed Keller.
"There's a whole spectrum, from nothing to a disaster."
Karen Knudsen, conservation associate with the Clark Fork-Pend Oreille Coalition, is
also worried about long-term effects on the water. "There certainly are effects, but
sometimes they don't manifest themselves immediately," she said. “The chlorine
molecule is reactive and can combine with organic materials to form dangerous
compounds called organochlorines that can stay in the air, water, soil and fatty tissues of
humans and animals, she said. The most toxic groups o f those compounds are dioxins."
By late afternoon, instruments used to test for chlorine gas showed no gas present at 600
yards from the site and only minimal readings at the accident. [Bill] Reed [Missoula
Rural Fire Department] said by then he was more concerned with fuel loads than with
chlorine. "Everything I'm getting says the potential for environmental damage is very
little, " he said. "It could have been much worse."
'Hazards routinely ride rails. ' M issoulian, 4/12/96, A1-B4.
"This stuff travels through Missoula all the time," said Bill Reed, Missoula Rural Fire
Department chief "Every train has hazardous material
John Fitzpatrick, spokesman
for the FRA in Washington, DC, said the general public has no way of knowing what
hazardous materials are moving across Montana. "The railroad, and the railroad only,
would know," he said.
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April 13,1996
Missoulian, 4/13/96.
"For others in the more immediate areas o f the derailment, it could be later than Friday
night before they can return home or tend to their animals, which, in several briefings
Thursday afternoon, was the prime concern o f many residents, said Frenchtown Fire
Chief Scott Waldron, the incident commander. ...He said that while residents’ safety will
not be jeopardized to take care o f animals, officials might have a plan by 10 AM Friday
to get feed to stranded livestock. "It may be that we determine life safety is such that we
don't go in. We've got all the best people in the country here doing all that they can do."
"There doesn't appear to be any foliage damage out there, and everything seems to be
green. Livestock in the area is fine, " he said.
'Two more weeks- About 400 attend meeting with emergency officials, experts. '
Missoulian, 4/13/96.
"Emergency officials, MRL personnel, and chemical cleanup experts attempted to
explain to residents o f an area that extends from about two miles east o f Alberton to
about five miles west o f town why they could not return to their property.
But angry dialogue burst from the overflow crowd... "It's been a day and a half. We have
pregnant mares out there," shouted one man from the middle o f the crowd.
Chris Hohol, who works for an incident management firm in Milwaukee, said the
decision to not allow residents to tend their animals until Saturday morning was made
after receiving technical advice from experts on the site Thursday afternoon.
But that didn't wash with some residents, who continued to badger anyone that stepped to
the microphone. "We don't care about the technical advice, " said on man. "Wasn't it
technical people who put that train together?" added another.
Officials said that beginning Saturday, if conditions at the derailment site did not change,
residents could be given about two hours each morning and afternoon to tend to their
animals. "This is the very best we can do, based on the technical advice we’ve received
from the experts," said Dan Watts o f MRL. "The issue boils down to the possibility of
another release."
Four tanker cars containing chlorine leaked, sending a dangerous plume into the
predawn sky. Chrysilic sodium, a caustic substance, also was leaking, according to
Hohol. "It made the cloud look worse, much worse than it actually was," said Hohol,
about the mixture o f the two chemicals.
Chrysilic sodium, a derivative of sodium hydroxide, is a strong caustic used in metal
plating and cleaning. It does not give off a gas but is dangerous if inhaled, he said. The
substances are leaking in minuscule amounts. While officials haven't seen any dead
animals in the derailment area, they readily admit that they have not been looking, and no
flight surveillance has been made.
Waldron, who lives in the Sixmile area, said in an interview that he would rather err on
the conservative side. "I would rather have you go home and complain for the rest of your
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lives that we kept you out too long," he said, "than allow you in for one minute and have
an occurrence where you get injured and complain that we didn't keep you out."

Missoulian, 4/13/96 Other headlines:
'In the wake o f the chlorine gas spill:
-Officials said th ^ have seen no evidence o f dead pets or livestock, but they admit
they haven V really looked -Beginning Saturday, residents will be allowed into the area
f o r two hours morning and evening to care f o r their animals- as long as conditions at
the wreck remain stable
-A fourth tanker car was found to be leaking chlorine Friday, as was tanker
containing chrysilic sodium, an industrial caustic that's not a gas, but can be harmful
i f inhaled
-Toxicology samples have been drawn from the train's two crew member, and it will
take several weeks for results. ’

Evacuee Meeting Notes. 4/13/96.
“Sec. o f Transportation spoke. Sen. Baucus will visit.
2 vets talked "Examined animals that were brought out. Did not find any with major
problems, 1 with problem, fairly moderate conjimctivitis. "
Waldron. "We have set up a unified command: Fire, Law Enforcement, Health and MRL.
Safety is the main concern."
At tomorrow's meeting will "assess issues, provide health information, and monitoring
that will be available" "The re-entry date for those areas [Bible Lane and Alberton] will
be set for April 26. That is if the findings at the site meet the entry criteria, and
everything goes on schedule.
Question: "Medications: can we go get them"?
Contact Randall Little at MRL Claims: phone #.
Last item recorded "If you have any medical problems, see your doctor "

Technical Group Meeting Notes, AM, 4/13/96.
"...they noticed a small vapor cloud in the morning ... They are working with full-face
canister respirators and have experienced no problems. They have cut the remaining
pieces o f rail, removed the trucks from the cars, and cleared the material out o f the way.
The Sodium Chlorate car has been moved over about five feet. The panels have arrived
and will be unloaded. Hulcher and MRL track crews will begin laying the new rail this
afternoon. All work will be done on the east end o f the site."
"Chris [Hohol] reported Operation Pet Rescue/Livestock Feed is in progress and will
continue until dark. He will be notified if Georgia Pacific decides to remove the angle
bars from Car 3 to make sure the Rescue process is halted."
"Envirocon will plan on putting in a berm near the edge o f the contaminated area to
prevent spreading in case o f rain fall."
198

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"Everyone is reminded to watch what you say when you're out in public. The general
public is very unhappy about the situation, so things you say can be misunderstood or
misconstrued and you may end up with a problem on your hands. Linda Frost and Dan
Watts are the spokespersons for MRL and any statement to the press should come from
them."

Technical Group Meeting Notes, 1800,4/13/96.
“Pressure of all cars was checked. "The cresylate car was checked. There are
approximately 3000 gallons remaining in the car. The vacuum truck is on the site,"
"There is a thin frost line on car 4, where it meets Car 1. There is a vegetation kill
straight down the line from that meeting point."
"Envirocon is continuing to do ground sampling. They have a track hoe on site ready to
build a primary berm on the south side ditch to prevent spreading o f the contamination.
They will build a second berm, the height o f the road crossing, for backup."
"Dan Watts reported Operation Pet Rescue/Livestock Feed was successful today and
eased some o f the worries o f the residents. They went in with monitors and tested every
residence before entering. There was nothing detected in any of the homes tested. All
livestock and pets were OK. They will plan to let the farmers and ranchers back in first
thing in the morning to do their feeding before any o f the transloading begins ... We may
want to notify residents o f the odor o f the Cresylate. It is not harmful but does have a
sulfur odor."

April 14,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Present;
FRA Clairmont
NIRL, Little
EPA, Weis
Olympus, Stine
IC,Waldron
MRL, IC, Watts
"Safety is the top priority. ...we will try to answer your questions."
Stine: “Soil and vegetation samples have been taken from residents (sic) in the area. We
are checking our chlorine readings, any potential health or environmental threats. We are
having the samples analyzed by a lab. We are taking PH samples from 100' of the site.
No depressed PH levels at any residences. There is no data on the Chlorine levels...”
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Weis: “I have been to the work site, out to Petty Creek and Ponderosa. Becker residence
water source, looked at animals large and small. Regarding the vegetation there is
nothing to believe there is a problem...
The re-entry area, we are working with medical personnel at the site since Thursday out
o f the office in Denver. It is very safe to re-enter the area with respect to residual
chemicals. We think your home is safe. There is technical activity in the Hot Zone. The
EPA is continually monitoring the activity. We have reviewed the evacuation plan.
Things are in order. The evacuation is in place in the event o f a failure. For added
protection, use a wet rag over your face to cover your mouth. Baking soda in the water
gives more protection...The local Health Dept, is involved in all the decisions."
Leahy: "We have been testing since the first release. Everything is okay. If you find
anything questionable, please call.”
Discussing access for re-entry and re-evac.
Q: My wife has been having reactions..
"No evidence o f exposure that would lead to long term health problems."
Dr. Peschel: " I have treated 3 patients. I have contacted the St. Pat's list search of
experts. Chlorine is very toxic, can cause tissue damage. Mild exposure: sore skin; longer
exposure: blisters. Long exposure might have long term respiratory problems. "
If you have any symptoms, seek medical care. Contact MRL for follow-up.”

Technical Group Meeting Notes, 1200, 4/14/96.
"The vacuum truck has removed 3000 gallons from the cresylate car. There are
approximately 1000 gallons left."
"There was a visible plume in the area of the cars, over the river and across the road."
"We have negotiated an entry plan for the NTSB, the EPA and the Coast Guard."
"The Health and Safety Team reported they have a better relationship with the IC and the
EPA.
The Coast Guard has been pointing out a few minor things, but overall, they and the
NTSB seem satisfied. John Grewell reported there will be a uniformed security officer
assigned to the bridge to keep a tight control on who enters the area. "
"Plans have been developed for 24 hour monitoring of the area. "John Grewell noted that
MRL needs to be kept informed as to what they can tell the public regarding the time
line.”
"The berms are not yet in place. They are waiting on equipment."

Technical Group Meeting Notes, 1800, 4/14/96.
"A body was found today at 1250. As o f 1800, the body had been removed and taken to
the morgue. Everything went well and appropriately. "
"A permanent decontamination station is now on site at the request of the EPA.”
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"The first draft was written for the unloading of Car 3. The EPA, USCG and NTSB have
given their blessing." "24 hour monitoring will begin today. One Marine Environmental
person and one MRL person will be in charge o f that. "
"The side boom dozers were brought in to move the box cars, move the Sodium
Cresylate car, and roll over Car 3. "
"Car 5 was finished, the load was shipped to the consignee."
"We should have two boxes of Sodium Cresylate moved by Tuesday morning. The
groundsmen will be in SCBA's, to do the wrecking o f the cars."
"The EPA requested to review the work plan for the transfer operation. The USCG wants
to stay on the site during the entire transfer. It was noted we need to limit the total
number o f personnel on site. It was decided to allow the USCG and EPA 15 minutes on
site to view the operations. They may be allowed in more than once but only in 15
minute windows."

*Fear turns to relief as residents fin d their animals survived spilL * Missoulian,
4/14/96. A-l-A-10.
"[Djuring the pet rescue effort in the evacuated town residents were allowed 5 minutes to
gather pets and other belongings before being ushered out o f town again...
Ranchers had 30 minutes. As long as conditions at the derailment site don't change,
residents will be allowed to return a couple of times a day, according to Sgt Howard
Reed, who coordinated the pet rescue effort... Technical advisors have said there could
be another poisonous cloud released if something unforeseen happens during the
offloading and removal o f cars...
Residents in the area closest to the derailment site were not allowed to return. Hazmat
personnel with protective equipment were given directions by residents whose homes are
in the 'hot zone' and they provided as much pet care and brought out as many personal
items as possible ... Brodsky said affected residents should be assured that the company
intends to take care of their concerns. "I think on any incidents that we've been involved
with, we try to do what's rig h t... We know the inconvenience we've created for people
and we're going to be here for many, many years."

'Lucky fe w to return home'- official word comes at meeting this A M with emergency
officials.
Missoulian, 4/14/96.
Re-entry for those who access homes via Petty Creek, Southside Road and Terrace View
Drive.
'Zero tolerance- Federal railroad chief puts public safety first' Missoulian, 4/14/96,
B-1.
Jolene M. Molitoris, Chief o f the Federal Railroad Administration.
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"What you see around these crises is the American spirit alive and w ell... The best
experts are on the scene ... our mission is to make sure this doesn't happen again."
Late last year, senior management at MRL had meeting with the FRA to discuss potential
safety improvement, Molitoris said. Such meeting are held periodically with individual
railroad companies, she said. "It was an extremely comprehensive meeting. The railroad
was responsive."

*Indusirtes tout safety records, but critics see calamity ahead. ' Missoulian, 4/14/96,
B-1.
"We want people to understand that this (accident in MT) is an anomaly." Gardner B.
Bates, National Chlorine Institute.
1995 13 million tons o f Cl produced in US
1994 12.7 million tons Cl produced
1994 1.9 million cars o f hazardous materials on shipped
10 years ago, 1. 1 million cars.”

April 15,1996
Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/15/96,1300.
"Operations were stopped for a few hours this morning when it was discovered there
were families who had not been evacuated from the southwest region o f the evacuated
area. Apparently they called in to find out why they had not been evacuated. They are all
o f the area now.
Hulcher began wrecking the west end o f the site to prepare for the handling of Car 3.
Two boxcars were pulled out o f the way. A yellow substance was observed on the end of
the boxcars which looks like a reaction to the chlorine. The area will be guarded off,”
“The cars will not be decontaminated now, but will need it before they leave the area.”
"We negotiated with the EPA for entry and revision o f site operations."
"Security has been tightened on the site. Terry Corson did a survey of the area to ensure
everything is up to OSHA standards. There were a few items noted, but things are getting
straightened up."
"Envirocon is working on a remediation plan for the area. They noted the railroad will
want all o f the bad soils out o f the rail bed before the rebuilding of the rail begins. They
will be allowed to puli samples from the soil while the cars are being moved out. "
"MRL wants to be able to show forward progress on the yardstick. The biggest concern
now is Car 3, and the patching process. It was agreed that the residents should be allowed
a three hour window, from 5-8 AM tomorrow, to go into their homes, feed pets and
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retrieve belongings if they would like. Everyone coming in would be escorted, either by
buses or by law enforcement."

Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/15/96,1800.
"The EPA will be included in the meetings from now on. He will not be a speaking
member, he's just here to listening.(sic)
Estimated 60,000 lbs. left in Car 3. Worst case scenario put together for release from
Car 3.
The worst case scenario showed the chlorine taking 10 minutes to reach the Forward
Command Post with a 7 mph wind. More scenarios will be developed tomorrow,
including ones with higher wind speeds"

'Alberton horses showing signs o f sickness. ' Missoulian, 4/15/96.A-1.
"Stewart, a nurse, said she would not expose her family by returning home and would
continue to keep her horses at the Stockyards where she is medicating their eyes several
times a day...
Montana Rail Link officials continued to emphasize their concern Sunday for the well
being o f the animals as well as the affected people and their property. "We'll do what's
right. We always have." MRL president Bill Brodsky said earlier.
Some residents are skeptical, others more understanding. "I don't trust Rail Link at all, "
said [Lori] Hawk.

'Evacuated fam ilies staying p u t ' Missoulian, 4/15/96.
... "[Rjesidents of Petty Creek and parts east have been given permission to return to their
homes. For the most part, they're not going. Resident o f the eastern reaches of the
exclusion zone were offered the opportunity to return to their homes for good Sunday,
and were given special notice o f evacuation routes to use should there be another rupture
o f a chlorine-filled train car. For many residents at Sunday afternoon's packed meeting at
the Red Lion Inn, there are just too many, unanswered questions...
Although residents were reassured by officials from the U.S. EPA and the MCCHD that
there is very little danger in the newly opened areas, questions about the long-term
effects o f the various spilled chemicals were Wemost on the minds of residents at the
meeting...
Residents were told their soils were safe and that they would be able to smell the
chlorine if it settled in their homes .... [Jamie] Becker and other residents of the areas
said they feel they haven't been given all the facts. "All o f the materials that were in that
other car, that they don't want to talk about," Becker said, referring to a tank of material
railroad officials are calling a "caustic" substance.
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"We have no idea what’s in it," Becker said. "I don't want to be asking about one thing if
the problem is something else."
Don Rainey said he won't go back "until they stop saying, 'I think it's safe,’" he said.
"We're not being given information," Becker said to muted cries of "Shut up!”.
"Is this malarkey responsive to the questions we asked this morning?" Becker demanded.
Waldron replied; "Nobody’s holding anything back from anybody. I have nothing to
gain.”
Ellen Leahy o f the Missoula City-County Health Department said there are no answers
yet about the long-term effects the chemicals may have on humans, animals or the
environment.
"In general, there is going to be a lot o f question, many questions, that we share," Leahy
said. "I don’t want to sit here and tell you we have all those answers yet. They don’t exist
for the long-term issues yet."
Although Becker expressed frustration at the lack o f information, she praised law
enforcement's efforts to evacuate the area quickly.
"I don't think any other group of people could've put themselves on the line in that
situation," Becker said after the meeting. "I think they’re exposing themselves to things
they don't even know about. "

Missoulian, 4/15/96.
Other headlines:
'The discomfort zone- chance to go home brings little peace,
Alberton area residents 'They ju st don't fe e l safe*
Spill claims first victim. '

April 16,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
"Dr. Bekemeyer will be at the evacuee meeting on Wednesday to answer questions"
Technical info.
"April 24th if the timeframe set for re-entry.
Leahy: "There are mental health personnel, a nurse, and environmental services available
to answer questions after this meeting. The Health and Environmental Services phone
number is 523-4920. Our objective is to prepare you for re-entry into your homes. We
will get information to you. We will have a briefing on Monday, April 22 to prepare you.
We will have monitoring available and will continue to monitor the area before your
re-entiy. The general information hotline number is ...”
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Weis: “If you experienced any problems with the temporary entry into Alberton today,
contact me. Dr. Peschel will appear on some local talk show to address any concerns you
have. St. Patrick's Hospital will have radio messages.”
Stine, Olympus: "We have been taking samples of the soil, water and vegetation. The
data we are receiving is in the normal range for pH levels. There has been no concern for
the houses we have checked. To check odors we have used a flame ionization detector.
No measurable levels were found in Alberton. We have found no contaminants. We will
take soil samples o f the derailment site."
Swartz, etc. Animals mostly fine. "Advise you to keep track of your animals and monitor
them. Any problems, call your vet. There is no data available on long term effects.
Margaret Watson, from the Mental Health Clinic will be available to answer any
questions after today's meeting.
Mrs. Becker statement: "There are a lot of fragmented actions ... lack o f communication
starts problems. Do not want lawyers, bureaucrats, do no want to give Dennis
Washington a bad time. I was in the hospital last night with another bad reaction. I'm
homeless ... we have the beginning o f a plan. We will try to communicate our ideas to the
group ... In turn we asked that there be not cover-up, no withholding of information ...
symptoms- no smell o f chlorine gas ... got good dose o f some other chemicals. One
extremely toxic- what are long term effects. It’s hard to find a lab to test. Given
information to doctor in the city to test. We have organized a think tank. We want no pay
offs under the table, we want our life back, I want my yard back and be able to give it to
my daughter someday. We will contact the company when we’re ready as a group. "
Q; [From resident o f 9-Mile area] Gentleman staying with me has burnt eyes. I have
medical report to confirm this. Have you tested the 9-Mile area?
A: We have received monitors, so we are able to do that.
Q: Resident would like a notarized statement declaring the home free from any
chemicals in order to rent or sale the house in the future.
Q: When you bring equipment back to the motel after being g in the toxic zone, it could
be contaminated. I'm not happy, please check this. Roger Chalmers.
Q: You say there is nothing detectable- you need to adjust to peoples' reaction...
Waldron: The calibration o f the monitors is set at the recognized standards.
Weis: EPA standards are being used in the calibration of the monitors.
Q: Who should we listen to- monitors or people..The nose is sensitive and we smell gas...
Q: I live in the middle of Alberton and go in for livestock feeding., people are having
reactions. Is there a buildup effect-should we go back in ...
Weis: You are more sensitive after exposure ... after a period o f time sensitivity does
disappear ... 68 weeks for sensitivity from exposure..
Q: Should you go back in for livestock feeding if you have a reaction?
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Pamell; If you have a reaction, no.
Q: Can you attempt to determine the level of exposure by computer modeling?
Q: ... returned to area—was forced to return to the hospital..does not match monitor.
Q: My nose is a better indicator than a monitor...
Weis: If you smell it..does not mean its dangerous.
Q: Turning chlorine into bleach ... can other chemicals be produced?
Weis: Not likely, if the chlorine was pure..carbon baring (sic) compounds cannot be
formed...
Q: Get back to us...
Q: Were there any fires at the site..?
Waldron: Report o f fire at the site was unfounded. There was a fire yesterday, it was a
grass fire started by a welder. There has never been a chemical fire at the site.
Q: Can chlorine cause permanent lung damage?
Leahy: If someone was severely exposed to chlorine gas... if you were hospitalized.
Q: What was in the box cars next to the tankers?
Watts: On the east end o f the derailment there was plywood, on the west end by the
caustic car there was fencing.
Q: What do skin irritations look like? My animal did not want to be brushed.
Swartz: This would not be common in an animal with thick hair-possibly mixed with
water and penetrated...
Q: Isn't it a federal regulation where box cars are placed when filled with chemicals?
Watts: Chemical cars are required to be six cars behind the engine. No other restrictions.
Q: If you had a family, would you move back into the red zone after the incident is over?
Watts: Yes.

Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/16/96.
"The re-entry o f the residents into Alberton will continue to be on hold, as well as-the
opening o f 1-90. Until we know more about car 3, it is too risky. We will continue to
allow the people back in to feed and check on pets, and retrieve their belongings during
the early morning hours.”

Technical Group Meeting Notes, 4/16/96.1800.
"This afternoon we had a few events. We had a very hard rain fall that lasted about three
to five minutes. The water got into the intersection o f Cars 2,3, and 4 and created a cloud
which looked like a grass fire. I quickly enveloped car 2. Health and Safety was prepared
to begin evacuation when suddenly the wind changed and cloud moved westerly...
Terry and Chris had a scare this afternoon. They went into the hills to recheck that
everyone had been evacuated. They cam across a house that he hadn't previously know
about. It looked like someone was still living here, however, they didn't find anyone.
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This afternoon the techs tossed around some ideas and plans for Car 3 ... The plan will be
sent to the Chlorine Institute for their approval. Once we receive that approval, it will be
made public at tomorrow’s 2:00 meeting at the Red Lion, so the residents have a better
idea o f what is going on.”

From Incident Command Notes, author unknown (handwritten).
Nose "serious lung" (brain?) Immune Heart
Lung tissue scarring- baseline monitoring?
some placard numbers fi-om train- UTLX 28662 ACFX 8850 GPBX 715
Porphyria behavioral disturbances documented in children form chlorine exposure
MCR potentiation 15%?
permanently sensitized
FULL STORY (circled)
Union Carbide nose
synergism- Example- CO + C12= COC12 Phosgene gas.
environmental fate
organochlorines
pockets
chlorine-pesticides, basis for — >dioxin
40 mile plume Missoula reports
If non detect then why are people experiencing breathing problems when returning to
area.
Workers still wearing respiratory protection.
Damage can occur at levels below the threshold of human smell.
Missoula effects.
If no residues, then why test soil "soil tests for ph" what about other chems?
"hypersensitivity" 15% dont be afraid of "it does disappear" almost all cases
Will Snodgrass'phone #
date (4/16/96)
‘M R L vets say horses looking OKfor now. 'Missoulian, 4/16/96, B-4.
"With the Stewart group of horses, our consensus here after the three of us checked it out
is that it wasn't anything like what was in the paper,” [Dr. Stan Swartz]

'Chlorine spill update- Cleanup ahead o f schedule.' Missoulian. 4/16/96, A-1.
"One car of potassium cresylate has been emptied and the car removed...
Chlorine readings near the site and in the surrounding area remained mostly
non-existent, according to Chris Weis, a Environmental Protection Agency Toxicologist
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from Denver. . He assured residents at Monday's daily meeting that once the tank cars are
removed, there will be no danger in the area.
" Once we move a hundred yards away from the train we are unable to measure chlorine
... Once any chlorine clouds move out of the area, there will be no residual chemical left
in your soil or your water that we are concerned about," said Weis.”
'Claims adjustors and lawyers line up to reassure victims, ' Missoulian, 4/16/96, B-1.
“Minneapolis lawyer William Jungbauer. "We’ve done railroad litigation and toxic
litigation. One o f the biggest problems in cases like this is that people don’t realize they
need to see a doctor right away, to document what's going on, " he said. Jungbauer said a
baseline medical report could help determine if later problems are linked to exposure to
the chlorine. .. “People affected by the derailment should take advantage of the services
that Montana Rail Link has provided for them, but understand that the help may not last
forever”, Modine said. "I hope Montana Rail Link keeps it up all the way through and
then pays for everything," he said. "But my feeling is, once they are back in their homes,
the spigot might turn off as far as the help."

'Many evacuees breathe easier, doctor reports, ' M issoulian, 4/16/96, B-1.
"A week ago. Dr. Walter Peschel had never treated a patient for chlorine intoxication...
Those people who suffered the most serious exposure to Thursday’s chlorine cloud .those
in intensive care- will have to wait and see the long-term effects, Peschel said. "They
could develop a reactive airway syndrome like asthma," he said. "That could last for
several months. There is also the possibility o f permanent lung damage or disease. There
is also, though, the possibility o f a complete recovery."
In those cases, the children- or adults, if they have similar problems-should stay away
from any new exposure to chlorine while their bodies are healing, Leahy advised.”

M issoulian, 4/16/96.
Other headlines:
’Chlorine killed hobo in seconds, toxicologist says, '
’Knowing w hat’s normal- counselors tell victims i t ’s OK to be upset’

April 17,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Dr. Beckemeyer- explains respiratory symptoms...
Q: Long term effects..’*'.what do we know?
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Beckemeyer: 1-2% that have problems with asthma may be sensitive. Problems will be
limited to individuals who have had major exposure.
Q; Chlorine exposure..does it knock you down, make you lose consciousness?
Beckemeyer: No.
Q: I was knocked dovm twice—after exposure. This is not classic from chlorine
exposure...
[No response to this- moved on to discuss roadblocks and reentry.]
Leahy: Health issues: If you are experiencing any problems or have any concerns, we
encourage you to consult your physician.
Nielsen- describes monitoring. Chlorine and pH.
Q: The off-gassing coming out o f the ground? Is that what the smell is? Should we be
concerned. No answer.
Technical G roup M eeting Notes, 4/17/96.
"All non-essential personnel were removed from the Forward Command area today. All
firemen, etc,, will be sent for complete physicals, including x-rays and blood tests, at
Frenchtown. This will be done for liability purposes...
We will need to develop a plan for what we will find underneath Car 3, once it is
finished."
*Next step: getting rid o f chlorine in 'Tank 3. ' M issoulian, 4/17/96,
“ ... Some residents said they had returned to their homes and smelled chlorine.
"If your machines are right, are the people wrong?" one woman asked. ...Weis also said
that anyone exposed to the chlorine might become hypersensitive to it- in swimming
pools or in return visits to the evacuated area to feed livestock. That hypersensitivity
should go away within about eight weeks."
M issoulian, 4/17/96.
Other headlines: 'Alberton man sues Rail Link. '
'Counselors help kids cope in aftermath o f disaster. '
'The Scenic Route- road crews to keep up with the traffic and potholes on 1-90 detour. '

April 18,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Health, Leahy: Health concerns call #. The nursing staff will make referrals to a doctor or
give you the needed information. "The people saying they smell something in Alberton
we believe that you smell something. We don't have answers yet, but we are working on
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it. We have contacted Garon Smith. We are attempting to find what the smell is. We are
in the assessment phase to determine the chemicals on site. We are testing the soils,
water and air. The DEQ, EPA and local health department are working on it. The results
will be public information.”
Nielsen: We are monitoring the chlorine ... The soil readings have all been okay. We are
looking at the chlorine reaction with other chemicals.
Stine, Olympus- Testing for Ph, Na, K, and Cl- non detection. "Readings look very
good."
Q: Do you have any data on the water, soil chemical levels before the spill?
Nielsen: The interaction with other chemicals is being looked into .... We are not
concerned with the chlorine readings at this time, more concerned with the reaction of
the other chemicals with the chlorine.
Q: We don't understand the chemistry that has happened here. I want to extend my
personal thanks to Snodgrass for his concerns, it is good to know the worst case scenario.
Q: Can you tell us the number o f cars derailed and the actual number of the car.
Chemical concerns:
Chlorine
Sodium Chlorate
Potassium Cresylate
Watts: The MSDS sheets were left here, we provided all the information that we had.
Q: What by-products can be produced? Are the chemicals being analyzed, need chemist
to explain.
Weis: We are looking into the source o f the potassium cresylate. We know it was used to
remove the impurities from gasoline. The bad mercaptans extraction was done in
Washington. They are no longer effective, they have been neutralized. ..The product is
regenerated with sulfuric acid and then becomes reusable... Samples form the
contaminated soils are being tested to give some idea o f what chemicals mixed. We are
using a mass spectrometer.
Q: Plateau Road- trees browning, heavy smell, eyes burning.
Weis: A plant specialist in being brought in.
Q: what are levels at the spill site.
Weis: We have that information and it is being continually monitored.
Q: But what are the levels..
Q: What was the reading at the initial time o f the wreck. I had family that went to help.
Weis: MRL is completing a computer model from the evidence on site. .. We don't want
to speculate.
Q: All those exposed can get detoxing herbs.
Leahy: I haven't looked into th a t... but I don't have that information.
Q: local health food store, vitamin C, don't drink chlorinated water...
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Q: Expertise for humans, bring someone in..
Watts: We have doctors in, if you have further concerns, contact your doctor.

Technical G roup M eeting Notes, 4/18/96.
Norman called in during the meeting to report that car 4 had been pulled away from Car
3. The access will be better now, with Car 4 away. The soil in this area is yellow, and
readings are at about 100 ppm. There is still concern about the north end of the car.
There hasn't been any excavating done around it..
Health and Safety notes there is more than enough monitoring going on, and the Coast
Guard in assisting with this.
Oxychem requested that Envirocon shorten the distance to the decon station, as long as
the readings are OK. They will put the operators in Level C protection (slicker suits).
Although it is nice to have some knowns, Brian reminded everyone there are still a lot of
unknowns out there."

Incident Command Notes.4/18/96,1900.
At 1900 hours Ellen Leahy contacted I. C. Scott Waldron and confirmed that the chlorine
and Potassium Cresylate did mix. Chlorinated Phenol.
On Waldron's "From the Chief paper": Health Dept, confirm the mixing "What does this
mean?... He measured liquid sample."

*Firefighters and MRL officials got a much-needed boost at Wednesday's regular
briefing fo r evacuated residents-applause f o r a jo b well done' Missoulian, 4/18/96.
A-10
"The 2 pm sessions have been well attended ... Many participants have used the time to
voice their fears and speculation that information about the situation was being withheld
... But on Wednesday Frenchtown Fire Chef Scott Waldron started the session with an
impassioned defense o f the work that cleanup officials and Rail Link employees are
performing. "It's very difficult to sit up here and listen to some o f the things we hear,"
Waldron said, his voice cracking. After Waldron's speech, most of the question and
answer period after the briefing was dedicated to residents praising the incident staff and
Rail Link...
"The opinion of the few is not necessarily that o f the rest of us," one man agreed. One
woman said she doesn't want outside lawyers trying to get into the picture. "There are
outside agendas creeping into this."

M issoulian, 4/18/96.
Other headlines: M R L calls suit ’P re m atu re’.’
’N arrow escape- Rail L ink engineer describes brush with death after derailm ent.’
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April 19,1996
Incident Com m and Notes, 4/19/96,1200.
1st Draft Transition Plan
When is When: When chlorine no longer poses a threat to the public
Other issues: Is there some other chemical threat that will prevent re-entry?
Leahy: Samples o f air, water and soils are being tested. There is a white chemical in the
homes (white dust) being sampled.)
Leahy: Smell-people are having symptoms when they return for limited visits.
Background: there is concern that the chlorine mixed with the chemical in Tank car #5.
Did it happen? There are symptoms-smell. Dr Garon Smith, U o f M chemist confirmed
that the chemicals did mix. We don't know what all the compounds are at this time.
Residential monitoring has started. How far this compound migrated from the site is
unknown. Air and soil is being monitored. We are attempting to answer this question.
We are working from the site out in a spoke-like pattern to attempt to locate the
migration zone. We are doing some monitoring in the homes, with the permission of the
homeowner. We will not have any further information today.
Watts: Best case scenario: Car #3 process complete and the chlorine will be gone.
DOT, Swartz: We also need the information on the threat of the chemical. We also have
a life threatening potential with the detour o f 1-90. The threat of both will have to be
weighed.”

Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Watts: April 24th is still the re-entry date.
Leahy: “We are checking other components at the work site and the smell in Alberton.
We are testing the white dust that was found in the homes. The potassium cresylate did
mix with the chlorine. The chlorinated compounds are o f greater concern. We have taken
samples from the area o f the wreck The symptoms that you have described to us have
been very helpful. We want to find the answer...
Dr. Garon Smith ... has confirmed the presence o f chlorinated phenol We do not know
the migration off the site. Air testing has been done and the residue in the homes and the
solid is being tested...We do need answers about the compound, and the migration before
we can allow reentry.”
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Garon Smith: “I was called Tuesday by the health dept, regarding the pesticide smell and
the contents o f the compound. I received samples on Wednesday and ran the tests
Thursday .... We have told MRL to have the spill at the site covered with plastic. The
compound will mix with water and go into the ground. This compound is not in aerosol
form. It will not ?? into the air. It could have been carried by the cloud and the rain the
day o f the incident. Cleanup at the site will be necessary. The compound coming in
contact with water is a concern. It is heavier than water and will pool in the bottom.”
Q: Tweedale- Is heat necessary for formation of chlorinated phenol
Smith- No, it can form at room temperature.
Q: What about the concentration .... garden plants?
Q: Fish, the Clark Fork River Smith: This compound accumulates in the fatty tissue.
Leafy vegetables can be washed. I would be more concerned with cows milk, meat..wild
meat., should stick to lean meat.
Q: It is critical the dispersion rate, how far would this compound disperse.
Smith: The more rain the tighter the pattern
Q: When will tests be done...
Leahy: Tests are being done on the disbursement, until results are known there will be no
re-entry into the exclusion zone.
Way, EPA: “There are extreme peaks o f chlorine monitored at the site and at times lethal
amounts
o f gas. When the dirt is disturbed when the cars are moved, there is extreme amounts of
chlorine
gas released... We are now turning our attention to the testing o f chlorinated phenol. We
will analyze the data as
it comes in. We are taking sampl[es] from the Alberton area: homes, etc. Dr. Pruyn has
sent
samples to a vet. diagnostic clinic in Moscow, ID. He will test animals as he thinks it is
necessary.
It is possible the compound could cause liver damage.”
Q: Human health risks?
Way: exposed to high concentrations- dermal, respiratory, liver damage, accumulates in
fatty tissue, remains in the tissue.
Q: If people left their furnace running, would you be able to capture samples form the
furnace filter?
Way: It is unknown., possibly too many variables. It is an interesting suggestion, and we
will consider it.
Torgeson, Olympus- Altered sampling techniques to address white powder. . "We
learned the results o f the sample from Dr. Smith. We will start sampling the compounds
to identify them. We are testing the soil close to the site. We have had one small hit in
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the soil close to the site. It was below the allowable limits. There has been no detection
in the water.”
Watts; “MRL has established rules for this meeting... we are providing support to the
evacuees, we have pledged to bring in the specialists to answer questions (they will find
the answer to: "what's wrong, what's going to happen, are my kids going to be sick, what
types, if any, ill effects will I experience).”
Benowitz (expert): “ We will be measuring exposures and testing samples. It is
premature to answer questions at this time.”
Way: “Monitoring the on-site cleanup with the technical specialists., the operation is
going well. We have the highest quality of expertise from all over the country. Our focus
at this time is on safety. Samples were taken the first day o f the spilled caustic material.
We [will] have data by the, first o f next week. We are attempting to identify the
migration o f the compounds. After the site is stable, more research will be conducted.”
Q: Regarding nausea, lots o f us have been nauseated. Will it pass..
Way: Two issues. Chlorine gas is nasty. There is nausea and vomiting from chlorine gas.
Symptoms abate in approximately 2 weeks. Sometimes children and elderly adults will
take longer.. Everyone is different.
Q: Perhaps it wasn't chlorine. If you have an additional release o f chlorine will it mix
with the potassium cresylate and make more chlorinated phenol.
Way: At the time o f the spill it did mix, but the chemicals are not close enough at this
time.
Q: When the earth [soil] is moved will the chemicals mix?
Way: It's possible.
'UM chem ist looks fo r other toxins resulting fr o m spill'. Missoulian, 4/19/96.
“A University o f Montana chemist is analyzing soil and air samples taken at the Alberton
canyon train derailment, looking for any new compounds created by the combination of
chemicals spilled when 20 cars left the track a week ago. Chlorine gas, which rolled out
o f one ruptured tank car, posed the most immediate and deadly danger, said Garon Smith
... But evacuees who have since returned to Alberton-briefly to retrieve belongingsreported a pesticide smell that gave them headaches and made their eyes water. Thus,
Smith's analysis o f the other chemicals spilled in the derailment: potassium cresylate, a
degreaser that spilled into a ditch alongside the train track and sodium chlorate, a white
crystal and strong oxidizer.
Late Thursday, Smith said he believes the cresylate is causing the odor. But he still did
not know if some new compound was created when the cresylate came in contact with
the chlorine gas...
" The potential health problem would be combination o f the organic and the chlorine into
a chlorinated organic”, according to Smith. "Even then, though, my guess is that if some
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chlorinated compounds were formed, they were probably not produced in significant
numbers.” Chlorinated organics .... work its way up the food chain. Any impact on
humans would be from eating affected fish. ...The chlorine gas will cause 'quite a bit' of
contact damage to vegetation, the chemist added...”

'Governor reviews Chlorine cleanup ~ Missoulian, 4/19/96. A- 1.
100 people treated at Community Hospital; 23 5 at St. Patrick's, and 14 at Mineral
County/Superior.

'Quick response- rapid deployment o f emergency teams kept chlorine casualties low in
Alberton. 'Inside: 'The nation's biggest chlorine spill in Florida causedfar worse loss
o f life.' M issoulian, 4/19/96.
National Chlorine Institute- 6 major leaks of Cl from rail cars since 1979 Youngstown
Fla-90 tons (180,0001bs) full carload- biggest in history.

April 20,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Clark Johnson, facilitator. "Rules for today’s meeting. ..Any debates will be after the
public meeting.
Waldron: IC update. There is a handout available showing the organizational structure of
the incident command. We are extremely busy, there is a lot going on, we do have a time
limit today for this meeting.
Q: You talk about the soil, what about the people. Are you recommending blood tests,
spit tests, this hasn't been addressed.
Dr. Benowitz: If there was severe irritation, the chlorine has been excreted. Testing
wouldn't rev eal... the organic compounds, it does not appear that they migrated to where
people live.
Q: It has been 8 days and still there is no answer. Isn't it better to get tested now and to
have the data, than have no data?
Dr. Benowitz: The compound was not transported, it is heavier than air. The only reason
for concern there may be some reaction with another chemical. The distance that it could
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have travelled is minimal. The farther it was transported the more diluted it would
become.
Q We should write down everyday how we're doing...
Dr. Benowitz: It is not a hazard if the compound did not enter your system. It cannot get
into your water supply. Only way is by surface contact. There is no concentration o f any
impact.
Q: Are those people that re-entered already at more risk?
Dr. Benowitz: No, at this time there is no detectable levels, (sic) Chlorine gas can be
released, but not in major amounts.
Q: Can you speculate on the long term effect? Can we get a contract from MRL to assure
medical coverage.
Watts: I can't answer that. MRL is here for the long run.
Q: What are you going to do about the white dust in our houses—will you hire someone to
come in and clean? (Command staff had already left the meeting, this will be addressed
on 4/21/96.)"

Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/20/96.
"The subject o f 1-90 was brought up: It was agreed no decision can be made until we see
what will happen with Car 3. Once Car 3 is taken care of, the Interstate can be opened
without there being a threat to motorists. The only problem will be with the dirt
excavation stirring up some vapors. At that point, finishing Car 2 and Car 3 will be a
normal operation. The highway will be marked and patrolled so there will be no
onlookers."
'New Fears in Alberton- Chemist says train wreck produced dozens o f dangerous
compounds, ' M issoulian, 4/20/96.
"We hoped we could rule out that a reaction took place," said Ellen Leahy, director of
the MCCHD. "But there was a reaction. We have confirmed the presence o f chlorinated
compounds at the site. Most importantly, we do not know if the compounds have
migrated off site, away from the derailment," Leahy said. "But we do know what to look
for now. And, certainly, chlorine is not the only thing."
The finding could affect Alberton residents' return to their homes, Leahy said. "Our
position at the Health Department is that re-entry won't take place until we have
satisfactorily asked and answered all the public health questions."
It also confirmed reports by residents who returned briefly to their homes this week to
retrieve personal items- reports o f a pesticide-like smell and complaints of severe
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headaches, burning eyes and nausea. The ill effects didn't jibe with tests showing no
further chlorine gas in the air.
So Garon Smith, a chemistry professor at the University o f Montana and member of the
Missoula Board o f Health, tested chemical samples taken at the derailments. The mixture
was so concentrated that his equipment had to be cleaned and reassembled on Friday.
...He found what he hoped not to find; chlorophenols created when chlorine from one
ruptured tank car mixed with potassium cresylate-a degreaser- that leaked from another.
While the chlorine gas that rolled out of tank car No. 3 immediately after the derailment
was the first and deadliest risk, the chemical compounds created afterward pose the
longer term problem. Smith said. ...The compounds are "pesticide like", by Smith's
description and are highly toxic and persistent in the environment. They tend to
accumulate in the food chain. At Smith's urging, health officers asked that the most
contaminated soil be covered with plastic late Thursday to prevent the chemicals from
further washing into the ground - and ground water. The "worst scenario" would find
pools o f chlorinated compounds sinking in to the aquifer and eventually polluting the
drinking water..., Smith said. There is also some possibility that the chemicals floated
away from the derailment on water particles-either particles created by the release of
chlorine or in the light rain that was falling at the time, he added .... Smith said the
chemical compounds could show up in cow and goat milkand in river fish. Leafy
vegetables might need washing with a soap solution. Meat from animals affected by
contamination also could be contaminated, particularly the fatty tissue where chlorinated
phenols tend to accumulate. "It's a matter, though, o f how far the compounds moved out
from the site," Smith said. Air and soil samples will be taken is a "spoke" out from he
derailment until there is no further detectable contamination, said Peter Nielsen ... Then
the unanswered questions can be answered, Nielsen said.”

^Health Survey starts Monday'. M issoulian, 4/20/96. A-1.
Leahy said "... the survey will scientifically characterize the health effects of the disaster.
Step one will be an overall description o f the symptoms-"and the symptoms as they relate
to where people live and where they were during the incident.," Leahy said. "We would
hope to come back then and follow up with a look at longer-term issues. What we have
now is anecdotal information that has been very helpful to us, addressing people's
questions and looking for problems," she said. "But we need the scientific survey
approach to give us a true picture of the event."

'Lawyer defends timing o f suit- says it's needed to get facts. ' Missoulian, 4/20/96. A-5.
Zander Blewett "It is absolutely mandatory in a chlorine gas exposure case o f this
magnitude that the injured parties determine, as soon as possible, the facts surrounding
the incident. The passage o f time tends only to obscure the facts." "It is extremely
important for those injured persons to marshal the facts as soon as possible to avoid any
confusion in the future. This is the reason the suit was filed,"
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Missoulian, 4/20/96.
Other headlines: 'Workers fin d 24-inch rupture in still-leaking chlorine car. '

April 21,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Watts: Car #4 and #1 are empty. #5 is empty. 2 cars have residue. The product in the
Sodium Chlorate car does not affect re-entry. April 24th is still the re-entry data.
Leahy: Re-entry allowable criteria: We were on a conference call with state
toxicologists, 3 medical doctors from the Rocky Mt. Drug and Poison Control Center, Dr.
Loehnen, Missoula, Dr. Brown, Msla, Dave Torgeson, Ellen, Jim Carlson, Peter Neilson,
Mike Schestedt, Missoula Co. Atty. We have gathered sampled at the site and going from
the site out in concentric circles.
Torgeson, Olympus: Showed map o f site and the chlorinated phenols. The samples sent
to the lab were collected 5-6 days ago from residential sites close to the derailment.
There is very low concentration. All the hits are from the spill site. We are sampling to
see if the compounds migrated off the site.

Notes from Conference Cali with Health Officials. 4/21/96.
To establish re-entry criteria
"13 ppm trichlorophenol in (air?) near tracks
Cl- 400- 1 OOOppm spikes
est. 550 still evacuated
I Cl- all removed
II Cl- compounds
III cresylate odor and sx (symptoms)
IV sodium chlorate- public health emergency — > clinical”
Diagram o f K cresylate "pesticide like odors"
Diagram o f "chlorinated compounds'- dioxin per Chris -do not expect dioxin- not enough
heat in exo ..?
pH too low- there would be radical scavengers
ND- ? ppm for surface and soils samples
sx o f delayed hypersensitivity kids in pool could also be triggered by other "phenolic
compound-move o ff site
I Cl transfer- Hwy open ND expected -some odor threshold
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n
III PH emergency clinical OSHA 10 hour standards
A) no info re: residential extrapolation
B) But population re-entering has been injured Loehnan- sever[al] that are complainingsmall airway diff. H/A Nausea -signif sx upon re-entry- much psych overlap- hard to
dissect re-entry- H/A Nausea resp. sx- chest pain- trach?
Small sample o f patients in office- those with problems have underlying problems
-Some children have small airway obstruction
Bronstein
I no chlorine leaking
II neg. soil C l
III odor will be a problem
per Chris- not much off-gassing; will dredge out K cresylate; calcium carbonate?
Railroad will do indoor air monitoring prior to and during re-entry per MRL consultant
Can use the FID for Cl hydrocarbons ?
consensus Statements
I Cl- When Cl levels are los (ND on highway but some odor in zone) and CL cars stable
(little/no risk o f catastrophic (?) releases) then open Hwy as long as engineers., no
stopping no gawkers
II A) Wait for the samples
B) When they do come back- even if a small amount (NOTE: small underlined in
origninal)-will have to extrapolate
C) a list o f compounds- not the only ones there
D) Dioxins- background levels difficult due to kraft mill
Peter 1/3 mile from site
10 soil samples -site -residential
10 compounds in Garon’s all not detect BUT work-zone has low levels of
tri-chlorophenol detectedother home samples pending EL can screen for those 10 compounds as indicators
-agree-wait- but ? qualitative- agree to go for the indicators- hold on dioxin testing
Loehnen- potential for stress and overreaction and fear?? hard to read IE cresylateoptimally gone before re-entry if cresylate not gone- reconsider re-entry
Schestadt- cannot sustain an exclusion on hypersensitivity
“can go in" -should be advised may be hypersensitive- talk to physician
A1 Bronstein- the bulk o f cresylate should be removed per Kohan? - re-entry- no
migrationcresylate removed then- becomes hyper-?-go to physician
Proviso- a bunch o f people obs. rashes or PFT changes ..come back to ..consensus group
IV calcium carbonate (lime chalk)- irritants- dust- poison control will prepare info
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per Loehnan- benign
per Bronstein- Be clear- terminology 'hypersensitivity' not multiple chemical
sensitivity self-limited; not progressive; time frame different from individual to individual
Kohan- delayed reaction to Cl some have a lowered threshold - sun bum analogy
Per Mike S.
1. Chlorine stable- Hwy open
2. Chlorinated Compounds- ? -move off site use markers if neg-OK if pos-confer
3. Cresylate- bulk ? removed A. reconvene if symptoms
4. Chalk Consensus on all 4 issues- meeting set for Tues 4/23 9 Am.
Signed E. Leahy.

M issoulian, 4/21/96.
“Scott Waldron told those in attendance at Saturday's briefing that officials were going to
concentrate on questions from Alberton area residents. Waldron said there had been
complaints that residents were unable to ask questions because much o f the briefing time
was being taken up by environmental activists. "This is not a forum for environmental
organizations" Waldron said "This is your meeting and we want to keep it that way."”

April 22,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Dr. Pruyn (vet) there again "to answer any questions you may have regarding your
animals.
Torgeson; " We have samples from the cresylate and have received some results. Some
detectable concentrations from near the site and some no detects. ...All the analytical
results have been low... "The potassium cresylate is being excavated from the site.
Q: After or before reentry?
A: It's going on right now
Q: So all contaminated soil will be gone...
A: Health Department has a flow chart.
Q: Are you using meteorological..
A: We are not an air sampling company..
Q: No- where the clouds went..
Deis: Please hold all questions like we agreed on.
Leahy: I have some announcements.
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'Officials set safety conditions fo r return'. M issoulian, 4/22/96. A -1.
"We're still optimistic that (April 24 re-entry) will take place," Watts said after the
briefing, "But I think it's going to come down to the health department... Leahy said the
bulk of the soil contaminated by the potassium cresylate will have to be removed before
residents can return.”

'Cracked rail m ay be clue to derailment'. M issoulian, 4/22/96.
"Hazardous material crews that have been on site did locate apiece o f track that appears
to be partially fractured. However, until the remainder o f this track is located and
microscopically inspected, it is impossible to determine the cause, said Lynda Frost of
Rail Link . The NTSB ... and FRA ... have not been to the derailment site during cleanup
because o f safety concerns. All have been informed o f the findings. "As soon as the
investigative teams are allowed on site, every effort will be focused upon determination
o f the cause o f this derailment." Frost said.

'Asleep at the switch- N TSB : Train safety suffers because engineers are fatigued. '
M issoulian, 4/22/96. A- 10.
Rail traffic has jumped by 27% in past 10 years. At same time, number o f crewmen is
one-half what it was in 1980.

M issoulian, 4/22/96.
Other headlines: 'The checklist- MCCHD officials have set up 4 criterita fo r allowing
re-entry to the evacuated areas'.

April 23,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Leahy: “To keep the chemicals in perspective (went over flow chart). The known risk is
chlorine. We are making progress. All our data is getting us towards the Yes. The
question: did the chlorinated phenols leave a trail from the site—so far we have a no
detect. The potassium cresylate, we are working on the best way to treat and excavate the
soil. On the white dust, so far a no detect. We are just being prudent and cautious.”

Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/23/96,1200.
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"There can be no reduction o f the evacuation zone. The readings on 1-90 are above the
acceptable level."

Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/23/96,1800.
"It was noted we have a 19 page report from the chlorine spill in Florida. The report lists
everything that was done wrong. We are not making the same mistakes... It will be
announced to the public today that the evacuation will not be over tomorrow. It is
expected that law enforcement will tell the people it will be about five more
days...Everyone is reminded they need to be in a full face respirator in the red tape area.
The readings have been averaging in the 3040 ppm range.”

T echnical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/23/96,1830.
"The Sodium chlorate car transfer is complete and the ground spill cleanup is well
underway. Envirocon will have two decon techs working the station. They are excavating
the soil as they can get to it. It was noted that the stain in the railbed is small for the
amount o f product that was spilled. Most o f the product went south."
'Tests show spilled toxic chemicals stayed put- M ore samples are y e t to be analyzed. ’
M issoulian, 4/23/96. “ Soil samples taken in a backyard garden and at two homes within
one-third mile of the Alberton canyon train derailment showed no trace of the dangerous
chemical compounds found at the accident site, a county health officer said Monday.
..."To hurt people, these compounds would have to get into their body either by ingesting
water or inhaling gases and into their bodies through puncture wounds," Nielsen said.
“So far it looks good," Nielsen said. "So far, there is no indication that any o f these
compounds moved off site."
...The resulting chlorophenols are highly toxic and persistent in the environment. The
contaminated soils at the accident site, must, in fact, be excavated and removed.
Olympus
Environmental, a cleanup consultant to M ontana Rail Link, is testing soil and water
samples in a
wide circle out form the derailment, looking for any trace o f the chlorophenols.
"We are sampling all the way upriver and downriver," said Dave Torgerson o f Olympus.
"We need to see whether the chemicals forming on site are getting o ff site. We have no
indication that they have gotten off site." "But we are going to make sure" he said.
Torgerson said ground-water and river-water samples also have shown non sign o f the
toxic mixtures .... We want that cleanup pretty much done and the contaminated soil
contained in some way before re-entry," Nielsen said. "The chemicals are real odorous.
They could cause some discomfort for some o f the people who already had the chlorine
exposure and may be sensitive right now."
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M issoulian, 4/23/96.
Other headlines; 'Officials still hold to Wednesday return. '

April 24,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Waldron: We have had some high levels o f chlorine. (Technical information on patching
tank car #3 followed.)
Leahy: Chlorine is the biggest known risk. The other issues are being tested, just to be
prudentand cautious, because you have concerns. Chlorinated phenols: 75% complete
towards yes- migrated-no trail. Potassium Cresylate: 50% towards yes-excavation started.
White dust: 100% yes. Consultants have determined the criteria for re-entry and will give
the Health Department go ahead when all the data has been received. We have tested
2000 samples. All data shows No Detect outside the spill site. We will meet again to go
over the data. The white dust, we have ruled out anything that could be a health threat.
...The consultants have agreed there is no substance that’is harmful."
Huff. The stock is fine, the EPA has been watching them, and they say the animals are
fine."
Weis, EPA regional toxicologist. I have been... roving the area. I have stopped and
visited with the animals. They are fine. I have not seen any signs of chlorine exposure.”

T echnical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/24/96,1200.
“Olympus Environmental is still doing testing in the area. Health and Safety is
continuing with a lot o f monitoring. There is a lot gas coming out o f the wet soil now that
the rain has stopped."
M issoulian, 4/24/96.
Headlines: 'Chlorine cleanup: It's going slower than expected'
'Detour on the detour- wreck temporarily closes Highway 200. *
Letter to the Editor 'Give MRL a break'.
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April 25,1996
E vacuee M eeting Notes.
Leahy: ”In answer to health question. The criteria list—go home is the best answer. We
want to answer all question so that you know you are safe. "
Leahy went over the chemical flow chart. Dust- answer: yes, no problem. Chlorinated
compounds tested from the site, stayed at the rail site. All results came from data, not
form speculation and done quickly. Today’s answer the chemical trail from the site-D O
NOT FIND ANY MIGRATION.
Torgeson: "In scanning the data we have non detects in the sample. Any detectable
between Plateau Road and the spill site was 246 trichlorophenol, but that did not go off
site.
Q: Have you determined which molecule was airborne and causing the odor?
Nielson: Cresylate, the mercaptan, causing pesticide like odor. Not a a strong odor now.
If you have been sensitized you might notice it more.
Q: Are there live fish in the river now?

Technical G roup M eeting Notes. 4/25/96,1400.
"Everyone is reminded to try and keep your attitudes up. if our coworkers see us down, it
will bring them down.”

'Alberton residents may be allowed home by weekend. ' M issoulian, 4/25/96.
“Leahy said authorities are about 75% sure there is no trail elsewhere. "We're looking for
a trail to see if our chlorinated compounds documented in the sludge itself traveled, said
Leahy. "We’re not finding evidence o f a tr a il... (after) almost 2,000 analyses, we’re
getting no detect anywhere outside the spill site” Leahy stressed that chlorine remained
the biggest threat and that other chemicals have been examined out of prudence and to
answer the concerns o f residents. "From the beginning o f this issue to now to the end of
this issue, we believe to a person on the incident command team and the consultants that
chlorine is the biggest known risk. It’s the big hazard," she said. "It's easy to lose sight of
that when we start talking about things (chemicals) that are a little more complex."

'With luck, evacuees may be home this weekend. ' M issoulian, 4/25/96.
Displaced Alberton residents got an apology, along with some assurance Friday from
Montana Rail Link President Bill Brodsky. "We’re going to be with you for the long haul
... We’re going to be here to see you through this thing." Brodsky apologized for the
"inconvenience" caused by the derailment o f the 71 -car Rail Link train which spewed
deadly chlorine gas, killing a transient railrider .... Ellen Leahy .gave people a few hints
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for getting back into their homes. Leahy said it was 'highly unlikely' that residents would
smell chlorine upon their returns but advised them to ventilate their homes and get out
should they find gas in their homes. In general, Leahy said, "It should be safe for your
children and your pets outside."
Missoulian, 4/25/96.
Other headlines:
'For most, motel life's getting old'
'Evacuee group presses MRL on health issues'

April 26,1996
Evacuee Meeting Notes.
Watts: They estimate there is 5 tons o f product left in the car. We have scheduled a
meeting for 9 AM on Saturday, 4/27/96 to finalize the going home process.
Leahy: We are preparing a document for you, the most frequently asked questions. That
will be a handout tomorrow.
The four criteria. Chlorine product gone. Chlorine smell- highly unlikely. There should
be no pockets o f chlorine in your home, if you smell chlorine ventilate the area.
Food: Medications Veg, Water Symptoms: You may continue to have symptoms. Get in
touch with your health care provider.
Chemicals: you may notice some smell, some do, some don't. There may be a residual
smell.
Clean your counters or rugs, use baking soda solution if you feel its necessary. A handout
will be available before you go home.
Bill Brodsky, MRL President. "We're here for the long haul- 1 year, 5 years, 10 years,
we'll be here. We can’t answer all the questions now. We want you to know we are deeply
concerned. We will evaluate all o f your concerns. We tiy to do what's right for our
employees, for our customers and for our community. We will be here. We are doing the
best job we can. We have respect for others, and we treat you like we want to be treated.
We will work with you. We will be here down the road. We apologize for any
inconvenience and any problems that we have caused. We won't forget you. We have the
best quality o f people here to help you. We are proud o f our people and the team. Our
goal is to get you back home."

Technical Group Meeting Notes. 4/26/96,1800.
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"We have been moving product at a rate o f one ton per hour We believe we now have 13
tons o f product left, so at this rate, the car should be finished by early morning." Once the
car is in the clear, Envirocon and Hulcher will get in to continue excavating and
preparing to lay rail. Health and safely noted they have plenty o f coverage and plenty of
monitoring is being done."
"Everyone is asked to relay to his people that we're not out of the woods yet. Since it does
look like we're getting hear the end, people may have a tendency to get in a hurry and not
be as careful as they should be."

Letter to the Editor: 'Give MRL's victims a break* by Jabe Jackson. M issoulian,
4/26/96.
"How dare any o f them ask the victims o f MRL's chlorine disaster to give MRL a break.
Who answers for those crimes? What form o f redress do the people have? Who is our
advocate? Did anyone give Exxon a break in Alaska? Or Union Carbide a break in
Bhopal, India? Maybe corporations should all be given breaks for not yet killing
everyone. Do these advocates o f poor unfortunate MRL really expect people who have
had toxics dumped in their town to somehow feel bad for MRL?"

M issoulian, 4/26/96.
Other headlines:
'Evacuee group presses MRL on health issues, '
'Some residents g et a quick visit via videotape. '
Letter to the Editor- 'A safe substitute f o r chlorine. '

April 27,1996
Evacuee M eeting Notes.
Watts: We are going to have a partial re-entry today .... Steve Way, EPA has approved the
reentry.
Way: I am the on-scene coordinator. I am from the EPA, Emergency Response Unit. The
following conditions have allowed me to make the decision to let you go home. I have
been at the site everyday since April 14 .... We have control o f the chlorine through the
off-loading process. When car #3 is empty, we will remove the soil from around the car.
Soil removal: the bulk o f the product will be staged on site, and covered. This soil will be
stable on site. The soil will be transferred off site at a later time.
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Watts: Re-entry today is not mandatory. You can wait until tomorrow. There will be
another meeting Sunday at 9 AM. MRL will meet with the leadership of ACE, at 6 PM
today at the Red Lion on W. Broadway.
Waldron: A handout is available: Health information. Phone Numbers MRL information
... There will be a claims office set up in Alberton within the next couple o f days.
Way: The 1-90 re-opening will be based on the level o f the chlorine monitoring. The
ofF-loading o f Car #3 continues to release high concentrations o f chlorine gas on 1-90
near the derailment site. We are unable to give a time when car #3 will be empty.
Watts: The EPA has completed a handout regarding the criteria for the contaminated soil.
The Health Department document has been signed by Ellen Leahy, Health Dept., Dave
Ball, Law Enforcement, Scott Waldron, Fire and Dan Watts, MRL.
Re-Enhy Allowable Criteria Sheet
1) Chlorine Gas
2) Chlorinated Compounds
3) Potassium Cresylate Spill
4) "White Dust"

Incident statu s sum m ary. 4/27/96 by Paul Laisy [Missoula R u ral F ire Dept.].
EPA concluded risk to the city o f Alberton was over. Chlorine contained although still
vapor transfer ongoing. All other(?) contamination risks eliminated. People o f Alberton
..were allowed to return to their homes. 1-90 still closed due to chlorine spikes carried by
wind from the site.

April 28,1996
'H om e at last'. M issoulian, 4/28/96.
'Officials have found no trace o f chlorinated compounds, which were formed when the
spilled chlorine mixed with_potassium cresylate, anywhere but at the derailment site. And
the contaminated soils has been stabilized and taken to a nearby area until a permanent
disposal site is located .... Members o f one o f the groups MRL is still meeting with -the
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Alberton Community Evacuees (ACE)- said Saturday they won't return home until MRL
addresses their concerns. In a press release, ACE listed the following conditions.
-A document signed by NIRL, the MCCHD and the EPA stating that it is safe for all to
return to their homes.
-Independent tests performed on ACE members, home and properties, including soils and
waters, by a lab o f ACE’s choosing.
-Base-line medical testing as determined by a health professional of ACE's choosing.
-Removal o f all contaminants from the accident site.
ACE members were meeting with officials from the train company Saturday night.

April 29,1996
W(9 m ore detour- last o f evacuees allowed back into their homes. ’ M issoulian, 4/29/96.
“After 17 days... "Ifs entirely safe for these people to return to their homes," said Lynda
Frost, Montana Rail Link spokesman (sic)... And although MRL, the local and state
health departments and the Environmental Protection Agency say the area is now safe, a
small group o f residents says they just won't go back. ..None o f the evacuees were forced
to return to their homes this weekend. Frost said. MRL will continue to pay for their
lodging. "We're willing to work with the group," she said. ...ACE wants an independent
tester- and perhaps two separate labs- to perform tests on their homes an property, before
they'll feel safe enough to return. "Our position is basically ... thus far, thousands o f tests
have been performed," Frost said. Those tests have been analyzed and Alberton has been
deemed safe for reentry.
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APPENDIX B

Year Six (FFY 1999) USDOT-HMEP Planning Grant
1. Project Manager(s):
Hope Sieck
2618 Rattlesnake Drive
Missoula, MT 59802
(406)728-1001
Missoula County LEPC
and Bill Silverman, Director
Missoula County Office of Emergency Management
200 W. Broadway St.
Missoula, MT 59802^292
(406) 721-5700

2. Project Title-. Hazardous Materials Transportation Study; Assessing and Planning for
Transportation Risks in and around Missoula County
3. Project dates: Start date; December 1, 1998

End date: September I. 1999

4. The specific hazardous materials risk management need to be addressed by the projecr.
To determine more specifically the risk presented by hazardous materials transport through the
community to allow for better emergency preparation and population protection
Background:
Missoula County is described in the Hazardous Materials Response plan as being "centrally
located in western Montana. The County has the largest population of all counties in the region
and is a center o f commerce, industry and transportation. The City of Missoula and its
surrounding urban area are located in a large valley formed by the confluence o f five major
drainage systems. Ninety percent of the County’s population lives in this central valley. The valley
has three highway access points. All o f these points are located on interstate routes for railroad
and truck carriers. The valley’s air shed routinely experience inversions for six months each year.
A sole-source aquifer provides drinking water to the entire valley."(p.9)
A 1985 database of acute hazardous events nationally ranked attributed 25.2% o f
hazardous materials released to transportation incidents. That number has likely grown as the
number o f chemical shipments by rail increased since 1985. Missoula County has had the
unfortunate experience of responding to a variety o f transportation incidents since its formation in
1986. The Missoula County LEPC is the most well-organized and active LEPC in western
Montana. Responders from Missoula County routinely assist departments in more rural, less
populated areas. The Missoula Regional HazMat Team travels statewide and is integral to
response in western Montana. The past several years have seen several transportation related
incidents in western Montana: an accident involving a truck carrying pesticides, an intentional
train derailment just east of Missoula, a train derailment with chemical release just west of
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Missoula.
Responders learned important lessons from each of these rail and truck accidents. The
importance of pre-planning was clearly illustrated by these incident responses, especially as it
related to communication between responders and industry and in the arena of public protection
(specifically in the form of evacuation).
In order to improve overall response and preparedeness efforts the Missoula LEPC wfl]
conduct a hazard materials transportation flow study for Missoula County and surrounding areas
and implement that data to improve response. Our project is in three phases; Phase 1 and Phase 2
are outlined in full here; Phase 3 will be pursued in the next funding cycle.
The purpose of Phase 1 is to identify shipments of hazardous materials that originate
from, or are destined to, or pass through the above men areas. We will also identify the
transportation routes and schedules likely to be used for the transportation o f substances from or
to those facilities subject to the requirements o f Title ILL
We will use the compiled data to improve upon our emergency plans and response training
in Phase 2. Population protection work is ongoing and this data wUl greatly assist those efforts to
identify vulnerable areas and create evacuation strategies. This information will supplement
existing information on fixed facilities and greatly assist responders from county departments and
the Regional HazMat Team. The HazMat Team will benefit from an analysis of risks from
surrounding counties, as they are relied upon to respond to incidents in those counties but have
little if any pre-planning information for those areas.
Phase 1: Conduct hazardous materials transportation flow study
The process used to conduct the study will include:
•
Identify the chemical, amount, frequency, and route of hazardous material that originate
from, or are destined to, or pass through the study area via raU, truck, air. or pipeline
•
Review transportation accident information in the study area for past 10 years
■
Identify high accident areas and high risk areas
•
Identify facilities vulnerable to transportation caused incidents
•
Contact federal, state and local regulatory agencies for additional hazmat data (e.g.
inspection, surveillance information)
•
Ask transporters to provide hazmat flow information to supplement our studies;
specifically any 24 hour, weekly, or seasonal fluctuations in loads
•
Develop a data base to house this information, along with a data entry process, data
retrieval and access for local users
•
Prepare a final report which summarizes collected information to be used by LEPC and
responders to improve response and preparedness
Phase 2: Incorporate flow study data into updated disaster and response plans; utilize
study data in pre-planning and public protection efforts via GIS mapping and risk
management planning
The LEPC is currently assisting in the improvement o f pre-planning for a variety of fixed sites
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throughout the County. The addition o f current, specific transportation risks to pre-planning and
population protection efforts will be extremely beneficial. We will work with rail, truck, and
pipeline carriers to achieve a higher level of preparedness, improved communication, accident
mitigation and tniniraization, and increased public understanding of risks.
Use the information gained to improve upon and update existing emergency response plans.
An update o f chemicals hauled and timing o f those shipments will enable responders to determine
the most likely hazmats to be encountered and in what potential combinations.

Phase 3: Plan and carry out a training on a transportation accident scenario incorporating
study results. A full training for hazmat responders and law enforcement officials involving
evacuation will address many concerns from previous transportation incidents (e.g. Clinton and
Alberton derailments). A funding request for this exercise will be submitted during the next round
of the grant.

S. Outline o f the work plan, with personnel, time schedule and deliverables.
WORK PLAN
Phase 1: Hazmat Flow Study
1) January 25, 1999- Training and practice run for aU involved in the survey.
Total: 8 hours each
2) January 26- February 2, 1999
1-90 east and West survey
2 employees
Total: 50 hours each
Hwy.93/12 North and South survey
2 employees
Total: 50 hours each
Railroad survey
2 employees
Total; 50 hours each
3) February 3, 1999
Employees review data with employee hired to do data analysis
Total: 5 hours each
4) February 5-15
1 employee completes data analysis o f highway and rail surveys
Total: 40 hours

231

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5) February 4
Inservice training for 2 employees involved in fixed site facility transportation survey
Total: 8 hours each
6) February 15-17
2 employees review transportation plans of fixed facilities under Title HI and document routes,
volumes, and trends.
Total: 24 hours each
7) February 17-18
I employee completes data analysis o f fixed site facility survey
Total: 24 hours
8) March 5. 1999
Final report and database delivered to LEPC
Total: 10 hours
W O RK PLAN
Phase 2: Inclusion o f d ata into planning efforts
1) Present data and prepare recommendations for emergency plan updates to LEPC
1 employee
Total: 10 hours
2) Facilitate meetings with transporters and responders to identify areas of improvement to
mitigate accidents and increase response coordination; prepare report o f findings firom these
meetings and chart future foUow-up for LEPC
1 errployee
Total: 40 hours
3) Present information and prepare recommendations for population protection working group
I employee
Total: 10 hours
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APPENDIX C

R eported Health Effects .
vs. E xpected Sym ptom s

(M S D S )

Actual
S ym ptom s

C la s s i c C h lo r in e

P o t a s s i u m C r e s y la t e /P h e n o ls

(a fte r K ilb u n i, 1 9 9 6 ;
A C C E H , 1 9 9 6 -9 )

acid b a s e d im b a la n c e

a b d o m in a l pain

bum inq in c h e s t

a cid reflux

bum inq skin

a lle rq ic se n sitiz a tio n
can cer

c h e s t tig h tn e ss

a sth m a

c o u g h with blood

blurred vision

co n ju n ctiv itis

c o u g h with m u c u s

conjunctivitis

con striction o f th e w in d p ip e

d e c r e a s e d sm e ll

brain en cep h a lo p a th y
ca n ce rfs)

com eal bum s
couqhinq

s e v e r e skin b u m s

d e la y e d blink reflex

d iarrhea

d iz z in e s s

e v e irritation

d iz z in e s s

dry co u g h

c h e m ic a l antibodies
c h lo râ cn e
ch ron ic fatigu e

in flam m ation o f th e skin e y e pain
lunq c o lla p s e
e y e red n ess

dry m outh

d e c r e a s e d m otor
skiHs

p erm an en t skin irritation jq e n e tic m u ta tio n s

e y e irritation

Expected
sy m p to m s

E xpected S ym ptom s
(m

so s)

c h e s t pain
chokinq

- '

e x tr e m e fa tig u e

d e p r e ssio n
diarrhea

pulm onary injury

harm ful n e r v o u s s y s t e m e f f e c t s

fin g er writing

w h e ez in q

h ead ach e

h ead ach e

dry e y e syn d rom e
dry skin

r e d n e s s and tearinq

h eart m u s c le d a m a q e
s l e e p d istu r b a n ce s

in d igestion
in som n ia

e y e d is e a s e
fibrom yalgia

respiratory d istr e ss
runny n o s e

irritate m u c o u s m e m b r a n e s

irritability

q astro-intestin al pain

irritate respiratory tract

liq h th e a d e d n e ss

heart palpitations

so r e throat
s p a sm o d ic blinkinq

k id n ey d a m a q e
leq & arm w e a k n e s s

lon g term m em o ry
lo s s
lo s s o f a p p etite

light sen sitiv ity

tearinq

liv er d a m a g e

lo s s o f b a la n c e

lo s s o f con centration

teeth corrosion

m e n ta l d istu r b a n c e s

lo s s o f con cen tration

lo s s o f to u ch
se n sa tio n

In a u se a
perm an en t c o m e a l d a m a q e

lo s s o f libido

lupus

m o o d sw in g s

m en ta l d istu rb an ces

p e r m a n e n t ep ith e lia l d a m a g e

n a u se a
p alpitations

m ig ra in es
m ultiple ch em ica l
sen sitiv ity

skin r a s h e s
s h o r tn e s s o f breath

m u sc le pain
'p eelin g skin

skin b listers

upper air obstruction

p erso n a lity c h a n g e s
!pulm onary e d e m a
!r e d u ce d co n ce n tr a tio n
I
r e d u ce d m em o ry
i
t
1s e v e r e e y e b u m s

joint pain

j
iskin itchinq

;re a ctiv e airway
id is e a s e
:short term m em ory
w ord u s a q e p ro b lem s llo s s
tee th corrosion

( s e v e r e e v e irritation

verbal recall
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APPENDIX D

Potassium Cresylate Testing
Energy Labs Semi-Volatile Organic Compovnds Testing o f sample from inside the
Potassivm Cresylate tanker car. 1996
Compound
Parts per million
(ppm)
23600
4-MethyIphenol/3-MethylphenoI
20400
2-MethyIphenoI
Phenol
12900
8180
2,4-DimethylphenoI
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol
183
Olympia Environmental Semi-Volatile Organic Compovnds Testing o f soil around
Potassium Cresylate tanker car, 1996 (area where Chlorine and Potassium
Cresylate reacted)
Compound
Parts per million
(ppm)
7320
2-Methylphenol
7190
4-Methylphenol/3-MethylphenoI
6010
Phenol
1140
2,4-Dimethylphenol
930
4-Chloro-3-methylphenol
599
2,4,6-Trichl orophenol
510
4-Chlorophenol
378
2-Chlorophenol
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APPENDIX E

April 11- Nine Mile and Six Mile re-entry
April 12- Envirocon conducts first environmental sampling at site (pH and chloride only)
April 13- Residents allowed in to feed pets and livestock and retrieve belongings
April 13- Reports o f symptoms deviating from chlorine effects begin and continue throughout
April 13- Olympus Environmental begins testing; tests potassium cresylate area for pH only
April 14- Ponderosa and Southside Road re-entry
April 14- EPA gains access to site; first samples o f potassium cresylate stained soil taken
April 14- EPA states “It is very safe to re-enter the area with respect to residual chemicals. We think your
home is safe. There is technical activity in the Hot Zone. The EPA is continually monitoring the activity. We
have reviewed the evacuation plan. Things are in order."
Missoula City/County Health Department states: “We have been testing since the first release. Everything is
okay. If you find anything questionable, please call.”
April 15-April 28 Pet rescues and livestock feeding continue
April 16- Olympus tests soil samples for cresylate and chlorine mixing
April 17- Olympus collects pure cresylate sample for Garon Smith
April 19- Smith’s results show chemical reaction between chlorine and cresylate created at least 35 organic
compounds, mainly phenolics; discloses results to public
April 19- Smith states “There is some possibility that the chemicals floated away from the derailment on
water particles-either particles created by the release o f chlorine or in the light rain that was falling at the
time.”Garon Smith suggest dioxin testing inside o f cresylate car.
April 20- Envirocon tests cresylate on site; 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol 183ppm
April 21- Missoula City/County Health Department notes state: “ 13 ppm trichlorophenol in air near tracks.”
In their final report Olympus states: “N o organic vapors were detected...on derailment site or beyond."
April 20-21- Soil samples taken on site to determine migration o f chemical reactants
April 22- “The other issue [cresylate reactions] is no threat." Scott Waldron, Incident Commander
April 22- Excavation o f contaminated soil begins
April 26- Soil ar.d wipe samples taken offsite to deterniine migration o f chemical reactants
April 28- Incident declared over; evacuation ended based on re-entry criteria including “Bulk o f potassium
cresylate contaminated soil removed from site prior to re-entry.”
May 18- 1610 cubic yards of potassium cresylate contaminated soil removed from previously evacuated area
2 35
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